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Abstract
This thesis discusses epistemological and ethical issues in classification and diagnosis
of psychiatric conditions, and briefly discusses realism about psychiatric conditions. I use
autism spectrum disorders (ASDs) as a case study to examine whether the explanatory
and predictive power of classification and diagnosis could be improved if psychiatry adopts
a cause-based framework in place of a symptom-based framework. However, there is sig-
nificant debate regarding the sort of explanatory pattern that will adequately represent
the complex causation involved in psychiatric conditions. I develop a preliminary list of
criteria for adequate explanatory patterns in psychiatry, and use these criteria to analyze
explanations of ASDs. I show that explanatory patterns unable to meet these criteria limit
the validity and reliability of diagnosis. However, I argue that an integrated pattern that
includes biological, cognitive and social levels of explanation may meet the criteria. Thus,
diagnosis of ASDs could improve if psychiatry adopted a cause-based framework informed
by an intergrated explanation pattern. More accurate diagnosis of ASDs may allow ear-
lier access to Intensive Behaviourial Intervention/Applied Behavioural Analysis treatment
programs, which may increase the effectiveness of this treatment and reduce the amount of
resources individuals with ASDs require from governments over their lifespans. Explaining
these conditions using an intergrated pattern of explanation can further challenge myths
regarding the causes of ASDs, and may provide support for Canadian lawsuits petitioning
for expanded public funding of IBI/ABA programs.
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Chapter 1
Philosophical Issues in Psychiatric
Diagnosis and Classification
1.1 Introduction
The way mental disorders are explained has a significant influence over the way these con-
ditions are classified, diagnosed and treated. Examining the relationship between patterns
of explanation for psychiatric disorders and how these conditions are diagnosed and treated
identifies several philosophical issues in psychiatric practice. First, there is significant dis-
agreement over the nature of causal explanations in psychiatry, how best to generate such
explanations, and how these explanations should influence the classification and diagnosis
of psychiatric disorders. Second, examining the relationship between patterns of explana-
tion for psychiatric conditions, how these conditions are currently classified, and how they
are diagnosed reveals some of the difficulties in developing and justifying realist claims
about mental disorders. Third, the way in which psychiatric conditions are explained
greatly influences how they are treated, how resources are allocated for such treatment,
and how these conditions are understood by society at large. In this thesis, I focus primar-
ily on questions regarding the epistemological and ethical issues in psychiatric diagnosis,
although I touch on the metaphysical issues as well.
One of the central debates in the philosophy of psychiatry is whether the classification
and diagnosis of psychiatric disorders should be based on causal theories, rather than on
descriptions of cognitive and behavioural symptoms co-occurring over time. Currently,
psychiatric disorders are classified based on differences in characteristic symptoms, and
diagnosis of a particular disorder is based on the presence or absence of these characteristic
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symptoms. However, many clinicians and theorists argue that diagnosis and classification
of psychiatric disorders could have more explanatory and predictive power if based on
causal theories from disciplines such as cognitive neuroscience, genetics and epigenetics.
In this thesis, I use autism spectrum disorder as an extended case study to help exam-
ine whether the problems in the diagnosis and classification of psychiatric disorders could
be improved if psychiatry were to adopt a cause-based diagnostic and classification frame-
work. I argue that basing the classification and diagnosis of autism spectrum disorder on
causal theories may improve the explanatory and predictive power of the diagnosis of this
condition. However, there are many different explanatory patterns that can be used to
explain the causes of psychiatric conditions such as autism spectrum disorder. In chapters
three, four, five and six, I examine different explanatory patterns from past and present
conceptual frameworks in psychiatry and clinical psychology. I show that some explanatory
patterns, such as those based on psychoanalytic or behaviourist conceptual frameworks,
limit the explanatory and predictive power of diagnostic categories for conditions such as
autism spectrum disorder, which reduces the effectiveness of treatment. Further, while
some patterns, such as those based on cognitive, cognitive neurological, genetic and epi-
genetic causal theories, may be more powerful, I argue that none of these patterns will
be robust enough to inform a cause-based diagnostic and classification system on their
own. Theorists such as Kendler (2008) and Murphy (2006) state that psychiatric condi-
tions, including ASD, will likely be explained using a multi-level approach incorporating
all the fields discussed in this thesis if psychiatry does adopt a cause-based framework.
I also argue that the diagnosis and treatment of ASD could be improved if informed by
multi-level explanatory patterns identifying causes and how these causes interact to pro-
duce the characteristic impairments and symptoms. We can combine the more powerful
explanation schemas discussed in this thesis into an integrated, multi-level mechanistic ex-
planation of the causes and symptoms of autism spectrum disorder. When combined in an
explanation pattern incorporating the biological, cognitive and social levels of explanation,
the more powerful explanation schemas, i.e., cognitive, cognitive neurological, genetic and
epigenetic, may help to better identify cases of ASD in the clinical population.
To begin, I discuss the arguments made by critics of the current system such as Poland
et al, (1994) and Murphy (2006) who state that the diagnostic and classification frame-
work contained in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual is plagued by incoherence, poor
explanatory and predictive power, and false assumptions regarding the nature of psychiatric
disorders. To support these arguments, I identify problems with the diagnosis and treat-
ment of autism spectrum disorder to illustrate the shortcomings in the current symptom-
based diagnostic and classification framework. Like many of the theorists discussed in this
thesis, I argue that the current problems with the diagnosis and classification of mental
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disorders could be addressed if diagnostic categories were based on causal theories.
However, there are considerable disagreements among these theorists regarding the
scope and levels that explanations of psychiatric conditions should include, and how to
develop adequate explanations of these conditions based on causal theories. For instance,
Kandel (1998, 1999) argues that psychiatric disorders can be explained in terms of molec-
ular biology, and that we can reduce higher level explanations of these conditions to the
levels of neurotransmitters and genes. In contrast, theorists such as Murphy (2006) argue
that the conceptual and methodological problems in diagnosis and classification could be
improved if diagnostic categories were based on causal theories from cognitive neuroscience.
Further, Murphy (2006), Kendler (2008) and Mitchell (2008) highlight the limits of nomo-
logical explanations in psychiatry, and discuss the possibility of generating mechanistic
explanations of these conditions. Based on an analysis of the various obstacles to generat-
ing causal explanations of psychiatric disorders, and the various arguments put forward by
theorists such as those just discussed, I generate a set of criteria that adequate explana-
tion patterns for psychiatric conditions should include. These criteria are not meant to be
exhaustive or definitive, but rather a preliminary tool for evaluating the ability of different
explanatory patterns to adequately represent the complexity of causation and progression
of conditions such as autism spectrum disorder.
Chapters three, four and five explore past and current conceptual frameworks in psy-
chiatry, and how different explanatory patterns for ASD have been developed within those
frameworks. Through an analysis of these past and current patterns of explanations for
these conditions, I argue that a diagnosis of ASD in an instantiation of the overall con-
ceptual framework and general explanatory pattern for mental disorders that psychiatry
adopts in a given time period. For this analysis, I use Thagard (1999)’s version of explana-
tion schemas. Explanation schemas highlight the causal factors each explanation identifies
in the development of psychiatric disorders like ASD. I argue that each of these explana-
tion patterns do not meet all the criteria for adequate explanation patterns for psychiatric
conditions developed in this thesis, and thus may be unable inform more reliable and valid
diagnostic categories. However, I argue that an integrated explanation pattern for the
autism spectrum may be the most powerful, and may improve diagnosis and treatment.
Chapter six develops a sketch of an integrated explanation schema for ASD, incorporating
the most powerful schemas discussed throughout the thesis, and there I argue that such a
schema could be an adequate pattern of explanation for psychiatric conditions. Finally, I
argue in chapter seven that cause-based diagnosis may help to further reduce the stigma
associated with ASD and other psychiatric disorders and address the ethical issues involved
in the allocation of resources to treat those with autism spectrum disorder.
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1.2 Philosophical Implications of Psychiatric Classifi-
cation and Diagnosis in the Wake of DSM-V
Since the beginnings of psychiatric practice, there has been significant disagreement regard-
ing how to best explain psychiatric disorders. With the exception of only a few conditions,
such as Downs Syndrome, disorders currently listed in the DSM do not develop based on a
fixed set of physiological or environmental causes. The complexity of psychiatric disorders
present significant difficulties in adequately explaining the causes and progression of these
conditions, thus making discrete, non-overlapping diagnostic categories difficult to gener-
ate. Further, poor explanations of psychiatric disorders make it difficult to non-arbitrarily
classify and differentiate between these conditions, which in turn affects the accuracy and
predictive power of diagnosis (Murphy, 2006; Poland et al, 1994). While psychiatry and
clinical psychology have had a standardized diagnostic and classification system since 1952,
there is an ongoing struggle to develop diagnostic categories that accurately represent and
identify the nature of psychiatric disorders.
The current diagnostic and classification system used in psychiatry is contained in the
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual, which contains over 300 conditions. There has been
much debate and discussion surrounding the compilation and publication of the fifth edition
of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual, just released in May 2013. The creation of a new
edition of the DSM has sparked intense debate between clinicians and theorists regarding
how psychiatric conditions should be classified and diagnosed. Several theorists and clini-
cians have discussed the shortcomings in current psychiatric diagnosis, and have debated
the benefits of changing the way psychiatric conditions, including ASD, are diagnosed and
classified in the newest edition of the DSM, as well as future versions (Sirgiovanni, 2009).
Since the publication of third edition of the DSM, clinicians have relied on character-
istic patterns of cognitive and behavioural symptoms to classify psychiatric disorders, and
use criteria based on these characteristic symptoms to diagnose these conditions. How-
ever, diagnosing psychiatric disorders based on their symptoms alone generates significant
conceptual and methodological problems, which I discuss in more detail in the next chap-
ter. These problems have motivated many philosophers and clinicians to re-evaluate how
psychiatric disorders are defined, classified, and diagnosed.
In the language of clinical psychiatry and psychology, diagnostic categories need to have
reliability and validity in order to accurately identify psychiatric disorders in the clinical
population. Reliability in this case refers to the consistency with which a diagnosis is
given, and thus reliable criteria accurately identify a particular disorder across individuals,
over time in the same individual, and across different clinical assessments. On the other
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hand, valid diagnostic criteria identify individuals with a particular disorder, based on
accurate accounts of the fundamental or distinguishing features of that disorder, such as
progression, onset, and prognosis (Jablensky & Kendel, 2002; Kendel, 2002). If diagnostic
criteria have poor validity, they may be weakly related or potentially unrelated to the
underlying malfunctions that are causing the outward symptoms, thus misidentifying the
characteristics of a particular disorder. If the characteristic features of a particular disorder
are not well understood, it can be difficult to generate criteria that consistently identify
that condition, thus resulting in low reliability.
Symptom-based diagnostic criteria are prone to both validity and reliability problems.
Identifying psychiatric disorders based on their symptoms often does not reflect their causal
structure and processes, and does not accurately differentiate between disorders. Given
the emerging and rapidly expanding research from neuroscience, genetics and epigenetics,
clinicians such as Kupfer, First & Regier (2002) and philosophers such as Murphy (2006)
argue that it is important for diagnostic categories to cohere with empirical data from these
disciplines in order to improve the reliability and validity of diagnostic categories in psy-
chiatry. Many of these theorists have argued that basing diagnosis on cause-based, rather
than symptom-based, criteria will eventually lead to a diagnostic and classification system
that is more accurate and more predictive of the onset, progression, and symptomatology
of psychiatric conditions. Thus, it is important to address whether a cause-based diagnos-
tic and classification framework is tenable for psychiatric conditions, given that emerging
data from neuroscience, genetics and epigenetics may motivate significant changes in the
way these disorders are classified and diagnosed.
The debate regarding the tenability of a cause-based diagnostic framework compared to
the current framework provides an opportunity to investigate central metaphysical, epis-
temological and ethical problems in psychiatric diagnosis. One of the most important
metaphysical issues is the way in which emerging data from neuroscience, genetics and
epigenetics should impact and inform the concept of what a psychiatric disorder is. For
instance, if psychiatric conditions are biologically-based disorders, where breakdowns in
biological mechanisms result in cognitive and behavioural symptoms, there is little justi-
fication for the view that psychiatric disorders are purely socially constructed. Further,
there is little justification for the current legal, social and professional distinctions between
disorders of the ’mind’ and disorders of the body that have existed since psychiatry’s
beginnings.
Epistemic issues include further elucidating the relationship between patterns of expla-
nations, diagnosis and treatment for psychiatric disorders, such as the autism spectrum.
One of the main issues I investigate in this thesis is the way in which past and present
explanatory patterns for ASD increase or limit the validity and reliability of diagnostic
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categories and the effectiveness of treatment. I show that weak or inadequate explanatory
patterns for psychiatric disorders, such as the autism spectrum, limit the reliability and
validity of diagnostic categories, and limit the success of treatment approaches. Through
an examination of the way in which different patterns of explanation for ASDs influence the
explanatory and predictive power of diagnosis and the effectiveness of treatment, I evaluate
what sort of explanatory patterns are the most tenable, given the complex, interactive and
multi-directional causation in the development and progression of psychiatric conditions
such as the autism spectrum. I argue that the diagnosis and treatment of ASD may in-
deed be improved if psychiatry were to adopt a cause-based diagnostic and classification
framework informed by multi-level, interactive mechanistic explanations that incorporate
the biological, cognitive and social levels of description.
In addition to the metaphysical and epistemic issues involved in evaluating the ten-
ability of a cause-based diagnostic framework, there are several ethical issues that arise as
well. Based on the investigation into what explanatory pattern may be the most powerful
for psychiatric conditions like ASD, and my argument that causal theories can improve the
diagnosis and treatments of these conditions, I make two ethical claims. First, the legal and
social distinctions that continue to exist between so-called ’mental’ and physical disorders
are unjustified if psychiatric disorders such as ASD are best explained using an integrated
explanation pattern. Psychiatric disorders should not be considered different in kind than
disorders treated by physicians in other branches of medicine, since ’mental’ disorders and
many ’physical’ disorders have the same causal structure if psychiatric disorders are the
result of complex interactions between biological, cognitive and social causes. For instance,
conditions such as type-II diabetes, obesity and lung cancer from smoking are the result
of complex interactions between biological causes (such as genetic predispositions), cogni-
tive causes (such as choosing to continue to smoke or consume high amounts of fatty and
high-sugar foods), and social causes (such as living in an area or subculture where tobacco
smoking and a high fat diet are common). Further, the treatment of psychiatric disorders is
just as important as the treatment of these ’physical’ disorders, since psychiatric disorders
can be just as financially, emotionally, and physically devastating if left untreated. Sec-
ond, I argue that a cause-based diagnostic and classification framework will further reduce
the social stigma associated with the diagnosis of a psychiatric disorder. If psychiatric
conditions such as ASD are best explained using an integrated explanation pattern, they
should not be considered character flaws or socially deviant attitudes. Rather, psychiatric
conditions are real disorders that are the result of complex interactions between biological,
cognitive and social causes, just like medical conditions such as type-II diabetes, obesity
and lung cancer caused by smoking tobacco.
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1.3 Autism Spectrum Disorder: A Case Study
We can begin to address these questions by looking at particular disorders as a case study.
I begin with a brief overview of the clinical history of the disorders now known as Autism
Spectrum Disorder (ASD). There has been much speculation and commentary regarding
possible changes to psychiatric diagnosis and classification for future editions of the DSM,
and one of the areas of controversy are the disorders previously recognized as subtypes on
the autism spectrum.
The previous edition of the DSM, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual, Fourth Edition,
Text Revision (DSM-IV-TR) defined autism spectrum disorder as a set of related condi-
tions under the category of pervasive developmental disorders. In the fourth edition of the
DSM, Autism spectrum disorders is an umbrella term for any disorder that shares three
characteristic socio-cognitive symptoms: 1) impairments in communication and interac-
tion, 2) lack of symbolic play, and 3) stereotyped and rigid behaviours. The disorders
that fall under this category are: Autistic disorder, Rett’s disorder, Childhood Disintegra-
tive Disorder, Asperger’s syndrome and Pervasive Developmental Disorder Not Otherwise
Specified. DSM-IV-TR recognizes these disorders as related, but the variants of ASD be-
sides autistic disorder, such as Asperger’s syndrome, were not diagnostic entities until the
release of DSM-IV. There are many issues regarding the diagnosis, classification, and pos-
sible explanations for the disorders on the autism spectrum, which I argue are partially
the result of larger conceptual and methodological problems with the current classification
and diagnostic system in psychiatry.
Some of the motivation for refining the diagnostic criteria for ASD include the fact that
it is difficult to clearly differentiate between subtypes on the autism spectrum based on
symptoms alone, and it is not clear why or how each subtype is distinct from the others
(Volkar, State & Klin 2009). For instance, there has been some controversy regarding the
placement of Rett’s disorder and childhood disintegrative disorder on the autistic spectrum.
However, Volkmar, State & Klin (2009) note that genetic and neurological studies of the
disorders on the autism spectrum have helped to further define and differentiate between
the subtypes of these conditions, and may motivate changes to future classifications of
autism spectrum disorder.
There have been investigations into the genetic origins of Rett’s disorder, which may be
a different pathogenesis than other subtypes of autism, such as the previously-recognized
autistic disorder, Asperger’s syndrome, and pervasive developmental disorder, not other-
wise specified (PDD-NOS). Amir, et al. (1999) found that a mutation in the MECP2 gene
was present in 80% of girls with Rett’s disorder. In DSM-IV-TR, Rett’s disorder was iden-
tified as a subtype of autism spectrum disorder, but unlike the other previously-recognized
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subtypes on the spectrum, it only affects female children, and its onset is preceded by
a period of normal development. Further, unlike other disorders that were identified in
DSM-IV-TR as the autism spectrum, which have much more complex genetic features that
are still not well understood, Rett’s disorder is thought to be the result of this single muta-
tion (also see Van Acker, Loncola, & Van Acker, 2005; Schanen, 2006; Thagard & Findlay
2010). Thus, Rett’s disorder may have different developmental and biological characteris-
tics from the other conditions previously identified as part of the autism spectrum. If so,
such differences in causation, progression, onset, and gender prevalence distinguish Rett’s
disorder from other conditions, and may justify the re-classification of this condition.
Also, there is evidence that childhood disintegrative disorder (CDD) has a different
etiology and follows a different developmental course than the other disorders previously
identified in the autism spectrum. Volkmar et al. (2009) state that this condition is
relatively rare (compared to the others on the spectrum), and is marked by a specific
developmental pattern that differs from autistic disorder, Asperger’s disorder, and PDD-
NOS. Children with CDD have a period of normal development, followed be a severe
regression of socio-cognitive and cognitive development. Volkmar et al. (2009) state the
prognosis for children diagnosed with CDD is worse than children diagnosed with other
previously-recognized subtypes of ASD, since most of these children are unable to acquire
these lost socio-cognitive and cognitive skills, and make little or no progress in developing
new skills after the period of regression. For these reasons, Volkmar et al (2009) state
that ”[a]s a diagnostic entity CDD is of interest for several reasons...In the first place the
disorder is so distinctive that it would seem ripe for delineation of specific genetic or other
mechanisms (p. 111).” If biological underpinnings of CDD are further elucidated, there may
be more compelling evidence that CDD differs from the other autism subtypes in terms of
causation, onset, progression and prognosis. Similar to the case of Rett’s disorder, further
genetic and neurological research may provide more justification for considering CDD a
distinct disorder from ASDs, even though individuals with this condition exhibit autistic
symptoms.
Finally, another of the proposed changes to diagnostic categories and classification for
DSM-V was the removal of Asperger’s syndrome. Baron-Cohen (2000) suggests that As-
perger’s disorder represents a difference in cognitive style, rather than cognitive deficiencies
or disabilities. He (2009) argues that Asperger’s syndrome should not be included in the
autism spectrum, where the other disorders are characterized by much more severe socio-
cognitive and intellectual difficulties. Rather, he states that this ’difference’ in cognitive
style may make individuals with Asperger’s more suited to occupations that require con-
siderable knowledge in narrow domains of information and attention to technical details
(such as engineering). Baron-Cohen (2000) notes that the only ’deficit’ that marks this
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’disorder’ is the lack of interest and/or ability to interact with others (individuals with
Asperger’s, by definition, have IQs in the typical range and do not exhibit language delays;
see Baron-Cohen 2000 for a more detailed discussion). However, he argues that individuals
with Asperger’s should not be considered ’disabled’ because of a lack of social interaction,
since these individuals are often able to function in society, and can even attain high-level
employment in fields such as engineering or the hard sciences. While there are neuro-
logical and cognitive differences between individuals with Asperger’s and individuals with
typical development, Baron-Cohen (2000) suggests these differences may not be severe or
’different’ enough to warrant calling Asperger’s syndrome a disorder.
DSM-V introduces several changes to diagnostic categories, including the conditions
previously identified as the autism spectrum. The separate subtypes of autism spectrum
disorder have been melded into a single diagnostic category: Autism Spectrum Disorder.
The previously separate categories of disorders are now considered to be a single condition,
with various levels of disfunction and severity of symptoms in communication and social in-
teraction, and various levels of restricted and repetitive behaviours and interests (DSM-V).
Thus, the new category Autism Spectrum Disorder encompasses the previous diagnostic
categories of autistic disorder, childhood disintegrative disorder, pervasive developmental
disorder not-otherwise-specified, and Asperger’s disorder. Finally, the diagnostic category
Social Communication Disorder was introduced, and was intended to help distinguish be-
tween children with difficulties in language and children with ASD.
While these changes will spark new debate regarding diagnostic accuracy and treatment
efficacy, this thesis discusses the debates and proposed changes leading up to the release of
DSM-V, and discusses the effectiveness of a symptom-based diagnostic and classification
system, rather than address specific changes to the symptom-based diagnostic categories.
The arguments presented here deal primarily with patterns of explanation for conditions
such as Autism Spectrum Disorder, rather than the accuracy or efficacy of particular
diagnostic categories. Thus, the arguments contained in this thesis apply to both the
current edition of the DSM as well as the previous editions, since DSM-V still uses the
same type of diagnostic approach: categories of disorder based on similarity and severity
of symptoms, rather than categories based on etiology.
1.3.1 Clinical and Classification History of Autism Spectrum
Disorder
The developmental conditions now known as autism spectrum disorder were first introduced
into the clinical literature in the 1940s. However, the term ’autism spectrum disorder’ is a
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fairly modern one, first used in the fourth edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual.
Leo Kanner and Hans Asperger published papers describing as-yet unknown psychiatric
disturbances in children in 1943 and 1944 respectively (Frith, 1991). Kanner published the
results of a study of 11 children in his clinical practice, while Asperger published his findings
in his doctoral thesis ”’Autistic Psychopathology’ in Childhood.” Both papers contain
descriptions of the disorders now known as autistic disorder and Asperger’s syndrome,
included symptomatology and a description of subjects’ developmental and familial history.
In Kanner’s (1943) paper, titled ”Autistic Disturbances of Affective Contact” he identified
the children’s inability to interact with others in their social environment as the hallmark
of this disorder. Kanner described this defining pathological feature as an
inability to relate to themselves in the ordinary way to people and situations
from the beginning of life. Their parents referred to them as having always
been ’self-sufficient’ [or] ’acting as if people weren’t there’ There is from the
start the sort of extreme autistic aloneness that, whenever possible, disregards,
ignores, shuts out anything that comes to the child from the outside. (Kanner,
1943, p. 41; in Donnellan, 1985.)
He noted that these children experienced language delays, and often displayed echolalia,
where they would repeat phrases and questions posed to them (Kanner, 1943). Also, the
children in his study had difficulty with personal pronouns, often being unable to apply
”I” and ”you” appropriately. Kanner (1943) discussed in detail his patients’ developmental
history, symptomatology, family history, and level of cognitive and intellectual functioning.
In his commentary on the 1943 paper, Bishop (1989) states that Kanner
did not attempt to specify strictly defined diagnostic criteria, but presented
detailed case histories of eight boys and three girls, noting the following char-
acteristic features:
1. Inability to relate to people, including family, from the beginning of life.
2. Failure to develop speech or abnormal, largely non-communicative use of
language in those that did speak. Pronoun reversal in those that could
speak (eight cases), and echolalia, obsessive questioning and ritualistic use
of language in several.
3. Abnormal response to environmental objects and events, such as food,
loud noises and moving objects. Kanner viewed the child’s behaviour as
governed by an anxiously obsessive desires for the maintenance of same-
ness, which led to a limitation in the variety of spontaneous activity.
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4. Good cognitive potential with excellent rote memory and normal perfor-
mance on the non-verbal Sequin form board test.
5. Normal physical status. Several children were clumsy in gait but all had
good fine motor control (p. 109; See Kanner 1943 as well for an extended
discussion of these clinical features).
These features were observed in varying degrees across all eleven patients. However,
Kanner (1943) himself noted, as does Bishop (1989), that there was heterogeneity in symp-
toms and the severity of the language impairments. However, Kanner believed that all
eleven children were suffering from the same, as yet unreported, disorder, which he called
early infantile autism.
Kanner adopted the label ”autistic” to describe these children. He drew upon Eugene
Bleuler’s (1916) discussion of dementia praecox, a general category of psychosis eventu-
ally narrowed to refer to patients now diagnosed with schizophrenia (Frith, 1991; Nadesan,
2005). Bleuler used the term ”autistic” to describe his patients’ withdrawal from the world
around them into their delusions. Nadesan (2005) notes Kanner recognized that his use
of the term ”autistic” differed from Bleuler’s use, since it did not describe schizophrenic
symptoms in the case of his subjects. Further, Kanner (1943) stated that the behaviour he
was observing in the children was not the behaviour of a child suffering from schizophre-
nia. Schizophrenic patients have developed socio-cognitive capacities that deteriorate as
the condition progresses. Autistic children, Kanner (1943) noted, show arrested social
development and cognitive dysfunctions early in their lives, which he argued led to later
social withdrawal and isolation (Tidmarsh & Volkmar, 2003). While the term ’autistic’
described the behaviour of the children in his study, Kanner (1943) maintained that he
had identified a childhood disorder separate from schizophrenia.
Bishop (1989) states many clinicians found Kanner’s account of the eleven children
to be similar to cases of children with psychiatric disturbances they had been unable to
diagnose. However, the adoption of ’early infantile autism’ into the classification system
created as much confusion as it alleviated. For instance, many clinicians were unwilling
to accept that early infantile autism was a separate disorder from schizophrenia. Also,
Wing notes that Kanner himself stated clinicians would often use the diagnosis far too
widely, making an assessment of early infantile autism on only one or two of the features
listed above (Wing, 1976). On the other hand, some clinicians would refrain from making
a diagnosis of early infantile autism unless the child displayed total social withdrawal and
no awareness of other people, even though none of Kanner’s original subjects were this
severely impaired (Wing, 1976).
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At the same time Kanner was writing about early infantile autism, Hans Asperger wrote
his doctoral thesis called ”’Autistic Psychopathology’ in Childhood.” He based his thesis
on research with a group of boys under his care in the remedial education program at the
University Pediatric Clinic in Vienna. Like Kanner, Asperger also used the term ’autistic’
to characterize the behaviour and interaction patterns of the boys he studied. He too,
adopted Bleuler’s use of the term, which described the social withdrawal and isolation of
individuals with schizophrenia. While Kanner and Asperger had never met, their findings
regarding the psychopathological characteristics of the disorders they studied agree in many
respects. Frith (1991) notes that both researchers recognized the importance of the three
central symptoms of autism: difficulties with language, communication and interaction,
and stereotypic behaviours. Further, both argued that the disorders they identified were
to be distinguished from childhood schizophrenia.
The major difference between Kanner’s and Asperger’s subjects is that Asperger’s chil-
dren did not exhibit the same language difficulties and delays that Kanner’s patients did.
While Asperger’s boys displayed the same deficits with communication and interaction,
they were able to express themselves (with varying degrees of relevance and attention to
a particular situation) using sentences (Asperger, 1944, in Frith, 1991). Asperger also
discussed the problems with socialization and educational progress displayed by these chil-
dren. When their Intelligence Quotients and level of intellectual development were tested,
the children often went on tangents and communicated the knowledge they possessed in a
haphazard, convoluted way. Their answers confounded the test scores, making it difficult
to assess the severity of the intellectual and language problems. Asperger also commented
on the children’s difficulties in learning social norms and proper classroom behaviour. He
noted that the children under his care did not respond to the authority of their teachers,
often acted against the teachers’ instructions, and did not interact well with other students.
The similarity between the accounts of the disorders studied by Kanner and Asperger
has been documented by Wing (1991). The common discussions of the same and simi-
lar symptoms could indicate that these two researchers were encountering disorders with
similar underlying pathologies. Asperger (1979) himself wrote about the ”astonishing sim-
ilarities within these two groups which accounted for the same choice of name.” (p. 98,
in Firth, 1991). Asperger (1979) argued that Kanner’s autism is a much more severe
form of ’autistic psychopathy.’ On Wing’s account, these disorders share the same triad
of symptoms described earlier, but differ in the severity of these characteristic symptoms.
Frith (1991) also discusses the relationship between autistic disorder, as characterized by
Kanner, and Asperger’s disorder. She (1991) argues that these disorders should belong to
the same diagnostic group because they share similar symptoms.
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Rutter (1978) discusses the diagnostic inconsistencies that were common during the
years leading up to the DSM-III, noting that several terms were used interchangibly to refer
to the disorder Kanner identified, such as ’early infantile autism’, ’childhood schizophrenia’,
and ’childhood psychosis’. These terms were applied to children that had some or all of
the clinical features outlined by Kanner, and none was used consistently in the clinical
literature (Bishop, 1989). While the three characteristic symptoms of autism remained
key diagnostic criteria used by psychiatrists throughout revisions to the Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual, autism’s place in the classification taxonomy has changed over these
revisions. In the first edition of the DSM, Kanner’s ’early infantile autism’ did not have its
own diagnostic category, but was referred to as ”Schizophrenia, childhood type.” (DSM-
I). ’Early infantile autism’ remained a subcategory of schizophrenia in DSM-II (DSM-II),
and was not a diagnostic entity on its own until the publication of DSM-III (Tidmarsh
& Volkmar, 2003). In the third edition of the DSM, many changes were made to the
classification of autism and its diagnostic criteria. First, the term early infantile autism was
changed to autistic disorder, and was now identified as a distinct developmental disorder,
unrelated to childhood schizophrenia. In DSM-III, autistic disorder was included under
”Pervasive Developmental Disorders,” a new diagnostic category added to the third edition
(Tidmarsh & Volkmar 2003). Conditions listed under pervasive developmental disorders
were categorized as such because the social and cognitive dysfunctions affected all spheres
of a child’s life (Tidmarsh & Volkmar 2003).
While the disorder Kanner identified has been included in the DSM since the publication
of its first edition, Asperger’s syndrome was not well known in the English speaking world
and was not included in the DSM until the fourth revision in 1994. In 1990, the World
Health Organization published the ICD-10, where Asperger’s syndrome is included as a
sub-group of pervasive developmental disorders (Wing, 1991). Francis, First & Pincus
(1995) state that
the diagnosis of Asperger’s Disorder has been introduced into DSM-IV to iden-
tify a potentially interesting subgroup of patients who have the marked impair-
ments in social interaction and the restricted and repetitive and stereotyped
behaviours characteristic of Autistic Disorder but who do not have delays in
language development (p. 389).
In DSM-IV, Pervasive Developmental Disorders (PDD) is a category of psychiatric dis-
orders of childhood and adolescence, meaning that the onset of these conditions occur in
infancy or early childhood. Francis et al (1995) state that all disorders falling under the
category of PDD are characterized by the early onset of severe impairments in social inter-
action, communication, and the presence of inflexible or restricted behaviours. Although
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there are many characteristics included in the diagnostic criteria, Francis et al. (1995) state
that the three characteristic symptoms (social interaction, communication, and stereotyped
or restricted behaviours) must be observed in the child before 3 years of age in order to
make a diagnosis of autism. There is good evidence from the clinical literature that the dis-
orders falling under the autistic spectrum share the same symptomatology, and may indeed
be caused by the same underlying neurological impairment(s). Both Kanner (1943) and
Asperger (1944) noted the disorders they had identified shared similar symptoms, and may
be different manifestations of the same underlying psychopathology. Later theorists and
autism researchers such as Wing and Frith echo this view. Clinicians like Firth and Wing
have argued that the different types of autism, or different manifestations of autism seen in
the clinical literature, are actually sub-types of the same disorder, something that has been
adopted in the fourth edition of the DSM, and its text revision (DSM-IV; DSM-IV-TR).
1.3.2 Autism Spectrum Disorder and Cause-Based Diagnosis
There are several features of autism spectrum disorder that make them good case studies
for evaluating the tenability and implications of a cause-based diagnostic and classifica-
tion framework. The inclusion of autism in the DSM since the first edition provides an
opportunity to discuss the relationship between the way mental disorders are explained,
classified and diagnosed. While the issues discussed by Murphy (2006) and others apply
to other disorders in the DSM as well, ASD present some interesting insights into how to
causal explanations may improve the diagnosis and treatment of mental disorders.
First, throughout revisions to the DSM, the changes in the definition and classification
of ASD have been influenced by the way these disorders have been explained, and the
overall conceptual framework in which diagnosis and treatment occurs. Several explana-
tions of the origins of ASD and their symptoms have been suggested since Kanner’s and
Asperger’s original papers. Each of these explanations was generated using the conceptual
framework that dominated psychiatric practice at a given time, such as psychoanalysis
and behaviourism. However, despite major conceptual changes to both theory and prac-
tice in psychiatry, and drastically different explanations of the potential causes of ASD,
the account of the three characteristic socio-cognitive symptoms of these disorders has
remained largely unchanged since their introduction into the clinical literature by Kanner
(1943) and Asperger (1994). The fact that the symptomatology of ASD has not been
significantly altered across conceptual frameworks in psychiatry suggests these conditions
have relatively stable underlying physical impairments, which have influenced the various
explanations of these conditions since their inclusion in DSM-I. An evaluation of past and
present explanatatory patterns for these disorders shows that weak or inadequate patterns
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limit the validity and reliability of the diagnosis of ASD, and reduce the effectiveness of
treatment. However, more powerful explanatory patterns identifying the possible causes
of these disorders may improve the accuracy of diagnosis and the success of treatment
approaches.
Second, ASD are pervasive, which means they are chronic disorders that first mani-
fest in early development, but continue to affect the individual’s socio-cognitive function-
ing throughout the lifespan. Many autism researchers discussed in this thesis argue that
neurological impairments, possibly stemming from genetic abnormalities, cause cascading
delays and impairments in cognitive and social development. Thus, ASD have a signif-
icant biological component, which indicates that these disorders are physical conditions
and not merely social constructions. However, the expansive literature on ASD indicates
that the manifestations of ASD’s symptoms and their severity are influenced not only by
the individual’s level of biological and cognitive functioning, but also by conditions in the
environment. Further, changes at the social and cognitive levels can cause changes in the
neurological impairments characteristic of ASD, indicating that causation in these disorders
is complex, multi-directional and the product of an on-going interaction between individual
and environment. Thus, ASD present an opportunity to examine how understanding the
interactions between biological and environmental causes can potentially generate more
powerful patterns of explanation for the disorders on the autism spectrum to aid in the
diagnosis and treatment of these conditions. Examining the interactions between biologi-
cal, cognitive and social causes of disorders such as those on the autism spectrum indicate
explanation patterns that are mutli-level, interactionist and mechanistic are the best ways
to explain the onset and progression of mental disorders (also see Murphy, 2006, 2008;
Kendler & Parnas, 2008; Kendler, 2008; Sirgiovanni, 2009).
Third, despite the stability in the core symptoms and consistency in the diagnostic
criteria for ASD throughout revisions to the DSM, these disorders can be difficult to diag-
nose based on the current criteria, and are often misdiagnosed. Like many other disorders
listed in the DSM, there is significant overlap in the symptoms of ASD and other men-
tal disorders. The characteristic symptoms of ASD overlap with the symptoms listed for
other disorders of childhood and adolescence, and with the symptoms of disorders on the
schizophrenia spectrum (Tidmarsh & Volkmar, 2003). Further, ASD are highly co-morbid
with other disorders of childhood and adulthood, which means they often occur along with
other, sometimes unrelated disorders in many individuals. For instance, there is often a
high co-morbidity rate of mental retardation in children with ASD, particularly autistic
disorder. Also, Bishop & Norbury (2002) state that the language impairments seen in ASD
are very similar to those seen in pragmatic language impairment (PLI). Further, Norbury
& Bishop (2010) also document the similarities between language disorders and ASD, such
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as pragmatic language impairment (PLI) and specific language impairment (SLI). These
theorists discuss whether these language disorders should be thought of as atypical autism
spectrum disorder, or whether ASD and language disorders represent different, and unre-
lated, kinds of disorders. Thus, classifying and diagnosing the conditions on the autism
spectrum based on causal theories, rather than symptoms alone, may improve the accuracy
and the diagnosis of these conditions and the effectiveness of treatment.
Fourth, several ethical issues involved in the treatment of ASD and psychiatric disorders
in general are partially the result of the way these conditions are currently explained, classi-
fied, and diagnosed. The capacity for many individuals with ASD to integrate and function
in mainstream society depends on accurate diagnosis, and focused, intensive treatment from
an early age. Thus, a better understanding of the interactions between the biological, cog-
nitive and social impairments involved in these disorders may help determine whether or
not the treatment of these conditions should be considered medically necessary under the
Canada Health Act, which would allow better access to behavioural intervention treatment
programs and special education programs. Further, explaining the causes of ASD in terms
of interactions between biological, cognitive and social causes may help further reduce the
pervasiveness of false theories of the origins of these disorders, which often cause signif-
icant emotional, financial and social stress for individuals with ASD and their families.
For instance, a better understanding of the causes of ASD may help to finally disprove
the ’refrigerator mother’ hypothesis of these conditions that still influences lay concepts
of the disorder, and may also further disprove the vaccine hypothesis of the development
of these conditions, thereby helping to reduce anti-immunization behaviours. Thus, an
integrated explanatory pattern for psychiatric conditions may help debunk the myths and
misconceptions about ASD and other mental disorders that continue to permeate popular
culture.
1.4 Patterns of Explanation, Diagnosis and Treatment
of Psychiatric Conditions
Several theorists and clinicians have discussed the role of causal theories should play in
the next edition of the DSM, and how a better understanding of the causes of psychiatric
disorders may begin to address the conceptual and methodological problems in psychiatry.
Theorists such as Murphy (2006) and clinicians such as Kupfer et al. (2002) argue that
cause-based diagnostic categories will have improved reliability. First, cause-based criteria
for each category will be less likely to identify symptoms unrelated to the underlying
malfunctions that characterize a particular disorder. Second, such criteria are less likely
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to identify symptoms indicative of unrelated underlying malfunctions that characterize
different disorders. Further, they argue that cause-based diagnostic categories will improve
validity, since cause-based criteria will identify clusters of symptoms that are more likely
to be robust indicators of underlying malfunctions, which makes the diagnostic category
and criteria more predictive of variables like progression and prognosis. In a cause-based
diagnostic and classification framework, treatment will be more focused on addressing these
underlying malfunctions, rather than just ameliorating the symptoms they cause. However,
it is important to discuss the relationship between patterns of explanation, diagnosis and
treatment of disorders such as ASD, since the conditions currently identified as psychiatric
disorders pose significant challenges to both classification and diagnosis.
First, psychiatric disorders are complex phenomena that span multiple levels of explana-
tion, and are often the result of complex, multi-directional interactions between biological,
cognitive, and social features (Kendler, 2008; Mitchell, 2008a, 2008b). There is significant
heterogeneity and variability in the biological, cognitive and social features of individuals
who develop a particular disorder, and determining the boundaries and distinctions be-
tween categories of psychiatric disorders is difficult based on this large variability. Further,
the presentation of symptoms of psychiatric disorders and their severity can change based
on the patient’s environment, the interactions between the environment and neurologi-
cal and cognitive functioning, and the effectiveness of treatment. Thus, determining the
central, defining features of each disorder is difficult, since these features are the result
of dysfunctions in complex interactive systems that are affected by the surrounding en-
vironment (Mitchell, 2008a; Woodward, 2008). Research into the genetic and epigenetic
origins of psychiatric disorders indicate that these conditions develop through a complex,
multi-directional interaction of genetic and environmental factors over an individual’s life-
time (e.g. Nestler, 2009). Thus, what symptoms a particular patient presents during a
clinical evaluation depends on that patient’s early development, current environment, life
experiences, and current patterns of thought and affect, all of which are influenced by both
biology and the environment. Thus, theorists such as Kendler (2008) argue that complete
explanations of psychiatric disorders would have to include many levels of description, since
the social, cognitive and biological features of these conditions are not caused by a single
factor, such as a genetic mutation or brain lesion.
Second, there is a large amount of variation among the types of disorders historically
and currently listed as psychiatric disorders. For instance, some conditions, such as eating
disorders and post traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), seem to have primarily environmen-
tal causes. However, other disorders such as autism spectrum disorder and schizophrenia
seem to have primarily biological causes. The differences in both the symptoms and the-
orized causal structures in eating disorders, PTSD, ASD and schizophrenia illustrates the
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heterogeneousness of conditions defined as ’psychiatric,’ and highlight the difficulty in de-
veloping a concept and definition of these disorders that subsumes all conditions in the
DSM. Causal complexity, heterogeneity in the categories of psychiatric disorders, and the
lack of definitive causal theories for most of these disorders has made it difficult to determine
what conditions should be considered ’psychiatric’ and included in an empirically-informed,
standardized psychiatric nosology.
Despite these difficulties, it is possible to generate a preliminary list of criteria for ad-
equate explanation patterns for psychiatric conditions. I show that explanation patterns
unable to adequately capture and represent the causal complexity of ASD reduce the re-
liability and validity of the diagnostic category autism spectrum disorder, which in turn
limits the explanatory and predictive power of diagnosis and the effectiveness of treatment.
To capture the dynamic and multi-level nature of the causes of psychiatric disorders, an
explanation pattern must be able to identify causes on multiple levels, and explain how
environmental factors can influence the biological and cognitive aspects of these conditions,
not just how biology influences the cognitive and social features. While there are no ’psy-
chopathological’ laws determining the relationship between certain underlying impairments
and observable symptoms, the complex causal interactions that lead to the development
of conditions such as ASD in certain individuals can be represented as mechanisms.
Mechanistic explanations can link phenomena at different levels of description without
having to subsume these phenomena under laws. A mechanism is an explanatory tool in
the philosophy of science, where parts and the interactions between them cause a particular
phenomenon (see Bechtel & Abramson, 2005; Machamer, Darden, & Craver, 2000). Mech-
anisms can bridge several explanatory levels by tracking the interactions between the parts
of the mechanism if these parts are at different explanatory levels. Thus, a mechanistic
representation of the characteristic neurological, cognitive and social impairments of ASD
can capture the complex, multi-directional, and dynamic relations between the biological,
cognitive and social aspects of this disorder. In this way, mechanistic explanations of the
disorders on the autism spectrum may provide a better account of why certain neurolog-
ical, genetic and epigenetic changes are associated with the characteristic cognitive and
behavioural symptoms. While indirect or secondary causes may influence the nature of the
symptoms a patient is presenting, to be useful in diagnosis, an explanation needs to only
identify those causes that are necessary for a disorder to be present. If we can identify
such primary causes, we can generate a multi-level mechanisms of the causal relations that
result in a particular psychiatric condition.
Determining the best explanatory pattern for ASD can also provide insight into how
best to explain psychiatric disorders in general. I argue in chapter six that these crite-
ria indicate that mental disorders like ASD are best explained as conditions that arise
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based on complex interactions between biological, cognitive and social causes. On this
account, autism spectrum disorder is best explained as breakdowns in neurological mecha-
nisms caused by ongoing interactions between biological factors and the environment, which
result in cognitive and behavioural symptoms. Thus, an integrated explanation pattern may
capture the complex causation of mental disorders by elucidating the relationships between
environmental, cognitive and biological factors. If correct, an integrated explanatory pat-
tern may help to identify and classify psychiatric disorders based on similarities in causal
structure, rather than similarity of symptoms.
1.5 Realism About Psychiatric Disorders
This thesis concentrates mainly on issues of explanation and the nature of causation in
psychiatric disorders such as ASD, but how these issues are addressed impacts two long-
standing metaphysical debates. The first is the debate between realist and constructivist
views of psychiatric conditions. The second is the related issue of how the relationship
between ’mental’ and ’medical’ disorders should be understood. It is beyond the scope
of this thesis to discuss realism about mental disorders in detail. However, I attempt to
identify ways in which an integrated explanation pattern may help develop and support
realist views of mental disorders, such as Wakefield’s harmful dysfunction analysis (1992;
1997).
While a symptom-based diagnostic system ostensibly improves the reliablity of diag-
nostic categories, these categories often have weak validity, i.e. it is not clear that they
refer to an underlying pathology, or what the nature of such pathology might be. How-
ever, merely identifying a cluster of behaviours or cognitive processes as problematic or
harmful for the individual or others is not enough to identify that cluster of symptoms as a
disorder. Symptom-based criteria can do little to determine whether mental disorders are
real malfunctions in neurological and cognitive mechanisms, or whether they are simply
clusters of behaviours that are problematic from the perspective of social functioning, such
as criminal behaviour. As many theorists have argued (e.g. Wakefield, 1992; Murphy,
2006), problematic behaviours in a social context is not enough to determine whether a
condition should be considered a disorder. Consider the example of criminal behaviour.
Acts such as vandalism and violent crime are problematic social behaviours, but are not
considered pathological, because there is (usually) no neurological or physical dysfunction
causing these behaviours. Simply identifying clusters of behaviours as disorders can lead
to purely socially constructed or politically motivated categories of psychiatric disorders,
and raise serious questions as to whether these conditions are ’real’.
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However, merely identifying biological dysfunctions or impairments is also not enough
to warrant calling such impairments or dysfunctions disorders. For instance, Murphy
(2006) discusses the example of the gourmand lesion. If individuals have this brain lesion,
they experience more salient and complex tastes and smells than those without the lesion.
However, the changes in sensation and perception individuals with this lesion experience do
not cause harm to themselves or those around them. Thus, although the gourmand lesion
is a neurological dysfunction, what determines whether it should be considered a disorder
is the nature of the cognitive and behavioural changes caused by this lesion. Thus, an
account of the cognitive processes and behaviours that result from the gourmand lesion
determine whether the presence of it constitutes a disorder to be treated by psychiatrists.
For those who have the gourmand lesion, the cognitive and behavioural changes do not
harm the individual or others around them, and in fact having this lesion can enhance
sensations such as taste.
Thus, in order to determine what conditions are mental disorders, we need to determine
whether or not the neurological malfunctions result in cognition and behaviour that is
harmful to the individual or others, and we cannot make these judgments on neurological
or biological data alone. Thus, any viable realist account of psychiatric disorders will need
to identify not just the causes and symptoms of these conditions, but why such conditions
should be considered disorders in the first place. Realists about mental disorders like
Wakefield (1992, 1997) and Murphy (2006) argue for a two-fold picture of mental disorders,
where the mental disorders and their diagnosis have both descriptive and normative aspects.
These theorists argue that the descriptive aspect of diagnosis comes from facts about the
human body that lead to mental disorders, such as breakdowns in neurological mechanisms.
However, whether these physical dysfunctions should be treated is based on the extent to
which they cause harm in individuals’ lives, which is a normative determination.
While I do not formally develop or commit to a particular realist account of men-
tal disorders here, an influential version of this two-stage picture is Wakefield’s Harmful
Dysfunction analysis. On this account, mental disorders are conditions that ”[lie] on the
boundary between the given natural world and the constructed social world; a disorder
exists when the failure of a person’s internal mechanisms to perform their functions as de-
signed by nature impinges harmfully on the person’s well being as defined by social values
and meanings (p. 373)” (Wakefield, 1992). Thus, both the social and biological aspects of
a particular condition are vital to identifying that condition as a harmful dysfunction in
need of treatment.
If an integrated explanation pattern of ASD is the most powerful, these conditions are
real disorders that are best explained in terms of breakdowns in neurological mechanisms,
caused by ongoing interactions between biology and the enviroment that produce cognitive
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and behavioural symptoms, and can result in significant harm to the individuals who have
these conditions. Thus, an integrated explanation pattern for psychiatric conditions may
be able to fulfill both the descriptive and normative aspects of the concept mental disorder
in the Harmful Dysfunction analysis. An integrated explanation pattern may be able to
identify the breakdowns in biological and cognitive mechanisms that cause these conditions.
However, such an explanation pattern for psychiatric disorders will also include the social
and environmental aspects of these conditions, which have a significant influence on their
onset and progression. Thus, an integrated explanatory pattern potentially provides a
way to link biological impairments with cognitive and behavioural impairments that cause
difficulties with daily functioning, gainful employment, etc. that affect many individuals
with psychiatric disorders.
According to an integrated explanatory pattern of psychiatric conditions, the descrip-
tive aspects of mental disorders are the interactions between genetic and enviromental
factors that cause neurological impairments. The normative aspect of mental disorders,
on this account, are judgments about the extent to which these biological, cognitive and
social dysfunctions are harmful to the individual who has them, or to other people. These
symptoms are harmful to the individual in terms of the ability to function in everyday life,
and can be potentially harmful to society if the symptoms become violent or disruptive in
nature. If an integrated explanation pattern is indeed the most powerful accounts of psy-
chiatric disorders, we can argue that these conditions are real, biologically-based disorders
and not merely social constructions. While social and political factors can shape what sorts
of conditions are considered psychiatric disorders (consider the example of homosexuality,
only removed from the DSM in its third edition), legitimate psychiatric disorders are those
that have biological as well as cognitive and social features that pose significant harm to
the patient or those around them.
The second is the related issue of how the relationship between ’mental’ and ’medical’
disorders should be understood. Murphy (2006) argues that poor explanations of the
causes of psychiatric disorders make realist accounts of these conditions harder to develop
and justify. He states that if we do not know what causes these conditions, it becomes
more difficult to argue that the cluster of symptoms identified by clinicians should be
considered a ’real’ disorder, which type of disorder, or in fact a disorder at all. Further,
poor explanations of the causes of the conditions currently listed in the DSM make it more
difficult to determine why a particular condition should be considered a mental disorder,
rather than a medical disorder, and why certain conditions should be included or excluded
from either category.
Historically, conditions diagnosed and treated by psychiatrists were considered different
in kind than conditions treated in other branches of medicine. Many aspects of this tradi-
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tional distinction, such as proposed differences in causal structures of ”mental” and medical
disorders, have remained in the contemporary literature. For instance, even though most
contemporary theorists hold that psychiatric disorders are biologically-based phenomena,
many argue that they should be distinct from other medical disorders because of the larger
role cognitive aspects such as beliefs, agency, and intention play in defining psychiatric
conditions. For instance, Arpaly (2005) argues that psychiatric conditions, while real dis-
orders, are ”not just like diabetes” because of the nature of the mental and cognitive
aspects of these conditions.
Arpaly (2005) states
”I do not mean to argue that mental disorders are not like diabetes at all.
Many mental disorders have all kinds of things in common with many non-
mental diseases. Take bipolar disorder, for example. Drugs work for diabetes,
and drugs work for bipolar disorder. Neither diabetes nor bipolar disorder can
be wished away, trying to ’snap out’ of bipolar disorder is as futile as as trying
to ’snap out’ of diabetes. One should not be ashamed of having diabetes,
and similarly one should not be ashamed of having bipolar disorder. Both
diabetes and bipolar disorder can be anything from mere chronic inconvenience
to the cause of a tragic death, depending to a large extent on the patient’s own
commitment to treatment (p. 282)”.
However, she argues that there is a marked difference between ”mental disorders” and
medical disorders like diabetes. While Arpaly asserts that both ”mental disorders” and
”medical disorders” are physical entities, she argues that there some that things that dis-
tinguish mental states from other biochemical states. She states that ”[f]irst, mental states
can be warranted or unwarranted (represent reality or miss-represent it)...whereas other
non-mental biochemical states cannot be warranted or unwarranted in that way....Second,
mental events can cause each other in ways that non-mental events cannot (p. 283).”
However, I argue that such warranted/unwarranted and content-efficacious mental states
play a causal role in several medical disorders as well, and as such are not the deciding
criteria for whether a condition is ”mental” or ”medical.”
Arpaly (2005) describes the difference between warranted and unwarranted mental
states in terms of representations of reality. Arpaly (2005) argues that mental states can
either represent reality, and are thus warranted, or do not represent reality correctly, and
are thus unwarranted. However, we cannot call the insulin deficiency that characterizes
diabetes as warranted or unwarranted, since such non-mental biochemical states do not
represent or misrepresent reality in the way that mental states do. Non-mental bodily
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states can be desirable or undesirable, but cannot be warranted or unwarranted. Further,
she argues (2005) that while mental states can be warranted or unwarranted, they can also
be desirable or undesirable. She notes that the difference between claims from psychiatrists
that one has a mental disorder, and a lay person claiming that one has a mental disorder
is the difference between warrant and desirability. She states ”[o]ne big difference between
the way psychiatrists use the term ’mental disorder’ and the way laypersons use the term
’mental disorder’ is that psychiatrists think of mental disorders as ’maladaptive’ mental
states, or states that cause ’impairment’ or ’distress’: in other words, they think of mental
disorders primarily as undesirable mental states, the way that diabetes is an undesirable
non-mental condition. To the layperson, being told that one has a mental disorder is first
and foremost being told that one has unwarranted mental states (p. 284, emphasis in
original).” Arpaly continues by stating that ”[t]he main message a lay person gets from a
psychiatric diagnosis is often not - or not only - ’you have a problem’ but ’you are getting
something wrong’” (p. 285, emphasis in original).
The second difference between mental states and non-mental biochemical states Arpaly
(2005) identifies is that mental states can cause each other in a way that other non-mental
states cannot, a property sometimes called ”content efficacy.” Arpaly explains content
efficacy as follows. She argues that ”[m]ental states differ from other bodily states in that
they have content: they are about something. One does not, for example, just have beliefs,
one has beliefs about love, the location of one’s keychain, and as Lewis Carol would put
it, of cabbages and kings. Sometimes, though not always, mental states cause one another
in a way in which their content plays a central role (p. 285).”
Arpaly is correct that the cognitive or ”mental” aspects of psychiatric disorders often
carry much of the explanatory weight, especially given the lack of robust causal data for
many of the disorders listed in the DSM. These cognitive or mental aspects of psychiatric
conditions are important, and arguably we cannot adequately explain or delineate between
psychiatric disorders without an understanding of the cognitive impairments involved. For
instance, content efficacious, unwarranted, and undesirable mental states can and do play a
major causal role in the on-going complex causal interactions that result in the symptoms
of several psychiatric conditions, including disorders that also have a significant biological
component, such as depression and addiction (both disorders are discussed in more detail
in chapter six).
As many theorists discussed in this thesis argue, the cognitive level is an important
part of the causal structure of psychiatric conditions, and therefore integral to adequate
explanations of psychiatric conditions. The cognitive aspects of psychiatric conditions can
include maladaptive beliefs, attributions and judgments. As I argue in chapter six, the
cognitive level, which includes phenomena like maladaptive beliefs can be included in inte-
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grated explanation schema, along with the biological levels and social levels of explanation.
In such an integrated schema, the cognitive level can be a significant part of the overall ex-
planation of psychiatric conditions, and may be the primary explanatory level in conditions
such as phobias, obsessive-compulsive disorder, body dismorphia and eating disorders.
However, as argued throughout this thesis, adequate explanation patterns for psy-
chiatric conditions must also capture and elucidate the causal interactions between the
cognitive, biological, and social levels. While cognitive aspects can be primary causes,
”non-mental events” such as biochemical states of the brain and other organs can and
do influence cognitive process and behaviour, and can be just as causally efficacious as
beliefs and representations of the subject’s reality. For instance, in the case of ASD, the
impairment of the mirror neuron system, thought to be involved in the development of
the disorders, causes specific cognitive impairments such as an underdeveloped theory of
mind. Part of the theory of mind deficit seen in individuals with ASD involves the inabil-
ity to identify and ascribe mental states to others. Even in disorders that have a large
”cognitive” component such as major depression or addiction, the physiological level can
and does effect the cognitive and social aspects of these conditions.
Further, the ”mental” or ”cognitive” factors of the type Arpaly (2005) identifies also
seem to be present in many traditional medical disorders. For instance, content-efficacious,
unwarranted mental states could be implicated as major causes at the cognitive level for
conditions such as obesity, certain types of cancers, and type-II diabetes. Certain types of
lung, throat and mouth cancers are caused by smoking tobacco, and conditions like obesity
and type-II diabetes are caused by ”lifestyle choices” such as consuming a high fat/high
sugar diet, and not engaging in regular exercise. Despite the wealth of information available
to the public about the dangers of smoking and the importance of regular exercise and a
balanced diet, many individuals continue these unhealthy behaviours anyway, eventually
leading to serious medical conditions. Decisions to continue to smoke or eat an unhealthy
diet are cognitive states, or ”cognitive causes,” and often involve the false belief that one
will not develop lung cancer despite the medical evidence to the contrary, or the belief
that the pleasure of a nicotine rush or a high-sugar treat are worth the associated physical
risks. One could argue that none of these beliefs are warranted, nor are they even desirable,
since they can lead to unhealthy choices and actions. Further, when treating conditions
such as obesity or type-II diabetes, patients often have to change how they view the risks
versus benefits of continuing unhealthy habits, and attempt to effectively use information
about the harms of such behaviour in order to successfully carry out the treatment regime
(e.g. sticking to a healthy diet and engaging in regular exercise by reminding oneself of the
risks of not doing so, and the benefits of these new habits, etc.).Thus, it seems that there
are both content-efficacious, and unwarranted mental states involved in medical conditions
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such as type-II diabetes, obesity and lung cancer caused by smoking. Thus the presence or
absence of certain cognitive features on their own may not reliably distinguish psychiatric
conditions as a discrete subset of medical disorders. Further, even the presence of content-
efficacious, (un)warranted mental states does not seem to cleanly demarcate medical and
”mental” disorders.
If the preceding analysis is correct, then psychiatric disorders do indeed have the same
causal structure as disorders such as type-II diabetes, lung cancer from smoking and obe-
sity. Thus, if psychiatric conditions like ASD are best explained as the result of complex
interactions between biological, cognitive and social causes, they not different in kind
from medical disorders, and are as ’real’ as other medical disorders. Each of the medical
conditions just discussed is caused by breakdowns in biologically-based mechanisms, and
can be equally harmful and debilitating to the patients diagnosed with these conditions.
Although psychiatric conditions often have environmental causes, many have biological
causes as well, such as ASD, schizophrenia, and mental retardation. Likewise, conditions
such as heart disease, cancer, type-II diabetes and obesity have both environmental and
biological causes. Further, in all the conditions just named, the onset and progression of
the symptoms are caused by the bi-directional interactions between these causes at mul-
tiple levels, and may be best explained mechanistically, since the deductive-nomological
model of explanation is limited in the life sciences (see Bechtel 2007 for a more detailed
discussion).
If mental disorders are the result of complex interactions between causes at the biolog-
ical, cognitive and social levels of description, they should be diagnosed and explained in a
similar way to medical disorders. If an integrated explanation pattern is the most powerful
for explaining the causes and progression of ASDs, these conditions have the same causal
structure as medical disorders such as heart disease, cancer, type-II diabetes and obesity.
If correct, an integrated pattern of explanation for conditions like those on the autism
spectrum may provide more justification than ever before for beginning to collapse the
distinction between psychiatric disorders and other medical disorders. If we can further
reduce the differences in the way psychiatric and other medical disorders are explained,
future editions of the DSM may be able to incorporate the medical model to a greater
extent, which theorists like Murphy (2006) argue is vital to increasing the validity and
predictive power of diagnosis in psychiatry.
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1.6 Ethical Implications of Cause-Based Classification
and Diagnosis
The final chapter of this thesis briefly examines some of the ethical issues involved in a
shift to a cause-based diagnostic framework. First, a better understanding of the causes of
ASD may help to further reduce the false, but still popular, beliefs that these conditions
are caused by poor parenting or the measles, mumps, rubella (MMR) vaccine. Explain-
ing autism spectrum disorder using an integrated explanation pattern may help to further
discredit these false casual theories by providing a powerful alternate causal theory to re-
frigerator mothers and MMR vaccination. Further discrediting these false causal theories
in lay society may help reduce the emotional costs associated with feelings of responsibility
or guilt by parents, and the financial costs of anti-vaccination behaviours. Finally, if psychi-
atric conditions are best explained using an integrated pattern, this pattern of explanation
may help to further reduce the still pervasive view by lay society that mental and medical
disorders are distinct kinds of conditions. Many people still believe that individuals with
psychiatric conditions are blameworthy in some way, even though the physical causes of
these conditions are beginning to be discovered. However, if psychiatric conditions are
best explained as epigenetic disorders, they are biologically-based conditions that develop
based on complex interactions with the environment, not character flaws or the product of
weak wills and minds.
Second, more effective treatment, based on diagnostic categories and criteria that re-
flect underlying causes of psychiatric disorders like ASD can help to address several ethical
issues in mental health care. First, a better understanding of the causes of ASD can help
support legal claims for expanded funding for treatment of these conditions in provinces
such as Ontario and British Columbia. If these conditions are best explained as complex
conditions that are the result of complex interactions between biological, cognitive and
social causes, the early environment plays a significant role in the development and pro-
gression of the characteristic symptoms. Thus, early access to intervention programs can
help to structure the child’s early experiences using behavioural techniques and tools to
develop communication skills in order to mitigate and reduce the impact of environmental
causes on the severity and progression of the symptoms of ASD. Second, if diagnosis be-
comes more accurate with a cause-based framework, children with ASD may be diagnosed
earlier in their lives, thus saving costs incurred from multiple clinician and physician visits
to gain a definitive diagnosis. Further, more accurate diagnosis will save total overall costs
of care and treatment of indidivuals with ASD over the lifespan.
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1.7 Issues and Arguments in the Following Chapters
This chapter introduced the philosophical issues in diagnosis and classification of mental
disorders and how these relate to autism spectrum disorder. Chapter two provides more
detail about the problems with symptom-based diagnosis of mental disorders such as ASD.
In that chapter, I analyze the relationship between patterns of explanation, diagnosis and
treatment in clinical psychiatry, and discuss what sort of explanatory patterns may be
best for mental disorders. Finally, I develop a preliminary list of criteria for evaluating
and adjudicating between explanation patterns in psychiatry, and discuss how explanation
schemas can help to evaluate different accounts of autism spectrum disorder.
Chapter three discusses two early explanatory patterns for autism spectrum disorder
from the psychoanalytic and behaviourist eras, and argues that these patterns of expla-
nation do not meet the criteria for adequate explanation patterns for psychiatric condi-
tions developed in chapter two. In chapter four, I discuss explanatory patterns for ASD
developed in cognitive psychology and cognitive neuroscience. I argue that like the psy-
choanalytic and behaviourist explanation patterns, neither of these accounts are adequate
explanation patterns for the conditions on the autism spectrum. Chapter five discusses
genetic and epigenetic explanation patterns for ASD, and argues that while a genetic
explanatory pattern does not meet the criteria outlined in chapter two, an epigenetic ex-
planation pattern may be a potentially powerful one. However, in chapter six I show that
an integrated schema meets all the criteria for adequate explanations in psychiatry, and
thus may be the most powerful explanation pattern for representing the complex causa-
tion involved in the development of psychiatric conditions, such as those on the autism
spectrum. Thus, I argue that the diagnosis and classification of psychiatric conditions like
ASD may be improved if psychiatry adopts a cause-based framework informed by causal
theories that identify the biological, cognitive and social features of psychiatric disorders.
Finally, chapter seven argues that a cause-based diagnostic and classification framework
may help to address issues in resource allocation for the treatment of conditions on the
autism spectrum. I discuss how biologically-based patterns of explanation for psychiatric
disorders can further reduce the social stigma that continues to plague these conditions.
Further, I argue that a better understanding of the causes of these disorders can help to
support legal claims that the treatment of these conditions is medically necessary under
the Canada Health Act, and that these conditions should not be considered different than
medical disorders in the legal systems in the United States and Canada.
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Chapter 2
Symptom-Based v. Cause-Based
Classification of Psychiatric
Conditions: Improving the
Explanatory and Predictive Power of
Psychiatric Diagnosis
2.1 Introduction
The last chapter discussed the classification and diagnostic history of the conditions now
identified as the autism spectrum, where I outlined the features of these conditions that
make them good case studies to investigate the relationship between patterns of explana-
tion, diagnosis and classification. Like many theorists, such as Murphy (2006), Kupfer et
al (2002) and Poland, Von Eckhardt, & Spaulding (1994), I argue that the lack of adequate
causal explanations of psychiatric disorders such as ASD is the root of the conceptual and
methodological problems that plague the diagnosis and treatment of these conditions. The
analysis of the problems with both past and current diagnostic and classification frame-
works I provide in this chapter supports the view that psychiatric diagnosis and classifica-
tion should be based on causal theories rather than observable symptoms alone. However,
there are several challenges involved in developing a viable cause-based diagnostic frame-
work for psychiatry. For instance, there is significant disagreement among theorists who
advocate a cause-based framework regarding the nature of explanations of psychiatric dis-
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orders, such as the levels of description that should be included and emphasized, and how
these explanations should influence and inform categories of disorder. Further, there is de-
bate regarding how best to develop adequate explanations in psychiatry, given the complex
and heterogenous causation involved in the conditions currently identified as psychiatric
disorders. Through an analysis of some of these debates and disagreements, I identify a set
of criteria that adequate explanation patterns in psychiatry must have in order to generate
reliable and valid diagnostic categories. I argue that a cause-based diagnostic framework
will lead to more accurate diagnosis and improved treatment of autism spectrum disorders,
provided the explanatory patterns on which it is based meet the criteria outlined in this
chapter.
2.2 Conceptual and Methodological Problems with
Symptom-Based Classification and Diagnosis
By the 1970s, the early-caused based approach contained in the first two editions of the
DSM had come under repeated criticism from the surrounding medical community, as had
the overall psychoanalytic framework on which concepts of psychiatric disorders, their di-
agnosis and their treatment was based (Mayes & Horwtiz, 2005, Shorter, 1993). Mayes &
Horwitz (2005) state that the publication of the third edition of the DSM brought with it a
radical change in the classification of psychiatric disorders. DSM-III took a more atheoret-
ical approach to diagnosis (Murphy, 2006; Poland et al, 1994), where diagnostic categories
were not based on theories of the origins of these conditions, but on observable symptoms
of the various conditions. The authors of DSM-III only included criteria that referred to
the behavioural and cognitive symptoms that appear to characterize each disorder. This
way, clinicians’ diagnoses are based on a standardized set of criteria, something that was
absent in the first two editions of the DSM.
However, Widiger & Clark (2000) state that the APA acknowledged there was a sig-
nificant lack of systematic research on most of the disorders in the DSM. Thus, diagnostic
criteria included in DSM-III were still heavily based on the clinical judgment of the task
force and the committee responsible for diagnostic revision. Further, DSM-III continued
to attract criticism on the grounds of poor validity and reliability of diagnostic categories.
Widiger & Clark (2000) and Kupfer et al. (2002) argue that a number of problems with
the criteria contained in DSM-III arose soon after its publication, since some of the cate-
gories contained inconsistent or even contradictory diagnostic criteria. In response to such
criticism, DSM-III-R was released in 1987. Widiger & Clark (2000) state that the field
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trials conducted by the task force assigned to make revisions to DSM-III were based on
improving diagnostic validity, as well as continued improvements in diagnostic reliability.
In 1994, the American Psychiatric Association published DSM-IV. Widiger & Clark
(2000) state that the committee appointed to construct the DSM-IV aspired to use more
conservative thresholds for approvals of new diagnostic categories or criteria. Like the
committee in charge of DSM-III, the task force assigned to create DSM-IV attempted to
follow the research and clinical literature more thoroughly, and base their criteria on this
literature. However, unlike previous editions of DSM, the DSM-IV committee compared
diagnostic categories and criteria from other diagnostic systems, most notably the Interna-
tional Classification of Diseases, 10th edition (ICD-10, World Health Organization, 1990).
Comparing DSM criteria to other psychiatric nosologies was done to standardize the diag-
nostic system more thoroughly, and to help ensure diagnostic categories incorporated the
central features of each psychiatric disorder. In 2000, the APA published the text revision
of DSM-IV, which contained some revisions to the categories and criteria contained in
DSM-IV, but did not include massive classification or conceptual changes.
The categories included in DSM-IV-TR are what Poland et al (1994) call lenient cate-
gories, which allow for overlap between them. In this framework, diagnosis of a particular
psychiatric disorder requires that an individual meets the central criteria for the disorder
in question, i.e. the necessary conditions. However, such an individual may also exhibit
symptoms that commonly occur along with the central criteria, symptoms which, by them-
selves, are not enough to warrant a particular diagnosis. Some psychiatric disorders do not
have necessary conditions, but have many sufficient conditions, none of which by them-
selves are necessary to make a diagnosis of a particular psychopathology. One example
of such a psychiatric disorder is substance abuse. For a clinician to give a diagnosis of
substance abuse, a patient need only meet one of several sufficient criteria: 1) recurrent
substance use resulting in a failure to fulfill major role obligations at work, school or home;
2) recurrent substance use in situations in which it is physically hazardous (e.g. operating
a vehicle); 3) recurrent substance-related legal problems; 4) continued substance use de-
spite having persistent or recurrent social or interpersonal problems caused or exacerbated
by the effects of the substance. On the other hand, a patient diagnosed with substance
dependence must exhibit, in addition to any or all of the criteria for substance abuse, 1)
tolerance to the substance(s) used, and 2) physical withdrawal when the substance is not
consumed.
Under the current diagnostic and classification framework contained in DSM-IV-TR,
the way psychiatric conditions are explained and diagnosed differs significantly from other
branches of medicine and even closely related fields such as neuroscience and cognitive neu-
roscience. First, disorders in other fields of medicine are classified terms of their causes,
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course, and their symptoms, whereas disorders in psychiatry are only classified by their
symptoms (Murphy, 2006). While the biological underpinnings of many psychiatric con-
ditions are being discovered, diagnostic categories in contemporary psychiatry are based
on sets of co-occurring symptoms over a given time period, rather than the presence of
underlying malfunctions. Further, there is still a lack of adequate data about all but a few
psychiatric conditions in terms of causes or disease progression. Most research is dedicated
to the continued investigation of the signs and symptoms of the disorders contained in
DSM-IV (Poland et al, 1994). Thus, DSM categories can become over-reified, where the
concept of a particular psychiatric disorder, e.g. ASD, just is the set of symptoms listed
in DSM-IV (Widiger & Clark, 2000).
Second, definitions of disorders in other branches of medicine include phenomena at a
lower level of description that cause outward symptoms, the course of the disorder, and
the prognosis based on the extent of the impairment in those lower-level phenomena. In
contrast, the disorders contained in the DSM are defined simply as clusters of cognitive and
behavioural disturbances co-occurring acutely over a given period of time. DSM criteria
identify only cognitive and behavioural symptoms, and contain no mention of lower-level
phenomena underlying or co-occurring with the symptoms observed. For instance, the
diagnostic categories for the disorders on the autism spectrum only include criteria that
identify the characteristic symptoms of these conditions (impairments in language, social
interaction and rigid behaviours) and make no mention of possible underlying malfunctions
identified by autism researchers, such as deficits in theory of mind or malfunctioning mirror
neurons. For these reasons, critics of the current diagnostic system in psychiatry argue
that a symptom-based approach cannot resolve, and in most cases exacerbates, the poor
reliability and validity that has plagued the diagnosis of psychiatric disorders since the
early days of psychiatry.
Third, the process of diagnosing a patient with a psychiatric disorder differs from other
fields of medicine. Like other branches of medicine, psychiatrists try to explain their pa-
tients’ symptoms by giving a diagnosis. However, in other branches of medicine, explana-
tions of patients’ symptoms are given in terms of phenomena at a lower level of description
than the symptoms themselves (Murphy 2006). For instance, the symptoms of Alzheimer’s
disease, e.g. memory loss, personality changes, and dementia, may be explained by the
presence of neuronal loss, senile plaques, and neurofibrillary tangles (Martin, 2002). A
diagnosis of Alzheimer’s disease involves identifying the characteristic symptoms of this
condition and finding these senile plaques and neurofibrillary tangles in patients, which
are phenomena at the neurophysiological level of explanation. In the case of a disorder
like Alzheimer’s disease the symptoms are described in cognitive and behavioural terms,
but what may explain the presence of these symptoms and allows a physician to give a
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diagnosis are physiological changes in the brain. In contrast, conditions such as ’autistic
disorder’ are identified only by the characteristic symptoms just mentioned, and a diagno-
sis of autistic disorder is made only on the basis of these symptoms, not on the presence
of certain neurological or physiological changes.
There are several conceptual and methodological problems with the current symptom-
based framework that reduce the reliability and validity of diagnostic categories, thus
limiting the explanatory and predictive power of psychiatric diagnosis. First, the current
symptom-based diagnostic and classification framework is supposed to be atheoretical,
since diagnostic categories and the diagnostic process are not based on causal theories of
the different conditions and how they arise (Poland et al, 1994; Widiger & Clark, 2000).
However, Poland et al. (1994), Kupfer et al (2002) and Murphy (2006) argue that the
current symptom-based diagnostic approach operates under the false notion that mental
disorders are syndromes with unity. Syndromes with unity are conditions where the overt
symptoms are robust indicators of underlying malfunctions, and the relationship between
the appearance of certain symptoms and the presence of underlying malfunctions is a
nomological one.
However, these theorists argue that the presence of co-occurring symptoms does not
necessarily provide insight into the nature of the underlying biological pathology. Fur-
ther, the relationship between the presentation of symptoms and the presence of certain
underlying malfunctions is not a law-like one in the case of most psychiatric disorders,
including ASD. The presentation of symptoms and their progression is affected by both
the complex interaction of biological and cognitive factors, and the environmental context
in which these symptoms appear (see Kendler, 2008, Poland et al, 1994; Kendler & Parnas,
2008). Conditions like ASD are not compact, discrete disease entities where one cluster
of symptoms accurately identifies a particular disorder. Rather, psychiatric disorders are
causally complex and casually heterogenous with significant overlap in overt symptoms
(Kendler, 2008, Woodward, 2008; Shaffner, 2008: Mitchell, 2008a; Murphy, 2006; Poland
et al, 1994). Classifying and diagnosing psychiatric disorders as if they were syndromes
with unity results in heterogeneous diagnostic groups, which severely limit the validity and
reliability of diagnostic categories.
One of the strengths of the DSM’s approach to the classification of psychiatric disorders
often identified is an increase in reliability in diagnosis. Reliability, i.e. the consistency
of diagnosis across clinicians and over time with the same patient, is ostensibly improved
with a symptom-based approach, since the criteria are based on standardized accounts
of observable symptoms. However, reliability is limited in a symptom-based diagnostic
framework. Recall that even unrelated diagnostic categories identify similar symptoms.
Thus, even symptoms that are highly correlated do not necessarily determine whether
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that particular cluster of symptoms indicates the presence of one psychiatric disorder,
or whether the symptoms are associated with more than one disorder. Further, even
highly correlated symptoms often do not indicate whether the patient is suffering from
a genuine psychiatric disorder, or merely a problem of living (where an individual has
interpersonal, financial or occupational difficulties but should not be diagnosed with a
psychiatric condition). Thus, reliable diagnostic categories only really improves diagnosis
if those categories also have validity, since false or dubious categories of disorder may
be highly reliable. Validity is central to establishing whether the cluster of symptoms
identified in diagnostic categories represent distinct psychiatric conditions, and whether
the symptoms identified are indications of disorders, rather than the less severe problems
of living.
However, because symptoms are poor indications of the underlying malfunctions that
cause them, it is difficult to validate categories of disorder in a symptom-based approach.
In psychiatry, good diagnostic validity occurs when the category and its criteria accurately
reflect key variables such as progression, onset, and prognosis based on the severity of un-
derlying malfunctions (Poland et al, 1994; Kendel, 2002). Since symptoms are often a poor
indication of underlying malfunctions, and symptom-based diagnostic categories result in
heterogenous diagnostic groups, it can be difficult to determine the typical progression,
onset and prognosis of a disorder based on the symptoms identified in diagnostic criteria.
Critics of the current diagnostic approach such as Poland et al (1994) and Murphy (2006)
argue that most categories in the DSM suffer from poor validity, and significant increases in
diagnostic validity are unlikely with symptom-based classification of psychiatric disorders
(also see Kendel, 2002 and Jablensky & Kendel, 2002 for a discussion of the challenges
regarding increasing diagnostic validity).
There are three main problems most often discussed by critics of the current diag-
nostic approach, which they argue are the result of the limited reliability and validity of
symptom-based diagnostic categories. The first is arbitrary boundaries between categories
of disorder, given that there is significant overlap in the symptoms and criteria listed for
distinct categories of disorders. The problem of overlapping symptoms is a problem in
many diagnostic categories, including ASD. If there is significant overlap between criteria
for different disorders, it can be difficult to determine with which disorder a patient should
be diagnosed. For instance, in autism spectrum disorders, there is significant overlap in
the symptoms of these conditions and the symptoms of currently unrelated conditions that
often occur along with ASD. Tidmarsh & Volkmar (2003) state that children with autism
often exhibit symptoms from a wide variety of disorders, including depression, anxiety,
oppositional behaviour, hyperactivity, poor attention, tics and compulsions. In these situ-
ations, it can be difficult for a clinician to determine whether a diagnosis of autism should
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be given. The symptoms a child displays may indicate the presence of a co-morbid disorder
as well as an ASD, or could indicate an autism spectrum disorder only, even though the
symptoms are atypical.
The second problem often discussed is over-inclusion in diagnostic categories. Over-
inclusion often occurs as a result of the problem of over-lapping criteria, since patients
can and often do meet criteria for more than one disorder. For instance, ASD are highly
co-morbid with mental retardation (particularly in the case of autistic disorder), and with
language disorders that arise in childhood. Most children with ASD have difficulties with
language, and even children with Asperger’s syndrome can have some difficulty with lan-
guage (Rogers & Williams, 2006; Frith, 1991). Further, Bishop (1989) notes that be-
havioural and language tests are not always able to determine whether a child is most
likely suffering from an ASD, or from another disorder. One problem is that individuals
with autistic disorder are often so language impaired that some of them do not develop
speech at all, or have very limited verbal abilities. Accurately testing whether a child
has mental retardation or autistic disorder, or both, is difficult to determine based on a
battery of tests of verbal ability. Further, children with mental retardation exhibit similar
behavioural symptoms to those of ASD, such as the social withdrawal, restlessness, and
rigid behaviours.
However, over-inclusion in diagnostic categories can also occur if patients are not dis-
playing all the symptoms of a particular disorder, but still seem to match some of the core
diagnostic criteria. With current diagnostic practices, meeting the primary symptom-based
diagnostic criteria is all that is required for a diagnosis of a psychiatric disorder (Poland
et al, 1994). However, individuals who have problems of living, longstanding personality
problems, interpersonal difficulties, or eccentricity often fit some of the criteria for psychi-
atric conditions, but should not be diagnosed with a full-blown disorder (Murphy, 2006;
Wakefield & First, 2003, Volkmar & Klin, 2005) . For instance, many individuals share
some of the characteristics as those diagnosed with Asperger’s disorder, such as narrow in-
terests, social awkwardness and lack of significant relationships with others. In such cases,
it may be difficult in a symptom-based diagnostic framework to determine when social
awkwardness and isolation end and Asperger’s disorder begins, especially in individuals
where these characteristics affect their ability to function in everyday life.
The third problem raised against current diagnostic methods in psychiatry concerns
arbitrary divisions between subtypes of diagnostic categories. For instance, autism disorders
are situated on a spectrum, and the disorders identified as the autism spectrum contain
subtypes that are at the moment linked only by symptoms. Autistic disorder represents the
most severe of the autistic disorders, and Asperger’s syndrome represents the least amount
of impairment and the highest level of social functioning. However, the other disorders
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included in the category of ASD, Rett’s disorder, Childhood Disintegrative Disorder and
PDD-NOS, are not arranged from most to least severe, and have symptoms that are difficult
to differentiate from autistic disorder and Asperger’s disorder (Wing, 1991). Further, since
there is high variability in the severity and presentation of the core symptoms of ASD in
each subtype, and across patients in the same subtype, it can be difficult to determine
the particular autism spectrum disorder the patient likely has (Wing, 1991). Thus, the
distinctions between several of the disorders included in the autistic spectrum, which are
often delineated based on severity and variability of symptoms, is not always clear.
Because of the heterogeneousness of the individuals within a particular diagnostic cate-
gory, the treatment of psychiatric disorders has varying and often limited success. Patients
who are diagnosed with a particular disorder are given similar treatments, i.e. a certain
class of drugs, and/or cognitive-behavioural therapy focused on minimizing their symp-
toms. However, since the symptom presentation and underlying biological impairments
can be drastically different between patients given a certain diagnosis, a certain drug or
therapeutic technique may have limited success on many of these patients. For instance,
current treatments for the conditions on the autism spectrum are targeted at ameliorating
symptoms, but since the diagnostic category autism spectrum disorders includes individu-
als with a wide variety of genetic, neurological, cognitive features interacting with a wide
variety of environments, such treatment will have highly variable levels of success. Thus,
while techniques such as behavioural interventions are still the most effective method for
managing the symptoms of ASD, they still have varying rates of success among patients,
because each patient has different neurological and cognitive impairments, in different
combinations, and at different levels of severity.
The conceptual and methodological problems discussed above limit the explanatory and
predictive power of psychiatric diagnosis. Since symptoms are poor indicator of underlying
malfunctions, individuals included under the same diagnostic category have a wide variety
of biological, cognitive and social features. Individuals diagnosed with the same condition
will display different patterns of the progression and severity of symptoms, and may have
very different underlying biological impairments causing these symptoms. Thus, under the
current framework, it is difficult to predict and explain the course, outcome, prognosis and
progression of symptoms in patients with disorders such as ASD based on symptoms alone.
Given the problems with the current symptom-based framework, theorists such as those
just above argue that the explanatory and predictive power of diagnosis can be improved
if psychiatry adopts a cause-based framework. However, there are several obstacles to
generating causal explanations and theories powerful and robust enough to motivate and
inform a cause-based system. If we can begin to identify what adequate explanation pat-
terns for psychiatric conditions such as ASD might be, we may be able to determine what
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sort of causal theories can and should inform a cause-based diagnostic and classification
framework in psychiatry. The rest of this chapter identifies the criteria that adequate ex-
planation patterns in psychiatry need to meet by analyzing what makes generating causal
explanations of psychiatric conditions difficult.
2.3 Causal Explanations, Diagnosis and Treatment of
Psychiatric Conditions
The complex and interactive nature of psychiatric disorders such as ASD present significant
difficulties in determining the causes and progression of these conditions, thus making
discrete, non-overlapping diagnostic categories difficult to generate. If psychiatry and
clinical psychology are going to base the diagnosis of psychiatric disorders on a cause-based,
rather than symptom-based, framework, viable causal accounts must address the following
problems. First, what sort of pattern of explanation will have the most power? What levels
of description should such a pattern of explanation include? Second, how do we generate
causal explanations of psychiatric disorders that capture their complexity, but remain
general enough to be useful in diagnosis? What sort of indications of impairments should
diagnostic criteria identify? Finally, how might adequate causal explanations address the
problems of poor diagnostic reliability and validity?
Several clinicians and theorists have discussed the type of explanations most suitable
to psychiatric disorders, and have argued that in order for explanations of the conditions
contained in the DSM to be viable, they must have certain features. I analyze the obstacles
to generating adequate causal explanations in psychiatry, and evaluate arguments by critics
of the current diagnostic and classification framework such as Murphy (2006), Poland et
al (1994) and others regarding how to address these obstacles. Through this analysis,
I develop a preliminary list of criteria that adequate explanation patterns for psychiatric
conditions should include, which may help to improve the explanatory and predictive power
of psychiatric diagnosis and classification, thus potentially improving the effectiveness of
treatment. I adopt Thagard’s (1999) version of explanation schemas, which identify the
causal features and structures of explanations, to identify and evaluate past and present
patterns of explanation for the disorders on the autism spectrum. The next three chapters
discuss the different patterns of explanation for ASD in the history of psychiatry and clinical
psychology, and identify the strengths and weaknesses of each explanatory pattern. I argue
that patterns of explanation that do not explain the causes of psychiatric disorders in terms
of interactive, multi-directional mechanisms limit diagnostic reliability and validity, and
thus only certain explanatory patterns for conditions like those on the autism spectrum
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will be viable. Explanatory patterns and causal theories that do not meet these criteria
are not viable candidates on which to base diagnostic categories in future editions of the
DSM.
2.3.1 Insight from DSM-I and DSM-II: Problems with Early
Cause-Based Classification and Diagnosis
We can begin to examine what sort of patterns of explanation for psychiatric disorders are
the most powerful, and how cause-based frameworks can improve diagnosis and treatment
by analyzing the shortcomings with the cause-based approach contained in the first two
editions of the DSM. The first and second editions of the DSM were heavily influenced
by psychoanalytic theory, the dominant conceptual framework in psychiatry at that time
(Poland, et al, 1994). In this era, there was still little known about the biological causes of
most psychiatric conditions, and psychoanalytic theories placed the origins of these con-
ditions in psycho-sexual conflicts of early childhood. Mayes & Horwitz (2005) state ”the
focus of analytic explanations and treatments...was the total personality and life experi-
ences of the person that provided the context for the interpretation of symptoms...DSM-I
and DSM-II made little effort to provide elaborate classification schemes, because overt
symptoms did not reveal disease entities but disguised underlying conflicts that could not
be expressed directly (p. 249-250).” However, this early cause-based approach failed to
increase the reliability and validity of psychiatric diagnosis, since the causal theories on
which it was based were empirically unsupported and internally inconsistent.
There were several problems as a result of the psychoanalytic view of psychiatric disor-
ders and their causes, only some of which will be discussed here. First, most categories of
psychiatric disorders included in DSM-I and DSM-II contained psychoanalytic descriptions
of the psychological and emotional characteristics individuals with these conditions can
display, rather than standardized diagnostic criteria. Second, Willick (1990) and Shorter
(1993) note that there was significant disagreement among analysts regarding the inter-
pretation of psychoanalytic theory and how to differentiate between disorders based on
such theories. For instance, many theorists in this era argued that most psychiatric con-
ditions were caused by the same underlying psychological disturbance, and there only
appeared to be different conditions based on the manifestation of symptoms, while others
argued that differences in symptoms did indicate separate disorders (Mayes & Horwitz,
2005; Shorter, 1993). Third, many disorders now recognized as distinct conditions were
classified as subtypes of the same psychiatric disorder, based on the psychoanalytic view
that these conditions were the result of similar psycho-sexual causes. Fourth, the first and
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second editions of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual reflected the psychoanalytic view
that childhood and adult disorders were continuous, and thus did not make a distinction
between disorders that appear in childhood and those that appear in adulthood.
These issues often resulted in significant diagnostic problems, which can be clearly seen
in the case of autism spectrum disorders. Willick (1990) notes that during the era of
psychoanalysis and leading up the publication of DSM-III, there was still much confusion
and debate among clinicians regarding whether autism spectrum disorders were a type of
schizophrenia, or should be considered separate disorders. Kanner (1943) argued that the
condition he identified was a separate disorder, and clinicians such as Mahler (e.g. 1952;
1958) and Bettelheim (1967) recognized ASD as separate conditions. However, Bishop
(1989) states many clinicians in this era understood the symptoms of ASD to be indi-
cations of childhood schizophrenia, and did not recognize autism spectrum disorders as
separate conditions. In this era, the disorders on the autism spectrum were considered to
be ’psychotic disorders,’ along with adult schizophrenia, based on the psychoanalytic view
that ASD and schizophrenia were caused by stalled ego development early in life.
The only diagnostic category that included mention of autism symptoms in the first
two editions of the DSM was ”schizophrenic reaction, childhood type,” which was clas-
sified under the larger diagnostic category of ”Schizophrenic Reactions.” The description
presented in DSM-I of ”Schizophrenic Reactions,” states that the term ”represents a group
of psychotic reactions characterized by fundamental disturbances in reality relationships
and concept formations, with affective, behavioural, and intellectual disturbances in vary-
ing degrees and mixtures (p. 26, DSM-I).” The disorders under this grouping ”are marked
by strong tendency to retreat from reality, by emotional disharmony, unpredictable dis-
turbances in stream of thought, regressive behaviour, and in some, by a tendency to ’de-
terioration.’ (p. 26, DSM-I).” ’Schizophrenic Reactions’ included many adult-onset types
of what is now recognized as schizophrenia, but only one childhood type. Thus, cases of
what are today recognized as autism spectrum disorders would likely be included under
the childhood type of ’schizophrenic reactions.’
However, the category ”Schizophrenic Reaction, childhood type” did not contain a set
of criteria to help clinicians identify cases of childhood schizophrenia or the conditions now
known as autism spectrum disorders in the population. Instead, it contained the following
description of the symptoms and nature of these conditions:
Here will be classified those schizophrenic reactions occurring before puberty.
The clinical picture may differ from schizophrenic reactions occurring in other
age periods because of the immaturity and plasticity of the patient at the time
of onset. Psychotic reactions in children, manifesting primarily autism, will
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be classified here. Special symptomatology may be added to the diagnosis as
manifestations (DSM-I, p. 28).
Without criteria identifying characteristic, observable symptoms, it was left up to the
clinician’s interpretation of a child’s symptoms as to whether a diagnosis of ”childhood
schizophrenia” was made, and whether the clinician understood the symptoms of autism
as representing a distinct type of psychopathology, as some analysts such as Bettelheim
and Mahler did.
DSM-II, published in 1968, also contained categories of disorder that were heavily in-
fluenced by psychoanalytic theories of the origins of these conditions, and also did not
contain standardized diagnostic criteria. Similar to DSM-I, DSM-II contained a category
called ”Schizophrenia,” which included disorders that were ”manifested by characteristic
disturbances in thinking, mood and behaviour (p. 33),” and by significant disturbances
in the patient’s interpretations and interaction with the surrounding environment. How-
ever, like its predecessor, DSM-II did not make a distinction between adult and childhood
disorders, or between schizophrenia and autism spectrum disorders. Instead, the cate-
gory of ”Schizophrenia, childhood type” in this edition of the DSM contains the following
description:
This category is for cases in which schizophrenic symptoms appear before pu-
berty. The condition may be manifested by autistic, atypical, and withdrawn
behavior; failure to develop identity separate from the mother’s; and general
unevenness, gross immaturity and inadequacy in development... (p. 35).
In many ways, this category’s description is more overtly psychoanalytic than its DSM-I
predecessor. The DSM-II version actually mentions the role of the mother in the develop-
ment of the child’s ego, which reflects the overall psychoanalytic view that ego development
in early childhood depends on the relationship between child and mother. Children exhibit-
ing the characteristic symptoms of autism spectrum disorders could be identified using this
description. However, without standardized diagnostic criteria identifying the key features
of these disorders, whether or not a child displaying the characteristic symptoms of autism
spectrum disorders would receive a diagnosis of childhood schizophrenia was heavily de-
pendent on the clinician’s interpretation of the symptoms and the relationships between a
child and his or her parents. Further, like its predecessor, DSM-II did not recognize ASD
as separate disorders, and thus identifying a child’s symptoms as a case of autism still
depended on the whether the clinician in question recognized these conditions as separate
from schizophrenia.
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Before the publication of DSM-III and the shift to a symptom-based diagnostic ap-
proach, the emphasis in psychiatric practice during the psychoanalytic era was placed on
exploring the developmental histories and parental relationships to understand the origins
of the symptoms. The emphasis on patient interviews and understanding the symptoms
within the context of early childhood development and familial relations reflects psychoan-
alytic explanations of these conditions as manifestations of psycho-sexual conflicts (Mayes
& Horwitz, 2005; Shorter, 1993). However, without standardized diagnostic criteria, diag-
nosis was heavily dependent on individual clinicians, which made the diagnosis of disorders
such as those on the autism spectrum highly variable and inconsistent, thus resulting in
poor reliability.
Further, without standardized criteria based on empirically informed causal theories,
diagnosis in the era of psychoanalysis suffered from poor validity as well. The classification
system and categories of disorders contained in DSM-I and DSM-II were based on a con-
ceptual framework that had weak empirical foundations and inconsistent theories. Many
clinicians and researchers argue that psychoanalytic theories of the causes of psychiatric
disorders were not grounded in the larger body of scientific knowledge in medicine (e.g.
Mayes & Horwitz, 2005; Shorter, 1993; Poland et al, 1994). Explaining most psychiatric
disorders as manifestations of psycho-sexual conflicts does not reflect the underlying biolog-
ical and cognitive impairments involved in psychiatric conditions like those on the autism
spectrum, and does not accurately account for the social features of these conditions, since
bad parenting is not a reliable indicator of the development of disorders such as ASD (see
Rimland, 1964; Rutter, 1978; Paluszny (1979); Siefert, 1991) for a discussion of the tenuous
link between parenting styles and the development of autism spectrum disorders). Thus,
basing diagnostic categories on explanations that are empirically inadequate and internally
inconsistent reduces the validity and reliability of diagnosis. As discussed in more detail in
the next chapter, psychoanalytic approaches to treatment were largely ineffective, since the
categories of diagnosis did not accurately reflect the nature of the underlying malfunctions
causing the symptoms of conditions such as ASD. Thus, the categories of disorders con-
tained in DSM-I and DSM-II were not based on empirically-supported causal theories, but
rather on a body of literature and theory that was still isolated from the related disciplines
such as neuroscience and medicine.
A cause-based diagnostic system must be based on explanatory patterns that accurately
represent the underlying malfunctions that result in the observable symptoms of psychi-
atric conditions in order to properly differentiate between these conditions and successfully
identify individuals who have them. A causal explanation should accurately represent and
identify the underlying malfunction(s), and should provide effective targets for interven-
tion. If a theory cannot be verified by research or by its effectiveness in developing a
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treatment approach, it cannot inform valid and reliable diagnostic categories. Therefore,
the first criterion an adequate pattern of explanation for psychiatric conditions must meet
is empirical support. Further, a theory should be consistent in both its account of the
underlying malfunctions and causal processes, and consistently applied in relevant clinical
cases.
However, empirical support can include both the degree to which a causal theory ac-
curately represents the underlying causal processes, and the ability to inform an effective
course of treatment. Many causal theories and patterns of explanation in psychiatry and
clinical psychology seem to include only one of these features, but not the other. For
instance, the presence of the MECP2 mutation in female children explains the presence
of the symptoms of Rett’s disorder, but it is not clear how, or if, this genetic mutation
can be a target for intervention or treatment. Further, behaviourist theories of psychi-
atric conditions have provided effective treatment approaches for a variety of disorders,
including ASD. However, behaviourist theories were not concerned with discovering the
underlying causal dysfunctions that cause the symptoms, but rather ameliorating or elimi-
nating them. Ideally, an empirically supported causal theory or pattern of explanation will
both accurately represent the underlying causal processes, and provide an effective target
for intervention. However, given the highly speculative and ’sketchy’ nature of most of
the causal theories in psychiatry and clinical psychology, many theories have one aspect
of empirical support but not the other. Even if a causal theory has either of these aspects
of empirical support, it may still provide information that can help develop cause-based
diagnostic categories, and can provide information on how to improve treatment. Thus, in
order for diagnosis in psychiatry to effectively identify psychiatric disorders in the popula-
tion and effectively treat these conditions, diagnostic categories and treatment approaches
must be based on empirically supported, internally consistent causal explanations.
2.4 Criteria for Adequate Explanation Patterns in Psy-
chiatry
Thus, we can identify the first two criteria for adequate explanation patterns for psychiatric
conditions. First, such a pattern should have empirical support, since a theory that does
not accurately represent the phenomena that it explains may lead to false or inaccurate
conclusions. Because of the lack of empirical supported theories, treatments prescribed by
analysts, usually psychotherapy to uncover and address psycho-sexual trauma, was largely
ineffective. Second, explanation patterns for psychiatric conditions should be consistent.
As the next chapter discusses, psychoanalytic theories of autism spectrum disorders differed
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in both their definitions and descriptions of these disorders. Inconsistent accounts regarding
the nature of ASD by psychoanalysts often resulted in the use of therapeutic approaches
designed for conditions very different than those on the autism spectrum, including adult
schizophrenia and adult anxiety disorders (Willick, 1990). Thus, adequate causal theories
of psychiatric disorders like ASD should include a set of concepts that are standardized
and adopted across all psychiatric evaluations.
We can also identify a third criterion for adequate explanation patterns for psychi-
atric conditions. Theorists such as Murphy (2006) argue that in order to increase the
explanatory and predictive power of diagnostic categories, these categories need to have
good validity. In order to improve diagnostic validity, diagnostic categories need to be
more representative and predictive of variables such as onset, progression, and prognosis
without treatment. However, the current classification system in the DSM contains many
categories that are not significantly related to these variables, and thus the progression and
prognosis of most psychiatric disorders is difficult to determine. There are different types
of validity, but the type with which Murphy (2006) is most concerned is what he calls pre-
dictive validity. He states that explanations of psychiatric disorders that have ’predictive
validity’ are explanations that obtain when one moves from a representation of idealized,
or typical, symptoms and course of a particular disorder to the real world, i.e. the explana-
tion is unaffected by variations in patients and their particular environment. Thus, in the
case of psychiatry and clinical psychology, explanations of particular disorders that have
good predictive validity should be able to account for the symptoms a patient is currently
presenting, and will continue to present in the future without treatment. Likewise, an
explanation with predictive validity will inform what sort of treatment will be effective,
given the nature of the particular symptoms from which a patient is suffering.
Murphy (2006) argues that predictive validity of diagnostic categories will be increased
if they are based on causal explanations, since causal explanations are better able to iden-
tify variables like onset, progression and prognosis. However, generating viable causal
explanations of conditions such as those on the autism spectrum is difficult for a number
of reasons. In what follows, I discuss the most significant obstacles to generating valid
and reliable diagnostic criteria. As the discussion progresses, I identify and evaluate sug-
gestions by theorists such as Murphy (2006; 2008) regarding both the development of,
and problems with, causal explanations in psychiatry, using ASD and other psychiatric
disorders as examples. Although autism spectrum disorders are my main case study, the
criteria I develop here can potentially be applied to other conditions in the DSM. So far,
I have argued that an adequate explanation patterns for psychiatric conditions must be
1) empirically supported, 2) consistent, and 3) must have predictive validity. However, I
argue that predictive validity depends on explanation patterns for these conditions meeting
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certain criteria, which I identify below.
2.4.1 Causation on Multiple Levels: Representing Interactive
Causation in Psychiatric Conditions
Theorists like Murphy (2006) and Boucher (2009) argue that causal explanations of psy-
chiatric disorders should include primary, or robust, causes. However, one of the most
significant obstacles to generating viable causal explanations of psychiatric disorders is the
complexity of such conditions. The severity and exact presentation of the symptoms of a
particular condition will vary depending on 1) the individual’s physiology, 2) features of
the individuals’ social environment, and 3) how the individual’s physiology and environ-
ment interact. These causal factors and the interactions between them often mean that
patients can have virtually identical symptoms, but very different primary causes for those
symptoms.
Consider two patients, both exhibiting the symptoms of major depressive disorder.
Each patient is suffering from the characteristic symptoms of major depression: insomnia,
lack of appetite, and anhedonia (the inability to take pleasure from things one previously
enjoyed). Patient A is in his late teens, is an average student, and had a previously active
social and family life before the onset of his symptoms. Patient B is in his late fifties, has a
history of steady employment and stable relationships with friends and family, but had lost
his spouse a year before seeking clinical assistance for his symptoms. Even though these
patients have essentially identical symptoms, the causal factors are different in important
ways. In the first case, the causal factors most relevant to the diagnosis may be the
genetic and neurological changes that are causing impaired cognition and social isolation.
In the second case, patient B may have the genetic disposition toward depression, but the
recent traumatic events in his life are likely the most relevant and fundamental cause of
his symptoms.
Even though these patients both display the characteristic symptoms of major depres-
sion, the exact nature of the etiology behind the onset of their symptoms is different,
and the role certain causes play in their respective diagnoses is also different. Thus, ade-
quate causal accounts of psychiatric disorders need to incorporate both social and biological
causes, since both are important in the development of psychiatric disorders (Murphy, 2006;
Mitchell, 2008a; Woodward, 2008; Boucher, 2009). Further, causal factors in psychiatric
disorders are multi-directional and multi-level, which means that causes at different levels
of description can influence phenomena and processes at both higher and lower levels. For
instance, biological causes such as genetic mutations and brain lesions can affect not just
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the cognitive aspects of a certain condition, but also the social aspects, such as a patient’s
behaviour and social interactions. However, social causes can also influence biological
causes, since stressful life events can exacerbate the neurological and cognitive malfunc-
tions that characterize a particular disorder. Thus, the malfunctions that characterize
psychiatric conditions can influence phenomena at more than one level of description, and
causes at different descriptive levels interact to produce the overt symptoms of psychiatric
conditions. In the case of most psychiatric disorders, including ASD, there are multiple
causes interacting at the social, cognitive and biological levels of description. However,
causal explanations of psychiatric disorders need to be able to include certain causes and
exclude others as central or fundamental in the development of a particular disorder in
order to be useful in diagnosing that condition. Thus, such an explanation must only what
Murphy calls robust causes, or in Boucher (2009)’s terms, causes that are necessary for the
disorder to develop.
Murphy (2006) calls explanations that identify primary or robust causes fundamental
explanations. On this account, a fundamental explanation of a given psychiatric disor-
der only identifies the causes implicated in most cases where the symptoms in question
are present, and cannot be radically shifted depending on the patient’s personal history.
Murphy (2006) states fundamental explanations in psychiatry are those that:
1. cite maximally robust causal relations, including relations that cross levels of expla-
nation
2. explain all the symptoms of a condition (p. 141).
A more fundamental explanation is one citing a factor that reliably produces an out-
come despite different values for other relevant variables. A less fundamental explanation
cites a factor that makes a difference to the outcome only under a very restricted range of
circumstances (Murphy, 2006). However, what Murphy calls a ’fundamental level of expla-
nation’ or a ’robust cause’ changes based on the disorder in question. As Murphy (2006)
and others have noted, the types of causes involved in most psychiatric disorders are at
different levels of description, such as the social level (which might include causes such as
active duty in a warzone, natural disasters, or stressful life events that are associated with
the onset of post-traumatic stress disorder or major depression), and the biological level
(such as the genetic mutations that cause Huntington’s chorea or Down’s syndrome). For
instance, consider the differences in causal theories for conditions such as anorexia nervosa
versus causal theories for ASD. In the case of eating disorders like anorexia, the funda-
mental causes of these conditions may include social pressures to be thin, a competitive
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home or professional environment (such as high parental expectations, pursuing a career
in modeling or acting, etc.), or other environmental or social causes, along with certain
biological and cognitive features. However, in the case of disorders like ASD, the funda-
mental causes are thought to include genetic, epigenetic and neurological malfunctions,
along with characteristic cognitive and social features. Thus, some psychiatric disorders
may have primary social causes, such as eating disorders, or primary biological ones such
as ASD, or potentially primary causes at both the social and biological level, which may be
the case for most disorders currently identified in the DSM (Kendler, 2008). Thus, pat-
terns of explanation that identify the causes of psychiatric disorders should include those
at the cognitive and social levels, and should not necessarily reduce these higher levels to
the biological or genetic level of explanation.
Murphy’s criteria for fundamental or robust explanations in psychiatry are not meant to
be exhaustive. However, they do give us broad parameters with which to work. Adequate
explanation patterns in psychiatry must be parsimonious, in that they must include only
include the robust causes(s) of a particular disorder, and do not include secondary or
indirect causes. Since causation of psychiatric disorders is complex, inter-level and multi-
directional, we must be willing to include ’social’ or ’environmental’ causes in acceptable
causal accounts in psychiatry. However, psychiatric conditions usually do not have one
primary cause, or even a few ’primary’ causes. As I argue in chapter five, even disorders
that have a strong biological basis, such as ASD, do not (at least as yet) have simple
biological explanations attached to them. Thus, while Murphy (2006) and Boucher (2009)
are correct that we must identify robust or primary causes, finding them is no easy feat,
which I discuss in more detail below.
2.4.2 Complex Etiologies, Complex Symptomatology: Identify-
ing Primary Causes
Recent research indicates that most psychiatric disorders involve multiple genetic muta-
tions and impairments in cognitive capabilities distributed across many areas of the brain.
Further, the symptoms characteristic of many disorders seem to involve an interaction be-
tween multiple neurotransmitters and multiple neurological structures. Schaffner (2008)
argues that the relation between genes and neuromolecular pathways is many-to-many,
rather than one-to-one. For instance, patients diagnosed with major depressive disorder
suffer from sleep disturbances, but these disturbances can be manifested as insomnia, or
as hypersomnia, where a patient sleeps too much (Murphy, 2006; see also DSM-IV-TR).
Also, many disorders listed in the DSM are associated with sleep disturbances, and other
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diagnostic criteria for major depressive disorder are shared by other conditions, e.g. psy-
chomotor agitation, changes in appetite, inability to concentrate, etc. Boucher (2009)
argues that ”for each set of defining behaviours, there are clearly numerous causal factors
all contributing to that particular set of behaviours (p. 101).” Thus, expression of phe-
notypes in the etiology of psychiatric disorders cannot be predicted solely from knowledge
of the genes involved. Further, even though individuals within a diagnostic category may
have the same genetic or neurological deficits, the exact presentation of the symptoms
associated with those deficits will not be the same across those individuals.
Another problem is raised by Woodward (2008). He discusses one of the common ’psy-
chosocial’ variables often implicated in the pathogenesis of various psychiatric disorders.
’Low socioeconomic status’ is a predicting factor in many of the conditions listed in the
DSM, including depression, anxiety, and schizophrenia. A ’macro-level’ or coarse grained
variable such as low SES does predict a higher probability of developing a psychiatric disor-
der, but SES does not tell us 1) which psychiatric disorder(s) (out of the set it predicts) are
the most likely to develop, 2) why certain individuals in a socio-economic strata develop
these psychiatric disorders and others do not, and 3) which direction the ’causal’ relation
goes.
For instance, as Woodward (2008) asserts, individuals with low SES may have more
stressful lives, poorer health care, meager medical benefits, and less stable support sys-
tems. Thus, the stresses and difficulties that accompany low SES may contribute to the
increased prevalence of psychiatric disorders in this population. However, as Woodward
(2008) also states, individuals with pre-existing psychiatric disorders may be forced to
take lower-paying and less-desirable jobs, since their conditions may make it difficult to
function in jobs with high levels of responsibility or stress. Further, the quality of life for
individuals with psychiatric disorders that go untreated tends to decline as the condition
progresses and worsens, which can result in financial and social difficulties. Thus, just
identifying predicting variables, no matter how ’robust’ they seem at first, will still leave
much diagnostic guesswork to the clinicians.
Likewise, several genes and neurological impairments are associated with more than one
psychiatric disorder, and physiological factors or causes can end up contributing little to
a differential diagnosis. Further, a genetic disposition to the neurological changes that are
characteristic of a disorder like depression is not the only factor in the development of this
condition in adolescence and adulthood. As the discussion above points out, conditions
such as major depressive disorder is often also triggered by environmental causes, such as
the death of a loved one, hard financial times, or socio-political upheaval.
Using the example of Major Depression, Mitchell (2008a) argues that psychiatric dis-
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orders are malfunctions in interactive complex systems. She states that disorders like de-
pression have complex etiology, where multiple genetic, neurological, cognitive, personality,
and environmental factors contribute to their development. She argues that to understand
the development of psychiatric disorders, we need to know not just how each component
of the system works, but how the system as a whole adapts to its environment. Based
on the complexity of the development of depression and most other psychiatric disorders,
theorists such as Murphy (2006), Mitchell (2008a), and Schaffner (2008) argue that multi-
level explanations of disorders are necessary for a viable causal diagnostic framework in
psychiatry. Thus, adequate causal explanations of psychiatric disorders must include mul-
tiple causes at different levels of explanation. However, most psychiatric disorders do not
have a stable and predictable progression or onset, because these causes interact to create
the cognitive and behavioural disturbances in a particular patient. Thus, adequate causal
explanations must also account for the interactions between causes.
2.4.3 Generating Mechanistic Explanations and The Lack of Psy-
chopathological Laws
Psychiatric disorders have complex symptomatology generated by causes interacting at
multiple levels of description. Thus, generating explanations of psychiatric disorders that
will subsume all individuals with that particular disorder is difficult. This section discusses
how best to represent these interactive and multi-level causal factors, since the complexity
in the development of psychiatric disorders requires a particular type of explanatory strat-
egy. With the exception of disorders like Huntington’s chorea and some aphasias, which
are caused by a single gene or brain lesion, the relation between symptoms and underlying
malfunctions in psychiatric disorders is not a law-like one. Thus, attempting to generate
explanations by appeal to ’psychopathological’ laws, where certain symptoms always in-
dicate a particular underlying impairment, has limited utility in psychiatry and clinical
psychology. Further, many theorists, such as Bechtel (2007) argue that explanations based
on laws have little applicability in any of the the natural sciences, including neuroscience
and biology.
To generate multi-level explanations, theorists such as Murphy (2006), Mitchell (2008a;
2008b) and Thagard (2008) advocate developing mechanistic explanations of psychiatric
disorders. Machamer, Darden & Craver (2000) describe mechanisms as ”entities and ac-
tivities organized such that they are productive of regular changes from start or set-up
to finish or termination conditions (p.3).” Thus, mechanisms are representations of the
parts of certain phenomena, and how those parts interact to generate the phenomena in
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question. Mechanistic explanations allow us to account for the regularities seen in certain
phenomena, and allows us to discuss causality, even though the phenomena in question are
not subsumed under laws of nature.
In the case of mechanistic explanations of psychiatric disorders, the parts include genes,
neurotransmitters, neurological structures and cognitive processes. Certain start-up con-
ditions, or inputs, will influence the activity of the parts of the mechanism, and how these
parts interact. In the case of psychiatric conditions, the inputs to the mechanism can in-
clude social and environmental factors, such as stressful events or aversive stimuli that can
influence and exacerbate neurological and cognitive malfunctions. Malfunctions in parts
at one level, such as chemical imbalances or breakdowns in neurological mechanisms, can
influence the activities of other parts at both higher and lower levels (i.e. the genetic,
cognitive, and social levels), and the interactions between these malfunctions produce the
characteristic symptoms of a particular disorder. The interactions between the parts of the
mechanism, i.e. how genetic, neurological, cognitive and social features influence each other
and mutually cause the ongoing progression and presentation of cognitive and behavioural
symptoms, explains how each of the aspects of a psychiatric disorder work together to
produce the outward symptoms.
On this account, identifying the nature of the malfunctions at different levels, the inter-
actions between these malfunctions, and how certain inputs produce regular changes in the
mechanism’s parts and activities explains how and why certain clusters of causes are re-
lated, and why certain symptoms are associated with particular malfunctions. For instance,
a mechanistic explanation of autism spectrum disorders would identify parts such as cer-
tain genes involved in neurological and socio-cognitive development, neurological structures
such as the mirror neuron system, and cognitive processes such as theory of mind. Break-
downs in these parts, such as genetic and epigenetic mutations, a malfunctioning mirror
neuron system, and an underdeveloped theory of mind, interact to produce the character-
istic socio-cognitive and behavioural symptoms of ASD: impairments in social interaction
and communication, and stereotyped behaviours. Further, determining how genes, neurol-
ogy, cognitive processes and social development interact to produce these symptoms can
help elucidate how the characteristic symptoms and progression of conditions like ASD
may manifest in a particular environment. In this way, mechanistic explanations allow us
to elucidate the interactions between different variables that regularly produce psychiatric
disorders, without having to subsume psychiatric disorders under psychopathological laws.
Thus, another criterion for adequate explanation patterns for conditions like ASD is that
such patterns are mechanistic, as well as multi-level and interactionist.
Throughout this section, I have argued that adequate explanation patterns in psychi-
atry are: 1) empirical supported, 2) consistent, and 3) have predictive validity. Predictive
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validity for explanations of psychiatric disorders depends upon the explanation being parsi-
monious, which means it includes only primary causes. However, these primary causes are
often at different levels of description, and thus an adequate explanation usually includes
multiple levels and explain the interaction between primary causes. Finally, a viable causal
explanation in psychiatry should be mechanistic, since there are no ’psychopathological’
laws governing the relationship between the presence of certain genetic, neurological, cog-
nitive and social features indicative of the different disorders listed in the DSM. Thus, an
explanation pattern that includes the above features will be the most powerful for gener-
ating explanations that are universal enough to identify all individuals with a particular
disorder, and specific enough to identify only those individuals with a particular disorder.
Identifying the differences in the causal structures of psychiatric disorders can help
differentiate between these conditions, despite similarity in their symptoms. Given the
causal complexity of most psychiatric conditions, multi-level, interactionist mechanistic
causal explanations are the most viable way of adequately representing the differences in
the causal structure of psychiatric disorders. If an explanation pattern meets the above
criteria, explanations generated using that pattern may help to inform diagnostic criteria
that are both reliable and valid. By elucidating the causal structures of psychiatric condi-
tions, clinicians will be better able to differentiate and distinguish between disorders based
on causal differences and the presence of outward symptoms, which improves diagnostic
validity and reliability.
For example, consider the following case. A male child displays repetitive behaviours
and language delays, and has a low IQ. These symptoms may indicate that this child has
an autism spectrum disorder, such as autistic disorder. However, these symptoms could
also indicate that this child has mental retardation. If diagnosis is based on symptoms
alone, it can be difficult to determine if this particular child should be diagnosed with an
autism spectrum disorder, mental retardation or both (recall mental retardation and ASD
can often occur together). However, a multi-level, interactionist mechanistic explanation of
conditions like ASD and mental retardation will be better able to distinguish between these
conditions. For instance, children with ASD may have patterns of genetic and epigenetic
mutations that are distinct from those associated with the development of some forms of
mental retardation, which I discuss in more detail in chapter five. Further, children with
ASD may have neurological impairments, such as a malfunctioning mirror neuron system,
that are different than those seen in mental retardation. Finally, children with ASD have
distinct cognitive impairments not seen in children with mental retardation, such as an
underdeveloped theory of mind. Identifying these and other causal differences between
these conditions reduces the amount of overlap in the diagnostic criteria for ASD and
mental retardation, and further sharpens the boundaries of these diagnostic categories.
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Thus, multi-level, interactionist mechanistic causal explanations are more likely to identify
the underlying malfunctions that are causing the symptoms a patient is displaying, which
will increase the validity of diagnosis. Diagnosis will also be more reliable in this case, it
will be based on the presence or absence of certain causal features, rather than only on the
presence of absence of symptoms. Even if the symptoms change or are atypical, the presence
or absence of certain causal features will be what determines a particular diagnosis, which
will reduce the problems of diagnostic overlap and over-inclusion in diagnostic categories.
2.5 Psychiatry and Explanation Schemas of Disease
Psychiatric theory and practice have undergone several conceptual changes, and the way
in which psychiatric disorders are diagnosed and treated has been influenced by the dom-
inant overall conceptual framework in a given era. Explanations of diseases and disorders,
including psychiatric disorders, can be elucidated using explanation schemas (Thagard &
Findlay, 2010; Thagard, 1999). Thagard (1999) states that explanation schemas have an
explanatory target, which is the phenomenon to be explained, and a particular explanation
pattern that includes identifying the causes of the phenomenon in question. On Thagard’s
account (1999), diseases are represented as causal structures, where
Symptoms are the observable manifestations of a disease, which can develop
over time in particular ways that constitute the expected course of the disease.
The symptoms arise from the cause or causes...of the disease. Treatment of the
disease should affect the symptom and course of the disease, often by affecting
the causal factors that produce the symptoms. (p. 21).
On this account, diseases are conditions with certain causal factors that bring about the
characteristic symptoms of a particular disease or disorder. Treatment of diseases reduces
or eliminates the symptoms, and thus affects course and prognosis.
Representing diseases in terms of explanatory schemas also helps to explain why some
beliefs change regarding the causes of particular diseases. Thagard (1999) gives the ex-
tended example of peptic ulcers, now understood to be caused by the bacterium Helicobac-
ter pylori. Before Marshall & Warren (1984) published results finding H. pylori in almost
all subjects with gastritis and peptic ulcers, ulcers were thought to be caused by stress.
Bland foods and milk were thought to relieve the symptoms of ulcers (Thagard, 1999).
Thus, an explanation of peptic ulcers, based on the theory that they are stress-induced,
can be given as follows. A patient has symptoms such as nausea, vomiting, and a burning
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sensation in the stomach because he or she is under stress, which causes acid to be secreted,
causing the painful symptoms of peptic ulcers. This condition can be treated by ingesting
bland foods and milk. We can also put this explanation of the development of peptic ulcers
into a schema:
Explanatory Target: Why does a patient exhibit the symptoms of nausea, vom-
iting, and a burning sensation in the stomach?
Explanatory Pattern:
The patient is experiencing a period of stress, which increases the secretion of
stomach acid Increased stomach acid causes the symptoms of a peptic ulcer.
However, after Marshall & Watson published their results, another theory was accepted
regarding the causes of peptic ulcers. Although initially the bacteria hypothesis of peptic
ulcers was not universally accepted among physicians despite the discovery of H. pylori,
eventually this hypothesis was adopted by the medical community. The explanation schema
for the bacteria hypothesis of peptic ulcers is as follows:
Explanatory Target: Why does a patient exhibit the symptoms of nausea, vom-
iting, and a burning sensation in the stomach?
Explanatory Pattern:
The patient’s stomach is infected with the H. pylori bacterium The presence
of H. pylori causes the symptoms of a peptic ulcer.
Thagard (1999) argues that hypotheses are accepted or rejected based on their coher-
ence with evidence and other beliefs regarding the phenomenon in question. Thus, the
bacteria hypothesis of peptic ulcers was not accepted by many physicians because the
findings of Marshall & Watson (1984) did not cohere with current beliefs regarding pep-
tic ulcers, and there was limited evidence to support the bacteria hypothesis. However,
as more research was conducted, physicians accepted that H. pylori caused the major-
ity of peptic ulcers because this hypothesis explained the evidence better than the stress
hypothesis.
Thagard’s (1999) analysis of explanatory schemas in medicine can be applied to the
field of psychiatry as well. The history of psychiatry reveals several hypotheses regard-
ing the etiology of the various psychiatric disorders, including ASD. By examining both
past and present conceptual frameworks and the patterns explanations of autism spectrum
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disorders created within these frameworks, we can begin to evaluate whether the various
patterns of explanation for ASD developed since Kanner’s and Asperger’s original papers
meet the criteria for adequate explanation patterns for psychiatric conditions discussed
above. I adopt Thagard’s version of the explanation schema, which I use in chapters three,
four, five and six to elucidate explanations of autism spectrum disorders within different
conceptual frameworks in psychiatry and clinical psychology. To identify such explana-
tions, I develop schemas based on the way psychiatric disorders as a set of conditions are
explained within each conceptual framework, and show that the pattern of explanation
for ASD developed in a particular framework is an instantiation of that general pattern
of explanation. In chapters three, four, five, and six, I show that we can adopt Tha-
gard’s method to represent autism spectrum disorders as causal structures, as discussed
above with respect to peptic ulcers. In the case of autism spectrum disorders, the symp-
toms are the impairments in communication and interaction, and stereotyped behaviours.
Treatments like behavioural interventions are designed to ameliorate these symptoms, and
reduce the problematic behaviours and social difficulties seen in individuals with these
conditions.
Unlike some diseases in other branches of medicine, the causes of ASD, as well as other
psychiatric disorders listed in the DSM, are not well understood. The lack of causal infor-
mation regarding psychiatric disorders makes generating an explanation schema like those
above more difficult than for conditions like peptic ulcers. However, we can still analyze
how these disorders were explained, classified and diagnosed, and discuss the strengths
and weaknesses of causal theories of ASD in different conceptual frameworks that influ-
enced such patterns of explanation, classification and diagnosis. Using explanation schemas
to identify the different accounts of ASD allows us to evaluate how different patterns of
explanation identifying the possible causes of these conditions affect their diagnosis and
treatment. By evaluating past and present patterns of explanation for ASD, we can gain
insight into what sort of explanation pattern may be the most powerful for elucidating the
causes and progression of these conditions, and how explanations generated using these
patterns may improve their diagnosis and treatment.
2.6 Conclusion
This chapter discussed the current diagnostic system in psychiatry, and the arguments
made by several theorists who are critical of the current approach and hold that psychi-
atric diagnosis should be based on causal theories. Theorists such as Murphy (2006) state
that explanations of the symptoms of psychiatric disorders must include an account of the
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underlying biological impairments, and such explanations will not be nomological ones. As
this chapter argues, causation in psychiatric disorders is complex, multi-level, and interac-
tive, and thus classifications and diagnostic criteria in psychiatry must reflect the complex
and dynamic nature of these conditions and their symptoms. Like these theorists, I argue
that a cause-based framework is better than the current symptom-based framework from
which to classify and diagnose psychiatric disorders. However, there are several challenges
cause-based diagnosis must face. One of the most important obstacle to address is the
complexity and heterogeneity of the biological, cognitive, social and developmental fea-
tures of psychiatric disorders such as ASD. Based on an evaluation of the obstacles to
generating causal explanations and discussions by the theorists above regarding how to
begin to address these obstacles, I identified criteria that adequate explanation patterns
for psychiatric conditions need to meet. Specifically, explanations of psychiatric disorders
must be empirically supported, be internal consistent, and have what Murphy calls predic-
tive validity. I argue that patterns of explanation will have increased predictive validity if
these patterns are also parsimonious, interactionist, multi-level and mechanistic. Explana-
tion patterns that meet all these criteria will be universal enough and specific enough to
correctly identify individuals with the condition in question. Thus, patterns of explanation
that meet these criteria may help to improve explanatory power of psychiatric diagnosis
by increasing the validity and reliability of diagnostic categories.
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Chapter 3
Explanation Patterns For Autism
Spectrum Disorder: Psychoanalysis
and Behaviourism
3.1 Introduction
The last chapter discussed the methodological and conceptual problems with the current
symptom-based diagnostic system in psychiatry. However, the complex, interactive and
multi-level nature of causation in the development of psychiatric conditions present signifi-
cant obstacles to diagnosis and effective treatment. An analysis of the explanation patterns
for the disorders on the autism spectrum developed in past and current psychiatric practice
can provide insight into how psychiatric diagnosis and treatment can be improved if they
are based on adequate causal explanations, and how the diagnosis and treatment of ASD
will improve based on such causal explanations. By applying the criteria for adequate
explanation patterns in psychiatry developed in the last chapter to different explanation
patterns for ASD, we can gain further insight into what sort of explanation pattern might
be the most powerful for explaining the complex causation involved in the development
of psychiatric conditions. Further, we can analyze why certain patterns of explanation
are not powerful enough to explain the development and progression of conditions such as
those on the autism spectrum.
Since the publication of Kanner’s (1943) paper, there have been a number of theories
regarding the causes of autism spectrum disorders. Each explanation pattern has been
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influenced by the conceptual and methodological frameworks that have dominated psychi-
atry and clinical psychology for the last 60 years. An analysis of these schemas reveals
the central role that causation in psychiatric conditions and causal explanations of these
conditions have always played in the diagnosis and treatment of these disorders. In some
cases, casual explanations have played a key role in diagnosis, as in the era of psychoanal-
ysis. However, causal data and theories have always played a role in the classification and
diagnosis of psychiatric conditions. As Murphy (2006) and Poland et al (1994) note, while
current DSM categories are supposed to be ’atheoretical’ with respect to causes, causal
data and theories has implicitly influenced the classification of disorders like those on the
autism spectrum. Further, even the absence of causal data affects the way psychiatric
disorders are diagnosed. Examining the relationship between diagnosis of ASD and expla-
nations patterns identifying the possible causes of these conditions throughout the history
of psychiatric practice reveals that explanatory patterns unable to accurately represent the
complex and interactive causal structure of conditions like those on the autism spectrum
limit the validity, reliability and explanatory power of psychiatric diagnosis.
This chapter examines psychoanalytic and behaviourist explanatory patterns of the
disorders on the autism spectrum, and evaluates the effect these explanation patterns have
had on the diagnosis and treatment of these conditions. I show that both the psychoanalytic
and the behaviourist explanation schemas are poor candidates for causal information to
include in diagnosis, precisely because of the problems that motivated the field of psychiatry
to adopt theory-neutral, symptom-based criteria for the third edition of the Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual.
3.2 Psychoanalytic Theories of Autism Spectrum Dis-
orders: Refrigerator Mothers
Psychoanalytic theory dominated psychology and psychiatry from the 1940s to the 1970s
(Shorter, 1993). Psychoanalysis had a major impact on theories of autism, and perpetuated
one of the most well-known explanations of autism spectrum disorders. In this section,
I review the psychoanalytic account of the origins of these disorders, also known as the
’refrigerator mother’ hypothesis. Psychoanalysts such as Bettelheim (1967) and Mahler
(1952; 1958) argued that the rigid behaviours, language deficits, and impairments in social
interaction characteristic of ASD were psychological defense mechanisms to protect the
infant’s developing ego from an emotionally frigid care-giver. The therapeutic interventions
recommended by psychoanalysts were designed to ’restart’ normal ego development and
allow autistic children to progress past the stage of development at which they were fixated.
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In what follows, I discuss the development of this hypothesis, and how the ’refrigerator
mother’ account influenced the diagnosis and treatment of the disorders on the autism
spectrum. I argue that psychoanalysis is inadequate as a viable causal account of psychi-
atric disorders. Psychoanalysis has been plagued with vague concepts, inconsistent clinical
findings, and poor empirical support since its beginnings in psychiatry and psychology
(Shorter, 1993). Further, the ’refrigerator mother’ hypothesis of the origins of autism
spectrum disorders has been condemned by many clinicians as both empirically false and
damaging to the relationship between children with ASD and their parents. Finally, the
lack of empirically verified causal information in the psychoanalytic explanation pattern
for ASD made treatment ineffective and did nothing to help clear up diagnostic confusion
with respect to these conditions. The lack of consistent and empirically supported causal
accounts of psychiatric disorders, along with the lack of a valid and reliable diagnostic ap-
proach discussed in the last chapter, make psychoanalytic explanation patterns of autism
spectrum disorders untenable.
3.2.1 A Psychoanalytic Explanation Pattern for Psychiatric Con-
ditions
In the psychoanalytic era, there were some conditions understood by analysts to have
a biological origin, such as the mental retardation and developmental delays associated
with malnutrition and PKU (DSM-I). However, many psychiatric conditions, including
the major affective, thought, personality and pervasive developmental disorders, were hy-
pothesized to have ”psychogenic” origins, given the lack of known biological causes for
these conditions. For instance, the condition Kanner identified, and other cases of what
are currently recognized as disorders on the autism spectrum, were some of the many con-
ditions included under the general diagnostic grouping of ”disorders of psychogenic origin
or without clearly defined physical cause or structural change in the brain (p. DSM-I, p.
24).” The lack of known causes for these conditions prompted theorists in the psychoan-
alytic era to develop psychological theories of the origin of the conditions on the autism
spectrum. Psychoanalytic theories placed the origins of most major psychiatric disorders
in early childhood development, and held that these conditions were the result of uncon-
scious psychological conflicts, caused by fixating at a particular stage of ego development.
As mentioned in the last chapter, not all analysts recognized autism spectrum disorders
as separate conditions from schizophrenia, and the boundaries between cases of childhood
schizophrenia and ASD was not always clear. However, several prominent analysts, such
as Mahler and Bettelheim, argued that autism was a separate condition, and developed
a theory of the origins of this condition based on the overall psychoanalytic conceptual
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framework.
According to psychoanalysis, the ego progresses through stages of psychosexual devel-
opment, where psychological structures and socio-cognitive skills are developed through
interaction with the outside environment (Mahler, 1952; 1958; Willick, 1990). Psychoan-
alysts often described this socio-cognitive development as a progression through stages of
object-relations, i.e. understanding the relationship between the ego and the outside world,
and argued that the relationship between the child and the mother was vital to progressing
through these stages and for proper ego development. Prominent psychoanalyst Margaret
Mahler (1952; 1958; Elkisch & Mahler, 1979) outlines the developmental stages of the ego.
She states that infants begin in a state of ’normal autism,’ where they are unaware of the
difference between the outer environment and the inner world of the mind, and do not see
the mother or primary care giver as an object distinct from themselves. After this phase
of ’normal autism,’ infants proceed to a phase of symbiosis, where the mother is seen as an
object joined with the infants’ developing psychological structures. At this point, infants
are able to recognize that their mothers are part of an external reality, but believe that they
and their mothers are fundamentally joined as two objects. The separation-individuation
phase follows, where children understand their mothers as separate objects from them-
selves, and begin to differentiate themselves from objects in the external world. Finally, at
the end of the separation-individuation phase, children are able to ’integrate’ the objects
in the world and themselves into a cohesive picture of reality.
In the case of psychiatric illnesses with no known biological cause, psychoanalysts looked
to the relationship between the patient and the primary care-giver, particularly the mother.
These clinicians hypothesized that it is a disruption in the development of object-relations
that characterize the so-called ’psychotic’ disorders such as schizophrenia and ASD (Mal-
her, 1952, 1958; Bettelheim, 1967). Willick (1990) states that psychoanalytic theories
relied on the developmental timeline above to ascertain the origins of the symptoms of dis-
orders such as schizophrenia, bi-polar disorder, and autism spectrum disorders, all of which
fell under the heading of ’disorders of psychogenic origin.’ Analysts believed deficient and
inadequate parenting on the part of the child’s mother causes the child’s ego to become
fixated at a particular stage of psychological development (Willick 1990). However, since
not every case of childhood psychiatric disturbances were accompanied by a neglectful par-
ent, analysts such as Bettelheim, Mahler, and Klein argued that the child only needed to
interpret the primary care-giver’s attention as neglectful or unsatisfying (Willick, 1990).
According to analysts like Bettelheim, the infant and young child are able to interpret
the motives and unconscious thoughts of the primary care giver, and attribute to that
care giver malicious and even murderous intentions (Bettelheim, 1967; Herbert, Sharp &
Gaudiano, 2002; Seifert, 1990). Such attributions by children would cause them to fixate
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at a particular stage of object relations and psychological development, thus determining
which disorder they will manifest in childhood and adulthood.
Mahler (1952; 1958), like other analysts, held that the ego’s alienation from, and distor-
tion of, external reality was the pivotal disturbance in ’psychotic conditions’ like schizophre-
nia and autism spectrum disorders. Many psychoanalysts believed that the various psy-
chiatric conditions observed by clinicians were all manifestations of the same psychological
disturbance, and the individual’s particular unconscious conflicts determined the develop-
mental stage at which the ego becomes fixated, and thus what symptoms were displayed
(Shorter, 1993). According to psychoanalysts, conditions like ASD and schizophrenia oc-
cur at distinct developmental stages, where the child has a certain understanding of the
relationship with the mother, i.e. as an undifferentiated, partially differentiated, or wholly
differentiated object. For instance, childhood schizophrenia was thought to be the result
of fixation at the beginning phases of the symbiosis stage of psychological development,
where infants are unable to differentiate the outside world from the contents of their minds
(Willick, 1990; Mahler, 1952; 1958; Elkisch & Mahler, 1979). On the other hand, autism
spectrum disorders were thought to be the result of stalled ego development at the ear-
liest stages, i.e. where even distinctions between self and other are not made (Mahler,
1958; Elkisch & Mahler, 1979). Finally, the symptoms of adult-onset psychiatric condi-
tions, such as the deterioration of cognitive and basic life skills in schizophrenia after a
period of typical psychological functioning, were interpreted as the patient’s regression to
an earlier stage of ego development (Willick, 1990). Depending on the stage at which the
ego becomes fixated, the child will react to the real or imagined malicious intentions and
inadequate care-giving by displaying the symptoms characteristic of an autism spectrum
disorder, schizophrenia, etc. (Bettelheim, 1967; Willick, 1990). Thus, for theorists such
as Mahler (1952; 1958), what differentiated schizophrenia and ASD was not the presence
or absence of core symptoms like hallucinations or delusions, but rather the age of on-
set. On this account, adult-onset disorders, such as schizophrenia and bi-polar disorder,
were thought to be continuous with so-called ’childhood psychoses’ such as ASD and child-
hood schizophrenia, since the same disturbance lay at the root of all so-called ’psychotic
disorders’ - disrupted object-relations caused by psychological trauma, created by real or
imagined inadequate parenting (Willick, 1990; Shorter, 1993).
We can frame the psychoanalytic account of psychiatric disorders as a pattern of ex-
planation. To put this pattern into more formal terms, I adopt Thagard’s (1999) version
of the explanation schema, discussed in the last chapter. The psychoanalytic account of
the development of psychiatric disorders is as follows:
Explanatory Target : Why do certain individuals develop psychiatric disorders?
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Explanatory Pattern:
The ego progresses through stages of psychosexual development, where a child
develops socio-cognitive skills, such as object relations.
All psychiatric disorders are the result of the same psychological disturbance,
i.e. the representation of real or imagined psychological trauma.
The child’s experience of real or imagined psychological trauma is caused by
inadequate care-giving on the part of the child’s mother or primary care-giver.
The child’s experience of real or imagined psychological trauma caused by in-
adequate care-giving stalls the child’s ego development.
Stalled ego development causes the child’s ego to fixate at certain stages of
psychosexual development.
Stalled ego development that occurs at certain stages of psychosexual develop-
ment results in the type of psychiatric disorder an individual develops.
The symptoms of the patient’s psychiatric disorder indicate the developmental
stage where he or she is fixated.
Thus, psychoanalytic explanation pattern of psychiatric disorders of ’psychogenic’ ori-
gin identified poor care-giving as the main cause of the symptoms characteristic of dis-
orders such as ASD and schizophrenia. Since these conditions had no known biological
features, the causes of these disorders were thought to result from unconscious psycho-
logical conflicts. Since the mother or primary care giver was considered vital for proper
ego development through the various stages of object-relations, poor parenting on the part
of the mother or care giver must be the reason for the individual’s inability to progress
through those developmental stages, which causes the symptoms of psychiatric conditions
observed in clinical practice.
3.2.2 A Psychoanalytic Explanation Pattern for Autism Spec-
trum Disorders
The psychoanalytic tradition was the first conceptual framework to generate a theory
regarding the origins of autism spectrum disorders. While psychoanalysis used a set of
concepts not included in Kanner’s and Asperger’s original work, psychodynamic theories
attempted to explain the same cognitive and behavioural disturbances these researchers
identified as the characteristic symptoms of ASD.
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While clinicians such as Mahler and Betteheim developed the ’refrigerator mother’ ex-
planation of ASD based on the concepts and theories prominent in the era of psychoanal-
ysis, theorists such as Wing (1997) note remarks made in Kanner’s (1943; 1949) original
papers that hint at a possible psychogenic cause of autistic symptoms, thus influencing
psychoanalytic theories regarding the etiology of ASD. In his early research, Kanner pro-
posed a theory that inspired many other theorists to find a psychological cause for the
behaviour demonstrated by children with autism. While Kanner suspected that autism
may have a genetic component, he also theorized that the emotional ’frigidness’ of the
child’s mother was a major cause of autistic behaviour. Mesibov, Adams & Klinger (1997)
state that Kanner was unable to find any clear biological impairments in his original sam-
ple of eleven children, and this lack of evidence for a biological cause led him to examine
the relationships between the parents and their autistic children. Kanner stated that the
parent-child relationships were characterized by ’mechanistic’ interactions, obsessiveness
and lack of parental warmth (Kanner, 1949; Mesibov et al. 1997). Further, he theorized
that children who had this type of interaction with their parents escaped the lack of af-
fection by withdrawing and seeking comfort in solitary activities. Kanner was unsatisfied
with, and skeptical about, his psychogenic theory, since many of his children’s siblings did
not have autism and many children with ’cold’ parents are not autistic. However, this
hypothesis motivated many clinicians within the psychoanalytic framework to establish a
link between unemotional parents (particularly the mother) and autistic behaviour.
Theorists in the psychoanalytic era focused on the difficulty children with autism had
with relating to people and objects in their environment. Mesibov et al. (1997) describe the
rationale for this type of theorizing as follows: ”[i]f children with autism could not relate to
others, their repetitive action, language impairments, and other symptoms must...represent
a withdrawal from an outside world that they found intolerable (p. 6).” As discussed
above, the self-other relationship is a central component of psychoanalytic theories of early
childhood development. Mahler’s work on children with autism spectrum disorders is
based on the psychoanalytic view that the symptoms of autism were a defense mechanism
against the emotional unavailability of the mother, which resulted in her inability to assist
the child in progressing through the stages of ego development. Mahler argued that in
order to understand ’psychosis’ in children, one must examine the stage of development at
which the mother is not yet, or is about to be, differentiated from the infant’s own ego.
Since children with autistic symptoms often fail to differentiate themselves and others from
inanimate objects, and fail to develop an emotional bond with their mothers, such children
must be stuck at the very first rudimentary stages of ego development - the so-called
’autistic phase’ (1952; 1958).
Following in this tradition, the most well-known psychoanalytic account of autism was
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put forward by Bettelheim in his 1967 book The Empty Fortress. Bettelheim’s account of
the psychological origins of autism adapted and simplified psychoanalytic concepts such
as self-other relations and ego development (Nadesan, 2005). He argued that autism was
the result of maternal behaviour toward the infant during critical periods of development.
Bettelheim rejected the possibility of biological or innate factors that could result in autistic
behaviour, and focused solely on the mother’s interaction with the child. Like the other
psychoanalytic accounts of autism, Bettelheim linked autism with frustrated attempts at
individuation and object relations. He argued that these failed attempts would lead to
a complete lack of development if experienced in the first year of life, or to incomplete
individuation if experienced in the second year of life (Bettelheim, 1967).
Like Mahler and other analysts working in the area of ’child psychoses,’ Bettelheim
attributed the causes of psychiatric disturbances in children to emotional unavailability
and inadequate care on the part of the mother. However, as mentioned above, Bettelheim
attributed more than just emotional frigidness to mothers of autistic children - he argued
that these mothers held subconscious ’murderous’ thoughts towards their children (Herbert,
Sharp & Gaudiano, 2002), and wished that their children did not exist (Bettelheim, 1967).
On this account, infants were able to ascertain the unconscious motives of their mothers,
and retreat into an ’autistic state’ in order to escape a reality in which they are cared for
in an emotionless, mechanical way (Seifert, 1990; Herbert et al, 2002). Bettelheim (1967)
gives his account of the origins of autistic symptoms and behaviour as follows:
Infantile autism...stems from the original conviction that there is nothing at
all one can do about a world that offers some satisfactions, though not those
one desires, and only in frustrating ways. As more is expected of such a child,
and as he tries to find some satisfactions on his own he meets even greater
frustration: because he neither gains satisfaction nor can be do as his parents
expect. So he withdraws to the autistic position. If this happens, the world
which until then seemed only insensitive now appears utterly destructive, as it
did from the start to the child who [fails to thrive in institutions] (1967, p. 46).
Thus, on Bettelheim’s account, a child becomes autistic as a defense against inadequate
care in the early years of development, that is, as a response to a ’refrigerator mother.’
Based on the view that ASD had a psychological origin, psychoanalysts argued that psy-
chotherapy was the way to treat these disorders. Analysts like Bettelheim recommended
removing autistic children from their parents’ care and placing them in the custody of
nurturing care-givers. Many of the theorists of this time assumed that the autistic child
would improve once they left the emotionally unavailable mother. Once removed from
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the ”frustrating” and ”cold” maternally-dominated environment, an autistic child would
undergo proper individuation and ego development, and proper ego development would
ameliorate the symptoms of autism (Bettelheim, 1967).
The ’refrigerator mother’ hypothesis of ASD and the diagnostic practices that stemmed
from this hypothesis are instantiations of the overall psychoanalytic conceptual framework
and the way psychoanalysis explained the origins and symptoms of psychiatric conditions.
First, the psychoanalytic tradition held that most psychiatric disturbances could be un-
derstood as unconscious psychological conflicts, and thus even conditions now understood
to have a strong biological basis, such as ASD, were explained in terms of unconscious
psychodynamic causes. In the absence of known biological causes of the disorders on the
autism spectrum, theorists like Mahler and Bettelheim developed a causal theory of autism
spectrum disorders based on the psychoanalytic view that disorders without known biolog-
ical causes were the result of real or imagined psychological trauma during early childhood
development. Second, the identification of autism spectrum disorders in the clinical popu-
lation and the diagnosis of these conditions relied on the psychoanalytic interpretation of
the relationship between patient and primary care giver, and on the interpretation of the
patient’s symptoms based on classifications and categories developed by analysts.
We can summarize the refrigerator mother explanation of ASD, and develop an expla-
nation schema like the one above for psychoanalytic theories of the origins of psychiatric
conditions. The explanation schema in formal terms is as follows:
Explanatory Target : Why do certain children exhibit stereotyped, rigid be-
haviours, and impairments in language and social interaction?
Explanatory pattern:
A child who has an emotionally unavailable mother will develop impairments
in language, interaction, and stereotyped behaviours as a way of coping with
the emotional neglect from the mother.
A child will continue to exhibit the characteristic symptoms of autism as a way
of protecting the ego from an emotionally frigid environment.
An underdeveloped ego causes the child to be unable to differentiate himself
or herself from objects in the world and other people, and the child will not
progress through the stages of proper ego development, thus perpetuating the
symptoms of autism.
Thus, psychoanalytic account of ASD holds that they are not biological impairments,
but are psychological or emotional problems that are environmental in nature. To sum-
marize, the explanation pattern for ASD in the psychoanalytic tradition is based on the
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general psychoanalytic explanation pattern for the origins of psychiatric conditions dis-
cussed above: the symptoms of ASD, i.e. the impairments in communication, interaction,
and language, are a coping mechanism to protect the child’s ego from an emotionally un-
available mother. The symptoms of ASD will be ameliorated by removing the child from
the mother’s care and restarting ’normal’ ego development, where the child learns to dif-
ferentiate himself or herself from others, and moves effectively through the stages of ego
development.
3.2.3 Psychoanalytic Explanation Patterns and the Criteria for
Adequate Explanation Patterns in Psychiatry
Shorter (1993) notes that psychoanalytic theory and practice were isolated from traditional
medicine and neuroscience, thus largely ignoring biological data that would better explain
many of the disorders psychoanalysts attempted to treat. A conceptual framework, like
psychoanalysis, that is isolated in both theory and practice provides little possibility of
linking psychoanalytic theories with related research in other fields, some of which are
vital to autism research, such as developmental psychology and cognitive neuroscience.
Further, diagnosis of conditions like ASD based on psychoanalytic explanation patterns is
plagued by poor reliability and validity, which limits the predictive and explanatory power
of diagnosis in psychiatry. As I argued in the last chapter, diagnostic criteria that have
weak reliability and validity fail to overcome the problems of over-inclusion and arbitrary
diagnostic boundaries, which are the most significant issues with the current diagnostic
and classification system in psychiatry. The psychoanalytic explanation pattern for ASD,
while consistent with the overall psychoanalytic framework, is an inadequate explanation
pattern for psychiatric conditions. The standard objections to both psychoanalytic theories
in general, and psychoanalytic theories of ASD specifically, help to illustrate why a causal
explanation like the ’refrigerator mother’ hypothesis is untenable. Briefly discussing the
flaws in psychoanalytic theory allows us to conclude that a psychoanalytic explanation
pattern for ASD does not meet the criteria for adequate explanation patterns in psychiatry.
The psychoanalytic explanation pattern meets some of the criteria for adequate expla-
nation patterns, but fails to meet others. The psychoanalytic explanation is multi-level in
a way, in that it implicates the subconscious, the ego, and the environment. This pattern
of explanation is also interactionist, since analysts like Mahler and Bettelheim argued that
the symptoms of disorders like ASD were the result of interactions between the subcon-
scious of the developing child and the environmental cause of a frigid mother. Further,
the psychoanalytic explanation pattern can be represented in a mechanistic way, where
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the parts are the child’s developing ego, the emotional reactions of the mother, and the
interactions between these parts explains the development of the characteristic symptoms
of autism spectrum disorders.
However, the psychoanalytic theory had poor empirical support and was internally
inconsistent, and thus was unable to correctly identify the primary causes that accurately
predict the presentation and progression of autistic symptoms. The fundamental cause
identified in the psychoanalytic explanation pattern of ASD was also implicated by analysts
like Mahler and Bettelheim in the development of unrelated disorders such as schizophrenia.
Cases of ASD being identified by clinicians depended more on the particular clinician’s
interpretation of the unsystematic and inconsistent psychoanalytic framework, rather than
on explanatory and predictive power of the psychoanalytic explanation.
First, as with the overall psychoanalytic conceptual framework and explanation pat-
terns for psychiatric conditions, the ’refrigerator mother’ explanation of the disorders on
the autism spectrum has poor empirical support. Clinicians such as Willick (1990), Leicht-
man (1990) and Kandel (1999) state that the concepts used in psychoanalytic theories have
not been verified by current knowledge of early socio-cognitive development, and do not
cohere well with established research in developmental psychology. Further, psychoanalytic
accounts of psycho-social development have been heavily criticized for overestimating the
capabilities of the developing child, such as Bettelheim’s claim that children in the earliest
stages of neonatal development are able to ascertain the unconscious, malicious intentions
of nursing mothers (Siefert, 1990). Psychoanalytic theories of both normal and patho-
logical socio-cognitive development hold that even very young infants have sophisticated
conceptual knowledge and emotional complexity. In order for the development of psychi-
atric disorders like ASD to occur, children were supposedly able to interpret the actions
of their parents in the very earliest stages of ego development. From what is currently
known about infant and early childhood socio-cognitive development, such sophisticated
conceptual and emotional development does not occur until much later in childhood.
Second, psychoanalysts working in the area of child psychiatry produced accounts that
differed significantly in their descriptions of both typical and impaired psychological de-
velopment (Willick, 1990). For instance, Mahler (1952; 1958) identifies a phase of ’normal
autism,’ where other clinicians, such as Klein do not recognize this phase of development
(Willick, 1990) when placing the beginnings of psychotic illnesses in the developmental
stages of the ego. Further, analysts were often inconsistent in the application of concepts
like ’psychosis’ and ’schizophrenia’ to conditions unrelated to both of these categories of
disorder, such as ASD. Many analysts failed to distinguish between child schizophrenia,
adult-onset schizophrenia, and autism spectrum disorders, regarding these conditions as
continuous (Willick, 1990). Thus, psychoanalytic theories of the origins of ASD had poor
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internal consistency, which makes diagnosis of ASD within the psychoanalytic framework
problematic.
Third, the psychoanalytic theories such as the refrigerator mother hypothesis failed
to correctly identify the fundamental causes of ASD. The claim that the symptoms of
autism were caused by an emotionally unavailable mother received only limited support
from studies conducted with autistic children and their parents, and there is little evidence
that poor or even abusive parenting tactics are responsible for conditions such as autism
or schizophrenia. As Kanner himself noted, not all children with ASD have an emotionally
frigid mother, and not all children with frigid parents have ASD. In the years following
Kanner’s original study, many other clinicians argued that the link between emotional
frigidness on the part of parents and autistic symptoms was only weakly substantiated
(e.g. Rimland, 1964; Rutter, 1978).
Empirically unsupported, inconsistent and poorly defined theories in this era made the
diagnosis of psychiatric conditions highly unreliable. Diagnosis of conditions like those on
the autism spectrum in this era was heavily dependent on the clinician’s interpretation of
the patient’s symptoms and whether the clinician recognized ASD as distinct psychiatric
disorders, and thus could vary drastically from clinician to clinician. In the case of the
diagnosis of an autism spectrum disorder, the clinician would examine and interpret the
interaction between the child and the parents, particularly the mother, and identify the
characteristic symptoms in the children in question. Whether a child’s symptoms were
diagnosed as ”autistic” depended more on the particular analyst’s interpretation of the
mother-child interaction, and the identification of ’unconscious’ attitudes and feelings on
the part of the mother and the child. Thus, characterizing the interaction between mother
and child could be the subject of disagreement between clinicians, and if the mother is not
seen as sufficiently frigid in the view of the clinician in question, a diagnosis of ASD may
not be given. However, interpreting a mother’s interaction with her child as emotionally
frigid could lead a clinician to interpret ambiguous symptoms as indicative of ASD, when
they could be better explained by another diagnosis. For example, a child who exhibits
language delays and a limited repertoire of behaviours could be diagnosed as autistic if he
or she had an emotionally cold mother, even though this child may be suffering from mental
retardation, which is also characterized by limited behaviours and language impairments,
rather than ASD.
As well as poor reliability, diagnosis within a psychoanalytic framework also suffered
from poor validity, which often results when diagnostic categories do not accurately identify
vital information such as the primary causes, onset and progression of the disorder. While
the psychoanalytic explanation pattern for ASD is parsimonious and attempts to identify
a primary cause, i.e. refrigerator mothers, simply attributing the symptoms of ASD to
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uncaring mothers does not explain 1) the significant variation in the symptoms of ASD
across patients and in the same patient over time, and 2) the interaction between the
individual and the environment that affects the presentation of the characteristic symptoms
of these disorders. Further, psychoanalytic theories of the origins of ASD do not identify
a correct primary cause, based on empirical evidence since the era of Bettelheim’s and
Mahler’s work that has definitively shown the refrigerator hypothesis to be false. Thus,
many causes of ASD were likely misdiagnosed, since the psychoanalytic explanation pattern
fails to reliably distinguish between cases of ASD, childhood schizophrenia, and other
developmental disorders. Misidentifying the primary causes(s), even an interactionist,
multi-level mechanistic explanation will likely misrepresent the nature of the disorder in
question, and will be less likely to correctly identify the disorder in the population.
Poor validity also occurs when explanations of psychiatric conditions do not accurately
differentiate between categories of disorder. In both DSM-I and DSM-II, which were based
on psychoanalytic concepts and theories, ASD were classified as a subtype of schizophrenia,
and was not distinguished from childhood schizophrenia. In the psychoanalytic era, autism
spectrum disorders were included under the broader classification of ’psychotic disorders,’
which included unrelated illnesses such as schizophrenia and bi-polar disorder. Classify-
ing ASD and schizophrenia as types of the same disorder does not reflect the nature of
the underlying pathology or characteristic symptoms of autism spectrum disorders, which
have biological, cognitive and social components significantly different from those seen in
schizophrenia. Thus, the psychoanalytic explanation pattern for ASD was too universal,
in that it identified many other individuals who in all likelihood do not have an autism
spectrum disorder, and also included ASD into a diagnostic group with unrelated disorders.
Likewise, the psychoanalytic explanation pattern was not specific enough to identify only
those individuals with an autism spectrum disorder.
Because of the problems in the psychoanalytic explanation pattern for psychiatric con-
ditions, treatment of these conditions in the era of psychoanalysis had very limited success.
As just discussed, the psychoanalytic explanation pattern for these conditions did not ac-
curately represent the underlying malfunctions causing the symptoms of conditions like
those on the autism spectrum, and thus psychoanalytic treatments were unable to repair
or address these malfunctions. Further, since many analysts argued that most psychiatric
conditions were the result of the same psychological disturbance, psychoanalysts treated
almost all psychiatric disorders with the techniques used during psychotherapy, including
free association and discussion of childhood relationships and events (Willick, 1990). How-
ever, psychoanalytically-based psychotherapy has limited success in most cases of ASD,
since the impairments in language and social interaction make traditional techniques like
free association impossible. Finally, the treatment prescribed by theorists like Bettelheim,
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i.e. removal from the ’refrigerator mother,’ failed to ameliorate the symptoms of ASD.
The treatment of ASD that is prescribed based on psychoanalytic explanations for these
disorders is ineffective, which also undermines the explanatory and predictive power of
psychoanalytic explanations of autism spectrum disorders, such as the refrigerator mother
explanation. Unlike children who are neglected or abused, autistic children show little
improvement once they are removed from their homes (Paluszny, 1979).
While the psychoanalytic framework was the dominant conceptual framework in psy-
chiatry and psychology, and the psychoanalytic explanation pattern meets some of the
criteria, the psychoanalytic explanation pattern is not able to adequately explain and pre-
dict the onset and progression of psychiatric conditions such as ASD. The psychoanalytic
explanation pattern could be represented in terms of interacting, multi-level mechanisms,
and thus meets some of the criteria outlined in chapter two. While the psychoanalytic
explanation pattern is parsimonious, this pattern misidentifies the primary causes of con-
ditions like ASD, and is unable to reliably distinguish between ASD and disorders with
similar symptoms. Further, the psychoanalytic explanation pattern lacks empirical sup-
port and internal consistency. Finally, this pattern of explanation is too universal, and not
specific enough to accurately identify individuals with ASD. For these reasons, a psycho-
analytic pattern of explanation is inadequate for explaining the complex causation in the
development and progression of psychiatric conditions.
3.3 The Rise of Behaviourism and Behaviour Modifi-
cation
Following the reign of psychoanalysis, behaviourist approaches dominated clinical psychol-
ogy and psychiatry well into the 1970s (Riesman, 1991). From the beginning, behaviourists
were critical of the psychoanalytic approach to diagnosing and treating psychiatric disor-
ders, highlighting the limited effectiveness of psychoanalytic therapies for most of the major
psychiatric conditions, such as schizophrenia, ASD and bi-polar disorder (Shorter, 1993;
Eysenck, 1985). Although behaviourism and behaviour modification became popular in
the later half of the 20th century, behaviourist psychology and behaviourist discussions of
psychiatric disorders date back as early as the 1910s and 1920s. In a 1916 paper called
”Behavior and the concept of a psychiatric disorder,” behaviourist pioneer John B. Watson
critiqued Freudian theories of the origins of psychiatric disorders, and discussed the role
of habit and behavioural contingencies in the development of psychiatric conditions. Con-
tinuing in that tradition, modern theorists such as Eysenck (1985) argue that behavioural
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therapy based on the principles of learning theory is more effective than psychotherapy in
both the short and long term.
3.3.1 A Behaviourist Explanation Pattern for Psychiatric Con-
ditions
In his 1916 paper, Watson highlights the distinction made by analysts such as those dis-
cussed above regarding disorders with known biological causes, and those without known
biological causes. He states that physicians and clinicians in his time differentiated between
conditions with biological causes and those that were ”purely mental (p. 589).” As dis-
cussed above, many of the major psychiatric disorders were thought to be ”purely mental”
and attributed to unconscious psychological conflicts. However, Watson (1916) is skeptical
of psychoanalytic concepts of psychiatric disorders, and states ”...I began to attempt to
formulate my own ideas as to the terminology I should use in describing a mental disease...I
am strengthened in this attempt to give my concept of mental diseases by the difficulty
I have had in understanding the terminology...of the psychoanalytic movement (p. 589).”
While he argues that there is some genuinely valuable insight about psychiatric disorders
contained in the psychoanalytic account, Watson maintains that there is a simpler and
more scientific way to define these conditions.
Watson’s (1916) theory of psychiatric disorders retains the core insight from psycho-
analysis, which is that childhood experiences can shape the way we think and act as adults,
often resulting in maladaptive habits and patterns of behaviour. He states ”[t]he central
truth that I think Freud has given us is that youthful, outgrown, and possibly discarded
habit and instinctive systems of reaction can and possibly always do influence the function-
ing of our adults systems of reactions, and influence to a certain extent even the possibility
of our forming the new habit systems which we must reasonably be expected to form (1916,
emphasis in original, p. 590).” In many cases, ”some of these [childhood habits] yield
with difficulty and we often get badly twisted in attempting to put them away, as every
psychiatric clinic can testify (p. 591).”
Further, Watson believed that many of the disagreements between clinicians regarding
the meaning of psychoanalytic terms could at least be partially resolved by making reference
to behaviour and using behaviourist terminology. He states
[t]he implication is clear that in the psychoneuroses I should look for habit
disturbances -maladjustments- and should attempt to describe my findings in
terms of the inadequacy of responses, of wrong responses, and of the complete
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lack of responses to the objects and situations in the daily life of the patient. I
should likewise attempt to trace out the original conditions leading to malad-
justment and the causes leading to its continuation. To these statements most
psychopathologists will subscribe, but most of them will insist that maladjust-
ments can not be stated wholly in behavior terms (1916, emphasis in original,
p. 591).
Thus, behaviourist accounts of psychiatric conditions differ greatly from psychoanalytic
approaches, and attempted to move explanations of psychopathology away from unmea-
surable, unseen psychodynamic causes.
Later behaviourists would continue to explain psychiatric conditions in terms of mal-
adaptive stimulus-response pairings, and argued that the most effective treatment of these
conditions is to alter those stimulus-response pairings. For instance, Eysenck (1985) ar-
gues that therapy based on the principles of Pavlovian extinction is the most effective
treatment for conditions like obsessive-compulsive disorder. By changing the patient’s
environment, the stimuli to which the patient is exposed are altered, thus changing the
nature of the responses. He states that behaviourists understand phenomena like anxiety
and obsessions to be the result of the patient’s inappropriate responses to stimuli, rather
than the cause of the patient’s reactions to particular stimuli. Psychoanalytic explanations
of obsessive-compulsive disorder would likely implicate memories from the patient’s child-
hood, unresolved feelings towards parental figures, and the feelings and beliefs the patient
is repressing. However, Eysenck (1985) argues that psychoanalytic approaches were inef-
fective in reducing the intensity of the obsessions and compulsions, and the frequency with
which they were experienced by the patient.
On the other hand, the behaviourist account of obsessive-compulsive disorder states that
the fear and panic characteristic of this condition results from associating the object of the
obsessions with feelings of anxiety or distress, and associating the compulsions that follow
the obsessions with relief from anxiety. Over time, these associations get reinforced and
strengthened by continued pairings, finally resulting in extreme anxiety anytime the subject
of the patient’s obsession is near. By focusing on how symptoms of psychiatric conditions
are triggered, behaviourist clinicians were able to reduce the severity and frequency of
these symptoms by changing features of the patient’s environment. We can frame the
behaviourist explanation of psychiatric conditions using an explanation schema, as we did
for the psychoanalytic explanation of psychiatric conditions. The behaviourist explanation
pattern is as follows:
Explanatory Target : Why do certain people develop the symptoms of psychi-
atric disorders?
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Explanatory Pattern:
A patient develops the characteristic symptoms of psychiatric disorders because
of maladaptive stimulus-response pairings and conditioning.
Maladaptive behaviours, like the symptoms of psychiatric disorders can be
extinguished by not reinforcing these behaviours, and reinforcing other, more
desired behaviours.
The symptoms of psychiatric disorders can be ameliorated by altering the re-
sponse patterns to particular external stimuli.
We can compare this explanation pattern for psychiatric conditions with the psycho-
analytic explanation pattern discussed above. Like psychoanalytic theories, behaviourist
theories of psychiatric disorders maintained that the symptoms of psychiatric conditions
were a reaction to events in the external environment. However, unlike psychoanalytic
theories, which held that psychiatric disorders were the result of maladaptive ego devel-
opment, behaviourism understood most psychological and behavioural problems to be the
result of external stimuli (Siefert, 1990). On the behaviourist account, it was not neces-
sary to posit internal states that cause behaviour, since what causes behaviour are external
stimuli. Thus, if a subject’s social learning was altered, and the reactions to various stimuli
changed, negative behaviour could be extinguished and new, positive behaviour could be
put in its place. The connection between manipulating external stimuli and altering the
presentation of the symptoms of psychiatric disorders like phobias, anxiety disorders and
ASD is the central aspect of behavioural therapy to treat these conditions.
3.3.2 A Behaviourist Explanation Pattern for Autism Spectrum
Disorders
A contrast can be seen in psychoanalytic and behaviourist explanations patterns for autism
spectrum disorders. Behaviourist theories of autism spectrum disorders provide an inter-
esting counterpoint to psychoanalytic theories, cognitive theories and neuroscientific the-
ories of these conditions. Clinicians in the behaviourist tradition held that problematic
behaviours like those seen in children with autism spectrum disorders were the result of
conditioning, and that problematic behaviours could be reduced by altering that condi-
tioning. Like the other theories discussed, behaviourist theories identified ASD by their
characteristic symptoms. However, Paluszny (1979) notes that behaviourist theories of
autism treatment approaches were not aimed, as psychoanalytic theories were, at discov-
ering the reason autistic children exhibited the symptoms of autism. Instead, behaviourist
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theories were aimed at teaching autistic children to overcome these symptoms to improve
their social interactions and language. Thus, a behaviourist account is not a full explana-
tory account of autism spectrum disorders, but does contain a description of the three
characteristic symptoms of ASD, a treatment for these conditions, and way to generate
prognosis. We can generate an explanation schema for the behaviourist account of autism
spectrum disorders, based on behaviourist theories of psychiatric conditions, and based on
the research regarding the treatment of these conditions using behaviourist techniques.
In the 1960s, when psychoanalytic theories were still popular, Ferster (1961) made
an important connection between learning theory and the symptoms of autism spectrum
disorders. He argued that the behaviour of autistic children was maintained by external
reinforcement, and could be controlled through behaviour modification. Ferster (1961;
Ferster & DeMyer, 1961) stated that the way to alter a child’s behavior was to eliminate the
consequences the child receives for behaving in a particular way, and reinforcing different
behaviours that are to replace the old ones. Behaviourists were unconcerned about the
possible cognitive or biological features of ASD, and behaviour modification became the
therapy of choice for children with autism. This therapy, like all behaviourist approaches,
was based on learning theory, and focused on the child’s reactions to external stimuli.
In behaviour modification, a therapist identifies the behavior patterns to be changed,
engages in reinforcing the desired behaviour, and extinguishing undesired behaviours. In
the case of autism, these patterns could be social withdrawal and self-injurious acts, such
as banging the head. Paluszny (1979) outlines the steps in this form of therapy as follows.
First, the therapist must define the symptoms to be modified, either to eliminate a partic-
ular behaviour or to produce one. Second, the therapist identifies the cues and stimuli that
produce the behaviour of interest. Third, the goals and plan for the therapy are outlined.
Finally, the therapist uses positive and negative reinforcement, in gradual steps, to guide
the child’s responses and produce the desired results. Behavioural interventions based on
applied behaviour analysis have been shown to be the most effective treatments for disor-
ders on the autism spectrum. Unlike the treatments prescribed by psychoanalysts, autistic
children who receive 40-plus hours a week of applied behaviour analysis for a period of at
least two years can show improvements in IQ scores, language, social interaction, and can
be placed in a regular classroom when they reach school age (Lovaas, 1987; 1993).
Behaviourist theories emphasize the role of the environment in the generation, sever-
ity, and progression of the symptoms of ASD, and while rejecting biological or cognitive
explanations of disorders like those on the autism spectrum. While not an explicit causal
explanation, behaviourists argued that the symptoms of ASD were the result of learning
to generate a particular response to external stimuli. Thus, the behaviourist explanation
pattern for autism spectrum disorders holds that the characteristic symptoms of these
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conditions arise as the result of maladaptive stimulus-response pairings, i.e. pairing prob-
lematic behaviours with particular external stimuli. These symptoms can be ameliorated
by altering the conditioned responses to these stimuli. For example, a child who bangs his
head against a wall when he becomes upset at sudden changes to his external environment
can be conditioned to refrain from banging his head when these changes occur.
We can represent the behaviourist explanation of autism spectrum disorders as an
explanation schema, which is as follows:
Explanatory Target : Why do certain children exhibit rigid and stereotyped
behaviours, and impairments in language and social interaction?
Explanatory Pattern:
A child exhibits the characteristic symptoms of autism spectrum disorders be-
cause of maladaptive stimulus-response pairings and conditioning.
Maladaptive behaviours like banging of the head or limited patterns of social
interactions can be extinguished by not reinforcing these behaviours, and rein-
forcing other, more desired behaviours.
The characteristic symptoms of ASD, like limited patterns of social interac-
tion and tantrums, can be ameliorated by altering the response patterns to
particular external stimuli.
Recognizing the importance of the patient’s environment provided a key insight into the
development of applied behavior analysis, which remains the most effective treatment for
ASD. However, while behaviourist approaches had more effective treatments, behaviourist
explanation patterns for psychiatric conditions are too general and simplistic to effectively
differentiate between categories of these disorders, and limit diagnostic reliability and va-
lidity.
3.3.3 Behaviourist Explanation Patterns and the Criteria for Ad-
equate Explanation Patterns in Psychiatry
This explanation pattern for autism spectrum disorders, like the psychoanalytic explana-
tion pattern just discussed, is consistent with the larger behaviourist conceptual framework,
and is an instantiation of behaviourist theories of psychiatric disorders. Behaviourists held
that all behaviour, including the disordered and erratic patterns of behaviour seen in psy-
chiatric disorders, is the result of external stimuli. Theorists like Eysenck (1985) and
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Ferster (1961) acknowledge the complexity of psychiatric disorders, but argue that the
symptoms are largely determined by the external environment. The symptoms of ASD
could be effectively treated using behaviourist techniques, and so these conditions must
share the same general characteristics of psychiatric conditions, and are thus explained
in the same way. Since behaviourist therapies were more effective than psychoanalytic
therapies, behaviourists like Eysenck argue that understanding psychiatric disorders as
the result of stimulus-response pairs is a better explanation than what was provided by
psychoanalysts.
Despite further conceptual changes in both psychiatry and clinical psychology, be-
havioural interventions have remained one of the most popular treatments for autistic chil-
dren, since this form of therapy is still the most successful in ameliorating the symptoms in
children with autism (Mesibov et al. 1997; Paluszny, 1979). Effective treatment provides an
important piece of information about ASD: the characteristic symptoms, while difficult to
treat, are affected by changes in the environment. Thus, one of the factors that influences
the severity and chronic nature of ASD’s characteristic socio-cognitive symptoms is the
environment with which a patient interacts. Like the psychoanalytic explanation pattern
just discussed, the emphasis behaviourists placed on the external environment highlighted
the social aspects involved in the development and maintenance of disorders like those on
the autism spectrum.
Behaviourist theories give a more consistent account of the characteristic symptoms of
ASD. Further, the treatments prescribed by behaviourists have empirical support in that
they provide effective treatment approaches for ameliorating the severity of the symptoms
of ASD. Behaviourst approaches are interested in treating and managing the symptoms,
rather than elucidating the underlying causal mechanisms that potentially differentiate
particular psychiatric disorders. However, the behaviourist explanation patterns for these
conditions fare no better than the psychoanalytic explanation pattern in differentiating
ASD as a distinct set of psychiatric conditions. Both the psychoanalytic explanation pat-
tern for autism spectrum disorders and the behaviourist explanation pattern for these
conditions reduce the potentially radically different causal history and pathology of dif-
ferent psychiatric disorders to one primary cause: psycho-sexual conflict and maladaptive
stimulus-response pairings respectively. On the behaviourist view, ASD are much like other
conditions listed in the DSM, in that they have the same ’cause’ and can be treated in the
same or similar manner. However, the behaviourist explanation pattern for autism spec-
trum disorders do not clearly differentiate these conditions from other psychiatric disorders.
Social or environmental factors are identified in causal theories for many psychiatric disor-
ders, and explaining the presence of symptoms as maladaptive stimulus-response pairings
does not explain the significant variability in the type, onset, severity, and clustering of
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symptoms across individuals diagnosed with psychiatric disorders.
Without more detailed causal information, diagnostic categories based on behaviourist
explanations of psychiatric disorders have poor diagnostic validity. Diagnostic categories of
psychiatric disorders based on behaviourist theories do not effectively distinguish between
ASD and other disorders of childhood, or conditions dissimilar to ASD, such as depression
or anxiety. The diagnostic category of autism spectrum disorders defined in behaviourist
terms does not accurately identify cases of ASD because the symptoms of these conditions
are also found in other disorders of childhood. Thus, the behaviourist explanation pat-
tern for ASD, like the psychoanalytic explanation pattern, is too universal, since it does
not reliably identify individuals with ASD versus another psychiatric condition. Because
behaviourist accounts of ASD did not clearly differentiate these conditions from other ill-
nesses, even if they could be treated the same way, the behaviourist explanation pattern
is not specific enough to reliably identify only those individuals with ASD.
Thus, the behaviourist explanation pattern for psychiatric disorders ends up only pro-
viding an account of how to mitigate the symptoms of these conditions, rather than an
account of the breakdowns of underlying mechanisms that cause the various behaviours
that characterize the different psychiatric disorders. However, merely treating the symp-
toms of disorders like those on the autism spectrum may be ineffective in the long run,
since behaviourist therapies such as ABA and other behaviour modification techniques
were not developed to treat autism particularly, but as an explanation of psychiatric con-
ditions in general. The problem with not differentiating between conditions that are po-
tentially radically different is that the same treatment will have varying effectiveness, since
the underlying pathology of each condition is different. Using the same treatment for
most psychiatric disorders misses important features of the underlying impairments in
each condition. Further, effective treatment of symptoms does not necessarily indicate
the underlying malfunctions that cause them, nor does effective treatment of a cluster of
symptoms necessarily indicate that these symptoms are caused by the same, similar or
even related underlying malfunctions. While the symptoms of ASD can be reduced by
applied behaviour analysis, a behaviourist explanation pattern as outlined above does not
provide a way to differentiate the symptoms of ASD from similar symptoms characteris-
tic of other disorders of childhood, such as mental retardation. Further, most psychiatric
conditions, including conditions unrelated biologically to ASD such as depression, phobias,
and post-traumatic stress-disorder, respond to the techniques of behaviour modification.
Behaviourist treatments of autism spectrum disorders are effective, but not necessarily
because behaviourist explanations are better at identifying these conditions in the clinical
population, but because these treatments work on most psychiatric conditions.
Psychological behaviourism, like logical behaviourism, is a positivist view. Thus, the
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behaviourist account of ASD cannot be mapped onto a mechanistic representation. The
behaviourist view identifies the important role the environment can play in the progres-
sion and severity of the symptoms of ASD, a key insight that helped develop behavioural
therapies, such as applied behaviour analysis (ABA) that are still used in the present day.
However, a behaviourist explanatory patterns of conditions like those on the autism spec-
trum cannot fully account for changes in the progression and presentation of symptoms as a
child ages, or why the presentation of symptoms changes even if the environment does not.
First, this account does not explain how the more ’cognitive’ aspects of these disorders,
such as language impairments and the inability to relate to others as intentional objects,
influence the outward behavioural symptoms. Second, the behaviourist account of ASD
is unable to explain the neurological and genetic abnormalities found in individuals with
these disorders, which also determine the presentation and severity of the characteristic
symptoms of these conditions. While behaviourist theories were not intended to explain
these features of ASD, the neurological, cognitive and genetic aspects of these disorders
are vital pieces of their explanations. Thus, the behaviourist account of ASD does explain
some of the interactions between symptoms and environment, the behaviourist explanatory
pattern is too simplistic to fully capture the complexity of the conditions on the autism
spectrum since it does not include causes from multiple levels. Diagnostic categories based
on behaviourist explanation patterns for psychiatric disorders provide little predictive or
explanatory power, and thus behaviourist explanation patterns are inadequate for explain-
ing the development and progression of psychiatric conditions. By concentrating solely
on the environmental causes of the symptoms of these conditions, a behaviourist explana-
tion pattern for psychiatric disorders like ASD suffer from the same shortcomings as the
psychoanalytic explanation pattern, although for very different reasons.
While the behaviourist schema has good empirical support and internal consistency, it
does not meet all the criteria for adequate patterns of explanation for psychiatric condi-
tions. The behaviourist pattern of explanation is not mechanistic, and does not include
causes at multiple levels. Further, although the behaviourist pattern provides important
insight into the environmental factors that influence the presentation and progression of
the symptoms of particular psychiatric disorders, is unable to fully explain the complex,
multi-level interactions between the biological, cognitive and social aspects of these con-
ditions. Finally, even though the behaviourist pattern of explanation identifies a primary
cause, the pattern is too universal and not specific enough to accurately demarcate the
boundaries between psychiatric conditions and identify these conditions in patients.
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3.4 Conclusion
This chapter examined two historical explanation patterns for the symptoms characteristic
of autism spectrum disorders. As in the case of the psychoanalytic explanation pattern
for ASD, the symptoms of autism were what generated theory construction and treatment
procedures in the behaviourist framework, as they continue to do in present-day cogni-
tive, cognitive neuroscientific, genetic and epigenetic theories. Each theoretical change
influences what an explanatory account of ASD includes, such as the contrast between
psychodynamic causes and environmental causes emphasized by psychoanalysts and be-
haviourist clinicians respectively. Both of the explanation schemas patterns discussed in
this chapter have had significant impact in the history of the diagnosis and treatment of
autism spectrum disorders. The psychoanalytic explanation pattern for the conditions on
the autism spectrum is one of the most famous accounts of these disorders. The theory
that these conditions are caused by poor parenting remains one of the most common and
enduring myths about these disorders, and continues to impact lay concepts of these disor-
ders to the present day. The emphasis placed on the external environment by behaviourist
clinicians when explaining these conditions led to an approach to treatment that is still
the most effective in ameliorating the symptoms of these conditions. However, neither of
these explanation patterns are adequate for explaining the development and progression
of psychiatric disorders like those on the autism spectrum, and limit the reliability and
validity of diagnosis of these conditions.
The psychoanalytic explanation pattern suffers from poor empirical support and incon-
sistent theories among other weaknesses, and thus is unable to accurately identify cases of
ASD in the clinical population and predict the progression of the characteristic symptoms.
The behaviourist explanation pattern for these conditions produced an effective means of
treatment, but without more detailed causal information, this pattern of explanation is too
simplistic and general to generate reliable and valid diagnostic criteria. The behaviourists
emphasized the role of the environment in the etiology of psychiatric disorders, an im-
portant insight still influencing currents treatment of psychiatric condition. However, the
biological and cognitive aspects of psychiatric conditions, including ASD, are vital pieces of
their explanations, and thus without these aspects an explanation pattern for psychiatric
disorders is inadequate. While still treated using Applied Behavioural Analysis and the
techniques of behaviour modification developed in the behaviourist era, explanations of
the potential cognitive, neurological, genetic and epigenetic dysfunctions responsible for
the symptoms of ASD have been developed in recent years, which the next two chapters
discuss.
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Chapter 4
Explanations Patterns for Autism
Spectrum Disorder: Cognitive
Psychology and Cognitive
Neuroscience
4.1 Introduction
This chapter discusses two current explanatory patterns for autism spectrum disorders.
The first explains the characteristic symptoms of ASD in terms of malfunctions in socio-
cognitive processes, and the second is based on data from cognitive neuroscience. While
cognitive explanations of ASD remain the most widely adopted theoretical views, these
cognitive explanations have also been expanded and refined by theories and research from
cognitive neuroscience and neuropsychology. I discuss cognitive views of autism and the
cognitive explanation pattern, and then discuss the cognitive neurological explanatory
pattern of the conditions on the autism spectrum. I evaluate these explanation patterns
using the criteria for adequate explanation patterns in psychiatry discussed in chapter two.
I argue that while these accounts seem to be promising candidates for explanation patterns
from which to develop valid and reliable diagnostic categories, the cognitive and cognitive
neurological patterns of explanation for autism spectrum disorders may not resolve the
problems in psychiatric diagnosis discussed by theorists such as Poland et al (1994) and
Murphy (2006).
The cognitive explanatory pattern for autism spectrum disorders I discuss below has
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been developed by psychologists, rather than psychiatrists. Clinical psychology differs
from psychiatry in several respects, including the theoretical and conceptual systems in
each field, and the approach each field takes to the diagnosis and treatment of psychiatric
disorders. In general, psychiatry employs a more biological approach when explaining and
treating psychiatric disorders. The development of the first effective psychoactive drugs
in the middle of the last century allowed psychiatrists to take a more pharmacologically-
oriented approach to the treatment of psychiatric disorders, replacing psychoanalytic and
behaviourist theories (Shorter, 1993). However, the cognitive revolution replaced be-
haviourism as the dominant conceptual framework in psychology during the 1960s, and
has shaped both theory and practice after the era of behaviourism. Many aspects of be-
haviourism remained in cognitive psychology, such as the emphasis on empirical research
and behavioural therapy as a way to treat the conditions listed in the DSM.
4.2 A Cognitive Explanation Pattern for Psychiatric
Conditions
In the cognitive era in psychology, clinicians began to re-examine the psychological origins
of the dysfunctional behaviours seen in psychiatric disorders. Cognitive psychologists argue
that the mind is an information processor, where mental structures organize and interpret
information learned and assimilated throughout our developmental history and social inter-
actions. Cognitive theories are developed in psychiatry as well, such as Beck’s (1967) cog-
nitive approach to explaining and treating disorders such as depression and schizophrenia.
Cognitive explanations of both typical socio-cognitive processes and psychiatric disorders
often refer to ’schemas,’ which include beliefs and patterns of reasoning that influence how
an individual processes information, and interprets the external world. In a seminal work,
Kelly (1955) argued that phenomena like anxiety, depression, and paranoia were the re-
sult of the patient’s ’construction of reality’ (Leahy, 1996). Beck’s famous cognitive model
of depression states that patients often attribute their failures and hardships to internal
factors, such as lack of talent, ability, or character, rather than attributing such failures
to factors beyond their control (see Beck, 1967, 1972; Beck, Rush, Shaw, & Emery, 1979).
According to this theory, depressed patients distort information from the external world,
emphasizing negative aspects of situations, and reinforcing negative self-images and beliefs.
Thus, cognitive explanations of psychiatric disorders usually focus on the way the pa-
tients interpret information, and what sort of attributions patients make regarding them-
selves and others. We can generate an explanation schema, like those discussed in the
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last chapter, to elucidate a cognitive explanation pattern for psychiatric conditions in the
following way:
Explanatory Target : Why do certain people develop the symptoms of psychi-
atric disorders?
Explanatory Pattern: Individuals exhibit the symptoms of psychiatric disorders
because they have dysfunctions in cognitive processes, such as the generation
and implementation of attributions and schemas.
Attributions and schemas are the cognitive processes by which individuals pro-
cess information from the external world and develop beliefs and affective judg-
ments.
Individuals with impairments cognitive processes such as the generation and
implementation of attributions and schemas, develop beliefs and affective states
that are maladaptive and interfere with social interaction and typical cognitive
functioning.
These maladaptive beliefs and affective states cause the characteristic symp-
toms of psychiatric disorders.
Thus, the cognitive explanation pattern for psychiatric conditions identify the cognitive
processes that become impaired in these conditions, and explain the outward symptoms
in terms of these cognitive deficits (Leahy, 1996). Even with the shift from behaviourism
to cognitive psychology, behaviour modification remained a popular treatment regime, but
in the cognitive conceptual framework, such therapy included an emphasis on interpreting
and integrating information, not just extinguishing behaviours and replacing them with
new ones (Mesibov et al. 1997). This type of therapy begins by identifying cognitive and
affective distortions or impairments, and generating ways to change patterns of thought
and behaviour to mitigate or reduce the symptoms caused by these impairments. Unlike
traditional behaviourist interventions, cognitive behavioural therapy tailors the process to
the individual’s particular symptom presentation and progression, since these symptoms
and their severity differ from patient to patient.
4.2.1 A Cognitive Explanation Pattern for Autism Spectrum
Disorders
Cognitive theories of autism spectrum disorders also focus on information processing and
impairments in cognitive processes. One major cognitive theory of ASD that has been put
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forward is the theory of mind hypothesis. This hypothesis was first developed by Baron-
Cohen and his colleagues in the 1980s. This hypothesis assumes that the way individuals
with ASD process social information is different from the way typically developed indi-
viduals do. In particular, proponents of this view state that the cognitive deficits unique
to autism spectrum disorders are the result of an undeveloped theory of mind, i.e. the
ability to ascribe mental states to others, such as beliefs and desires, to explain their ac-
tions. Theory of mind enables us not only to explain the behaviour of others, but also
to detect deception, humour, sarcasm and irony (Baron-Cohen, 2000). Baron-Cohen and
other researchers argue that impairments in theory of mind occur early in childhood, and
that theory of mind deficits are universal, i.e. an autistic individual can do none of the
above things, or can do them in a very limited capacity.
Several tests have been used to investigate the theory of mind capacity in children with
ASD. Many of these tests require that an autistic child ascribe beliefs, particularly false
beliefs, to characters in vignettes presented to them (see Baron-Cohen et al, 2000 for a
discussion of these tests and their results). Baron-Cohen (2000; also see Baron-Cohen,
Leslie, & Frith, 1985) states that children with an autism spectrum disorder have difficulty
with attributions of the intentions of others, and identifying whether a character in a
vignette is being deceived. Such difficulty occurs even when these children possess the
basic knowledge of the difference between themselves and the characters in the vignettes,
and when they are familiar with social roles such as mother, father, and child. Baron-
Cohen and others theorize that this ’mind-blindness’ is what makes children and adults
with ASD unable to relate to and engage with the world around them.
Baron-Cohen et al (1985) used an adaptation of the false-belief test to investigate
whether the core impairments seen in autism spectrum disorders were the result of a theory
of mind deficit. Baron-Cohen et al administered this test to children with ASD, children
with Down’s Syndrome and typically developed children. They (1985) found that 85% of
the sample of typically developing children were able to answer the belief question correctly,
and 86% of children with Down’s Syndrome also passed this test. However, only 20% of
children with ASD answered the belief question correctly.1 Baron-Cohen (2000) states that
the autistic children in this sample had a higher mental age and chronological age than
either of the control groups (i.e., the typically developing children and the children with
1Baron-Cohen (2000) states that all children in this sample were tested on a number of cognitive
dimensions, to rule out the possibility that failure on the belief question was due to these factors. The
children were asked where the main character placed her marble at the beginning of the vignette, to ensure
that the children who answered incorrectly did not do so because their memories where overloaded. These
children were also asked where the marble actually is now that the other character had moved it, and
asked to identify which of the dolls was identified as the main character, to rule out incorrect answers on
the basis of inattention, or misidentifying the main character in the vignette.
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Down’s Syndrome), and argues that this strongly indicates that individuals with ASD have
a poor understanding of beliefs. The results of Baron-Cohen’s false-belief test have been
replicated several times, and are now considered to lend strong support to the hypothesis
that autistic individuals suffer from a deficit in theory of mind (see Baron-Cohen et al 2000
for a discussion of these replication studies).
With a cognitive view of ASD, psychologists are attempting to explain the symptoms
of these conditions, instead of just treating them with therapeutic interventions as be-
haviourists did. As mentioned in the last chapter, applied behavioural analysis (ABA)-
based interventions has remained the most successful treatment approach for conditions on
the autism spectrum. However, cognitive behavioural approaches emphasize the scaffolding
of critical socio-cognitive skills that are precursors to developing a typically functioning the-
ory of mind such as imitation and pretense (Mesibov et al, 1997; Rogers & Williams, 2006).
This type of therapy begins in early childhood, and involves identifying the stage at which
a particular child with an ASD is in terms of development, and generating teaching and
learning strategies to match the child’s developmental level. Unlike traditional behaviourist
interventions, ABA in the cognitive framework tailors the process to the individual child,
since developmental levels and difficulties in learning can vary significantly from child to
child. Since the theory of mind hypothesis contains an account of the socio-cognitive pro-
cesses that may be malfunctioning in ASD, it thus provides more detailed information
about how to address these malfunctions than behaviourist explanations alone.
We can re-frame the theory of mind hypothesis of autism spectrum disorders as an
explanation schema as follows:
Explanatory Target : Why do certain children exhibit rigid, stereotyped be-
haviours, and impairments in language and social interaction?
Explanatory Pattern:
Children who exhibit rigid behaviours and impairments in language and social
interaction because they have an underdeveloped theory of mind.
A theory of mind allows one to ascribe mental states to others, and predict
behaviour based on the ascriptions of mental states.
A child with autism spectrum disorders is unable to ascribe mental states to
others, and is thus unable to understand the actions and interactions of other
people.
An underdeveloped theory of mind causes the characteristic symptoms of ASD
by causing impairments in the ability to interact and to communicate effectively
with other people, and limiting a child’s repertoire of interactive behaviours.
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Thus, according to the cognitive explanation pattern for the conditions on the autism
spectrum, children and adults with these disorders have a malfunctioning theory of mind,
which causes the socio-cognitive impairments characteristic of ASD. These symptoms can
be treated using applied behavioural analysis, and this approach is tailored to the spe-
cific socio-cognitive and language deficits each individual presents. If the theory of mind
hypothesis of ASD is correct, this account should reliably identify individuals with these
disorders based on the presence of the characteristic symptoms and the underlying theory
of mind deficit.
4.2.2 Cognitive Explanation Patterns and the Criteria for Ade-
quate Explanation Patterns in Psychiatry
The theory of mind hypothesis of ASD put forward by Baron-Cohen and his colleagues
provides some additional diagnostic information, since it provides an explanation of the
nature of characteristic symptoms of ASD and why these characteristic symptoms appear
in certain children. Also, the cognitive explanation pattern meets some of the criteria for
adequate explanation patterns for psychiatric conditions developed in chapter two, and
thus has some strengths as an account of the conditions on the autism spectrum. If Baron-
Cohen and his colleagues are correct, an undeveloped theory of mind prevents individuals
with autism spectrum disorders from developing socio-cognitive skills like the ability to
ascribe mental states to others, and to relate to others’ mental states.
Over two decades later however, several studies have challenged the theory of mind
hypothesis and its ability to explain the deficits seem in children with ASDs. While the
hypothesis still has some support, it may not adequately explain the symptoms of ASD.
Further, Tager- Flushberg (2007) notes that more current research indicates that ASD
involves delays and deficits in other aspects of socio-cognitive functioning and information
processing that are not explained by the theory of mind hypothesis by itself. Thus, the
theory of mind hypothesis does not have good empirical support. However, the theory of
mind literature provides a consistent body of research that continues to provide insight into
the disorders on the autism spectrum, and identifies a potential primary cause for the con-
ditions on the autism spectrum - a malfunctioning theory of mind. Also, Baron-Cohen and
others describe the theory of mind capacity and the malfunctions in this capacity mech-
anistically, where interactions between malfunctioning parts produce the characteristic
socio-cognitive symptoms of ASD. Further, the theory of mind hypothesis is parsimonious
in that it identifies a single factor that explains the symptoms of these disorders. If correct,
this hypothesis of ASD could be specific enough to reliably identify individuals with ASD,
and to exclude children with other developmental disorders, like Downs Syndrome.
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However, while the theory of mind hypothesis potentially explains why individuals
with ASD have trouble with social interaction, it does not explain how the environment
influences the symptoms of these disorders, nor does it explain the genetic and neurological
abnormalities seen individuals with ASD. The theory of mind deficit, while a potentially
robust indicator of the presence of an ASD versus another disorder, is not a cause at a
lower-level of description. Without an account of break-downs in lower-level mechanisms,
identifying a case of ASD versus another disorder can still be difficult. The biological and
social aspects of these disorders are vital to a complete explanation of these conditions,
since the interaction between biology, cognition and the environment are responsible for
the development of the conditions on the autism spectrum. Thus, the theory of mind
hypothesis does not include multiple levels, and does not explain theinteraction between
the biological, cognitive and social aspects of ASD.
A test like Baron-Cohen’s false belief test may help in distinguishing between a child
who has language delays but has an intact theory of mind. However, children with lower
functioning types of autism spectrum disorders and children with severe mental retardation
not due to Down’s Syndrome have similar symptoms, and both can experience language
impairments so severe that they do not develop speech. If a child is non-verbal, the false
belief test will not be able to determine whether a child has an autism spectrum disorder,
an unrelated condition such as mental retardation, or has both mental retardation and
an autism spectrum disorder. Thus, while the false belief test can reliably differentiate
between Down’s Syndrome and autism, it may not reliably differentiate between a case
of autistic disorder and mental retardation of a different type and severity than seen in
Down’s Syndrome.
The theory of mind hypothesis faces similar diagnostic problems on the other end of the
autism spectrum. Since the symptoms of Asperger’s syndrome tend to be milder than those
of other disorders on the spectrum, children who have Asperger’s and are high-functioning
may have partial theory of mind abilities (note that some children in Baron-Cohen’s sample
passed the false belief test, Baron-Cohen et al, 1985). In the case of Asperger’s syndrome,
the false belief test may have limited clinical utility, since the deficits in Asperger’s disorder
are markedly different than those seen in other disorders on the spectrum, in that children
with Asperger’s have mostly normal language development and have IQs in the normal
range. If a child with Asperger’s manages to pass the false belief test, which at least 20% of
the autistic population in Baron-Cohen’s studies do, a diagnosis of another developmental
condition may be given, since autistic-like symptoms appear in many psychiatric disorders,
such as childhood coordination disorder, schizophrenia, and schizoid personality disorder.
Thus, the theory of mind hypothesis may not be universal enough to reliably identify only
those individuals with ASD.
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The theory of mind hypothesis is one of the most well-known theories of the causes of
autism spectrum disorders. Although it meets some of the criteria for adequate patterns
of explanation for psychiatric disorders, it is not powerful enough on its own. The cogni-
tive explanation pattern for psychiatric disorders meets several of the criteria developed
in chapter 2, and thus can important diagnostic information to help better identify cases
of ASD versus another developmental disorder. While the cognitive pattern of explana-
tion does not have strong empirical support, it is internally consistent, mechanistic, and
parsimonious since it identifies a single primary cause. However, this explanation pattern
doesn’t include causes at different levels of description, and also does not explain the inter-
actions between biological, cognitive and social factors in the development and progression
of the symptoms of ASD. Thus, the theory of mind test does provide information that can
assist in making a diagnosis of autism spectrum disorders in some cases. However, there are
still many aspects of the conditions on the autism spectrum that the cognitive explanation
patterns for ASD may not be able adequately explain. While cognitive theories like the
theory of mind hypothesis may be specific enough to differentiate between cases of ASD
and cases of Downs Syndrome, they may not be universal enough to reliably identify cases
of ASD across the spectrum.
However, in recent years, the cognitive explanation pattern for ASD just discussed
has been extended and refined based on data from cognitive neuroscience, such as the
discovery of the mirror neuron system. Rather than replacing previous explanations of
ASD, cognitive neurological theories such as the mirror neuron hypothesis provide an
account of the possible neurological underpinnings of the socio-cognitive deficits seen in
individuals with ASD, such as an underdeveloped or malfunctioning theory of mind. If
correct, the cognitive neuroscience explanation pattern for ASD discussed below (which I
take to include the theory of mind and the mirror neuron hypothesis together) provides
an account of the breakdowns in lower-level mechanisms. Thus, a cognitive neurological
pattern of explanation may ’fill in’ important details regarding the nature of theory of
mind deficits and the symptoms of autism spectrum disorders.
4.3 Neuroscience and Brain Dysfunction: A Cogni-
tive Neurological Explanation Pattern for Psychi-
atric Conditions
Cognitive neuroscience investigates the neural correlates of cognitive processes, such as
perception, memory, attention, language, and theory of mind. Cognitive neuroscientists use
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methods such as neuroimaging, lesion studies and computational modeling to help identify
the neurological structures and systems that are involved in these and other cognitive
processes (Harris, 1995). Ritchie & Richards (2002) state that by the 1980s,
”...theories of localization in cognitive functioning validated by neuroimaging
had been largely accepted within neurology. In parallel, the development of
efficient psychopharmacological treatment of many major psychiatric disorders
led to renewed interest in the neurobiology of these disorders and the neu-
roanatomical correlates of their associated cognitive disturbances. Cognitive
dysfunction was also recognized within psychiatry as a major cause of disabil-
ity (p. 182-183).”
These theorists argue that theories in cognitive neuroscience and neuropsychology can
help identify underlying neuropathology. A better understanding of the underlying neu-
ropathology can provide an explanation for why certain types of cognitive dysfunction
occur in disorders such as depression, schizophrenia, obsessive-compulsive disorder and
autism spectrum disorders.
For instance, neuropsychological deficits are commonly seen in patients with major de-
pressive disorder, and can include dysfunction in the hippocampus, mediotemporal lobe
and frontostriatal circuits. These dysfunctions are associated with difficulties in cogni-
tive processes such as attention, executive functioning and memory. Also, patients with
schizophrenia have typical patterns of neurological dysfunction associated with charac-
teristic symptoms such as poor integration and assimilation of information, delusions, and
disorganized thinking. Ritchie & Richards (2002) state that individuals with schizophrenia
often have significant difficulty with tasks such as the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test, which
indicates frontal lobe dysfunction. Further, these authors state that ”functional imag-
ing and morphometric studies point...to more widespread neuropathology [in schizophre-
nia],” where the cognitive deficits characteristic of this disorder are thought to result from
”dysfunction in cortico-subcortical connectivity with a neurotransmitter imbalance in the
thalamic-prefrontal motor cortex and basal ganglia (p. 186)”.
Thus, patterns of explanation for psychiatric disorders in cognitive neuroscience identify
malfunctions in neurological systems and structures that cause cognitive and behavioural
disturbances. We can construct an explanation schema for cognitive neurological expla-
nations of psychiatric disorders, where the symptoms of these conditions are caused by
malfunctions in lower-level neurological mechanisms. The cognitive neurological explana-
tion pattern for psychiatric disorders can be developed as follows:
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Explanatory Target : Why do certain individuals exhibit the symptoms of psy-
chiatric disorders?
Explanatory Pattern:
Certain individuals exhibit the symptoms of psychiatric disorders because there
are disruptions in cognitive processes.
Disruptions in cognitive processes are caused by neurological malfunctions.
Neurological malfunctions occur because of breakdowns in neurological systems
and mechanisms.
Breakdowns in neurological systems and mechanisms affect socio-cognitive pro-
cesses.
Breakdowns in neurological systems and mechanisms cause the cognitive and
behavioural symptoms of psychiatric disorders.
On this account of psychiatric disorders, patients display the characteristic symptoms
of the various conditions listed in the DSM because they are suffering from breakdowns
in neurological systems and mechanisms that underly cognitive processes such as atten-
tion, language, memory and executive control. Such breakdowns disrupt typical cognitive
functioning, and thus result in the cognitive and behavioural symptoms listed as the pri-
mary diagnostic criteria for psychiatric disorders. If psychiatric disorders are explained in
terms of breakdowns of neurological mechanisms, treatment of these conditions involves
identifying and addressing these breakdowns, which will help to control and ameliorate the
cognitive and behavioural symptoms that result from such breakdowns.
4.3.1 A Cognitive Neuroscience Explanation Pattern for Autism
Spectrum Disorders
In the case of autism research, neuroscientists are attempting to identify the brain dys-
function(s) that cause the socio-cognitive deficits characteristic of ASD: impairments in
social interaction, communications and rigid behaviours. Recently, research from cognitive
neuroscience has received much attention from autism researchers. A class of visuomo-
tor neurons, called ’mirror neurons’ were discovered in non-human primates, and evidence
suggests that such a system exists in humans as well. ’Mirror neurons’ are linked to socio-
cognitive processes like language acquisition, imitation, and social contagion. Because of
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the potential involvement of mirror neurons in these processes, malfunctions in this neu-
ronal system have also been implicated in the theory of mind deficit seen individuals with
autism discussed above.
’Mirror neurons’ were discovered in the F5 region of the premotor cortex in monkeys,
and in areas such as the superior temporal sulcus (Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004). A similar
system is thought to exist in these regions of the human brain as well. Mirror neurons
are activated both when a monkey performs an action, and when it observes another
performing directed actions. All mirror neurons code directed movement, but the number
of actions that each region of these neurons code depends on where they are located in the
brain. While their exact function is unknown, researchers argue that these neurons are
central to both imitation learning and understanding of action. It is thought that mirror
neurons mediate the understanding of actions in the following way:
Each time an individual sees an action done by another individual, neurons that
represent that action are activated in the observer’s premotor cortex. This au-
tomatically induced, motor representation of the observed action corresponds
to that which is spontaneously generated during active action and whose out-
come is known to the acting individual. Thus, the mirror system transforms
visual information into knowledge (Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004, p. 172).
While the presence of mirror neurons in non-human primates has been confirmed, there
is no direct evidence that these neurons exist in humans as well. However, numerous
neurological studies have provided indirect evidence for a human mirror neuron system.
For instance, neurophysiological studies demonstrate that the motor cortex becomes active,
in the absence of motor activity by the subject, when the subject observes others performing
actions (Williams et al. 2001). Also, transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) experiments
indicate that the motor system in humans has mirror properties (Rizzolatti & Craighero,
2004).
Williams et al. (2001) state that mirror neurons may be involved in many aspects
of social cognition, including reading the emotions of others from their body language,
and empathizing with others. These aspects of social cognition could account for the
phenomenon of emotional contagion, where we emulate the postures and moods of others.
Further, these theorists (2001) suggest the part of the brain that contains mirror neurons
”has evolved to subserve speech in humans, with language building on top of a ’prelinguistic
grammar of actions’ already existing in the primate brain (p. 290).” Thus, mirror neurons
may act as a bridge between perceived and performed action and speech, which could be
the foundations of language in primate species. Also, if mirror neurons encode auditory
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representations as well as visual ones, they may play an important role in representing
the relation between words and their speaker, such as understanding personal pronouns
(Williams et al, 2001). Based on these potential functions of the mirror neuron system,
theorists such as Williams et al. and Rizzolatti & Craighero believe that mirror neurons are
connected to theory of mind, and that we are able to ’reconstruct’ a person’s action in our
mirror neuron system. Gallese & Goldman (1998) suggest that the activation of mirror
neurons generates an executive plan to perform an action like the one being observed,
which allows the observer to ’put themselves in the subject’s shoes.’
Williams et al. (2001) argue that dysfunction in the mirror neuron system could be
involved in the development of the characteristic symptoms of autism spectrum disorders.
If mirror neurons have the functions described above, then impairments in this system
could cause significant difficulties in language development and socio-cognitive skills such
as imitation and pretense, both of which are impaired in individuals with ASD. Also, if
mirror neurons play a role in language development, a malfunctioning mirror system could
explain why autistic children have significant language delays, and why they have trouble
using and understanding personal pronouns (recall Kanner, 1943 and Firth, 1991 have
documented this impairment in individuals with ASD).
Further, Rizzolatti & Fabbri-Destro (2010) state ”Autism affects a variety of nervous
structures, from the cerebral cortex to the cerebellum and brainstem[h]owever, in the
context of a broader neurodevelopmental deficit, a set of ASD symptoms (impairment
in communication, language, and the capacity to understand others) appears to match
functions mediated by the mirror mechanism (p. 230-231).” These researchers cite several
behavioural and brain imaging studies that indicate a malfunctioning mirror neuron system
could be present in individuals with ASD.
In this way, the mirror neuron research could extend and refine the cognitive theory
of ASD discussed in the previous section. Thus, neuroscientific accounts of autism do not
represent a shift in theoretical views, but are rather an extension and expansion of the data
from cognitive psychology about the nature of the symptoms of autism spectrum disorders.
On this view, a malfunctioning or impaired mirror neuron system is thought to be involved
in the development of deficits in theory of mind seen in individuals with ASD, and thus
partially responsible for the characteristic symptoms: language delay, communication and
interaction difficulties, and stereotyped behaviours. Williams et al. (2001) also discuss the
link between mirror neurons and other autistic deficits, such as difficulties with emotional
contagion and shared attention. Individuals with autism spectrum disorders often have
difficulty relating to those around them as intentional objects. If the mirror system is
malfunctioning in individuals with autism spectrum disorders, this could partially explain
why they are unable to interact with those around them -they are unable to process and
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interpret the perceptual stimuli that are normally fed into a typically developed mirror
neuron system. Further, individuals with autism often do not respond to social cues
regarding emotions, as Asperger and Kanner discussed in their reports of the behaviour
of autistic children in the educational environment. Apserger (1944) noted that one can
communicate with higher functioning autistic individuals and get them to note social norms
by talking in an intellectual, affect-free way, but these individuals still do not understand
the emotions of others.
We can construct an explanation schema based on the cognitive neuroscientific theory
of ASD, and the possible connection between the mirror neuron system and an underde-
veloped theory of mind. The cognitive neuroscience explanation pattern for ASD is as
follows:
Explanatory Target : Why do certain children exhibit rigid and stereotyped
behaviours, and impairments in language and social interaction?
Explanatory Pattern:
Children with autism spectrum disorders exhibit rigid behaviours and impair-
ments in language and social interaction because they have an underdeveloped
theory of mind.
A theory of mind allows one to ascribe mental states to others, and predict
behaviour based on the ascriptions of mental states.
A child with autism spectrum disorders is unable to ascribe mental states to
others, and is thus unable to understand the actions and interactions of other
people.
An underdeveloped theory of mind may partially be caused by a malfunctioning
mirror neuron system.
An underdeveloped theory of mind causes the characteristic symptoms of ASD
by causing impairments in the ability to interact with other people, to com-
municate effectively with other people, and limits the repertoire of interactive
behaviours of a child with autism spectrum disorders.
The cognitive neurological explanation pattern potentially provides more causal infor-
mation by hypothesizing that the socio-cognitive deficits seen in these disorders could be
the result of neurological malfunctions, such as an impaired mirror neuron system. Thus,
according to the cognitive neurological explanation pattern for ASD, the characteristic
symptoms of ASD are caused by an undeveloped theory of mind, which could be caused in
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part by a malfunctioning mirror neuron system. The mirror neuron hypothesis is consistent
with several clinical features of both Kanner’s and Asperger’s children in their respective
studies, such as the language and communication difficulties of individuals with autism. If
this account is correct, it potentially provides more discriminating criteria for identifying
cases of autism spectrum disorders, since the characteristic symptoms must be present,
and these must be caused by specific neurological impairments that prevent the normal
development of socio-cognitive capacities like theory of mind. If this explanation is correct,
the symptoms of these disorders can still be treated by behavioural interventions, since this
type of therapy is designed to facilitate the development of socio-cognitive processes like
imitation and pretense. Understanding the neurological dysfunctions that cause the cog-
nitive impairments characteristic of these disorders can help in developing more focused
intervention designed to better address, mitigate and compensate for these dysfunctions,
which may make the learning and integration of skills like imitation and pretense more
manageable.
The discovery of mirror neurons is recent, and their exact role in causing or aggravating
the symptoms of autism spectrum disorders is not clear. The causal link between damaged
or malfunctioning mirror neurons is highly speculative. There is good empirical support
for the presence of mirror neurons in non-human primates. However, their function in the
human brain and the role they play in social cognition in humans is not well understood.
It is also unclear, at this point, whether the discovery of mirror neurons will give a full
explanation of autism spectrum disorders, on which to base diagnostic categories that
predict causes, symptoms, progression and response to treatment. Further, several studies
do not support the mirror neuron hypothesis. For instance, Fan et al (2010) produced a
study that indicates that mirror neuron function may be preserved in individuals with ASD,
to varying degrees. Fan et al (2010) do note that more severe deficits language and social
communication could be correlated with greater degrees of mirror neuron dysfunction,
but they urge caution in drawing causal links between mirror neuron dysfunction and the
development of ASD.
4.3.2 Cognitive Neuroscience Explanation Patterns and the Cri-
teria for Adequate Explanation Patterns in Psychiatry
The cognitive neuroscience explanation pattern for ASD has several strengths, and meets
some of the criteria for an adequate explanation patterns in psychiatry. While the ’mirror
neuron hypothesis’ of ASD has received attention in recent years, this hypothesis does
not have strong empirical support. However, if more research further elucidates the role
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of the mirror neuron system in the development of the disorders on the autism spectrum,
then the cognitive neurological explanation pattern for these conditions may provide more
causal information than schemas previously discussed. Further, the discovery of the mirror
neuron system in non-human primates and the indirect evidence for such a system in
humans lends more empirical support to the theory of mind hypothesis. Thus, the mirror
neuron hypothesis coheres well with one of the most popular cognitive theories of ASD,
and provides a consistent account of the neurological mechanisms that might underlie the
socio-cognitive processes that are impaired in these disorders.
Mirror neurons are at a lower-level of description than the cognitive processes they
facilitate. Thus, if correct, cognitive neurological theories such as the mirror neuron hy-
pothesis could begin to provide an account of the underlying neurological mechanisms in
socio-cognitive skills like theory of mind, and extend the theory of mind hypothesis by pro-
viding a way to link language and social deficits with impairments in neurological systems.
Thus, we may be able to fill in some of the biological aspects of a multi-level mechanistic
representation of the disorders on the autism spectrum. Also, investigating malfunctions
in the mirror neuron system can generate insight into how breakdowns in neurological
systems affect the severity and presentation of the socio-cognitive deficits characteristic of
ASD, thus providing some information regarding how the parts of the mechanism interact.
Finally, if correct, the mirror neuron system hypothesis identifies a potential primary cause
that may partially explain the core symptoms of ASD.
According to the cognitive-neurological explanation pattern, the individuals that should
be included in the diagnostic category autism spectrum disorders have the characteristic
cognitive and behavioural symptoms and certain neurological impairments that cause these
symptoms. On this account, the presence or absence of certain neurological impairments
and the symptoms determines whether an individual has an autism spectrum disorder. It
contains a causal account that, if correct, identifies not just individuals with autistic symp-
toms, but individuals with particular physical conditions that underlie these symptoms.
Thus, understanding ASD as cognitive neurological disorders could help to generate diag-
nostic categories with more validity and reliability, since it is not the presence or absence
of a cluster of symptoms that identifies a patient with an autism spectrum disorder, but
rather these symptoms and the presence of certain neurological impairments.
However, there are some problems with the cognitive-neuroscience explanation pattern
for ASD. The mirror neuron hypothesis, even in conjunction with the theory of mind hy-
pothesis, does not meet all the criteria for adequate patterns of explanation for psychiatric
conditions. Williams et al. (2001) state that mirror neuron dysfunction could be the re-
sult of genetic abnormalities, of external conditions that inhibit the development of this
neural system, or an interaction between organic and environmental causes. While we gain
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an understanding of the neurological deficits that could underly underlying the cognitive
symptoms, information about how these neurological deficits are affected by genetic and
social factors can be important for the diagnosis and effective treatment of autism spectrum
disorders. A neurologically-based explanation pattern for psychiatric conditions such as
those on the autism spectrum may not be able to account for the significant variability in
the symptoms of these conditions in the same patient over time. As mentioned previously,
the symptoms of ASD can shift and change as the child ages, as the child interacts with
the social environment, and if the child receives treatment. The cognitive neurological
explanation pattern for ASD may not be able to account for why the symptoms of these
disorders change in these ways throughout the lifespan, given that the impairments in the
mirror neuron system happen early in life. In order to explain why the severity and presen-
tation of the symptoms of these disorders might change, an adequate explanatory pattern
would have to cite other biological factors that lead to changes in the mirror system, or to
social influences such as stressful environments.
Also, the mirror neuron hypothesis may not account for the variability of symptoms
seen in the different autism spectrum disorders. Patients diagnosed with different disor-
ders on the spectrum often have significant differences in the presentation and severity of
the characteristic socio-cognitive symptoms, such as the relatively typical IQ and language
development in individuals with Aspergers versus the severe deficits in IQ and language
characteristic of autistic disorder. While the mirror neuron hypothesis, when combined
with the theory of mind hypothesis is a multi-level explanation, there are other levels,
such as the social level that must be included to explain ASD. Further, mirror neurons are
potentially involved in many aspects of language development and social interaction, and
different types of dysfunctions in these processes are features of many psychiatric disor-
ders. Thus, mirror neurons may also be involved in the development of other psychiatric
conditions, both related and unrelated to ASD, if those disorders involve deficits in social
interaction, language, and processing of information from the environment. The cogni-
tive neurological explanation pattern for ASD provides some important insights into the
biological and cognitive aspects of these disorders. However, if mirror neurons are also
involved in the development of other psychiatric disorders, the presence of mirror neuron
deficits may not be able to differentiate between a case of ASD and another disorder(s).
Thus, the cognitive neurological explanation pattern for explaining the development and
progression of the disorders on the autism spectrum may not be specific enough to reliably
identify patients with these conditions. Further, the cognitive neurological explanation
pattern for ASD may not be universal enough to identify cases of ASD given the variation
and heterogeneity of the characteristic symptoms of these disorders.
This section analyzed the cognitive neurological explanation pattern for psychiatric
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conditions such as those on the autism spectrum. The mirror neuron hypothesis has
good empirical support, and provides a consistent account of the possible neurological
dysfunctions that are involved in the development of the disorders on the autism spectrum.
Further, if correct, this explanation pattern may help to generate a multi-level mechanistic
account of ASD, and how some of the parts of this complex mechanism interact. Finally,
if correct, the cognitive neurological explanation pattern may identify a possible primary
cause for the development of ASD. However, the socio-cognitive symptoms characteristic
of the disorders on the autism spectrum may be the result of more than one type of
neurological dysfunction, and mirror neuron hypothesis may not be able to explain how
and why these symptoms change over time, since these changes may also be the result
of the interaction with environmental and social factors. Further, the pathogenesis of
the malfunctions in mirror neuron functioning is not clear, and there may be genetic,
environmental or genetic x environmental factors that contribute to mirror neuron function
and dysfunction. Thus, while cognitive neurological patterns of explanation may provide
more causal information that the previously-discussed schemas, such a pattern may not be
specific nor universal enough to reliably and correctly identify cases of ASD.
4.4 Conclusion
This chapter examined two contemporary explanatory patterns for the conditions on the
autism spectrum, and discussed the strengths and weaknesses of each pattern. The theory
of mind hypothesis of ASD provides a potential causal theory regarding the disorders on
the autism spectrum, and augmented with the mirror neuron hypothesis, provides a multi-
level explanation. Identifying the neurological deficits that underlie the cognitive and
behavioural symptoms of these ASD potentially provides more robust diagnostic criteria,
however, the presence or absence of certain neurological deficits may not be specific enough
criteria for classifying psychiatric disorders. In the next chapter, I discuss genetic and
epigenetic patterns of explanations for ASD. While all the explanatory patterns discussed
in this thesis will likely be helpful in explaining psychiatric conditions, I argue that an
integrated explanation pattern that includes the genetic, epigenetic, neurological, cognitive,
and social levels of description may be the most powerful for explaining the causes and
development of conditions like those on the autism spectrum.
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Chapter 5
Explanation Patterns of Autism
Spectrum Disorder: Genes and
Epigenetics
5.1 Introduction
So far, I have shown that the psychoanalytic, behaviourist, cognitive and cognitive neu-
rological patterns for ASD are unable to meet all of the criteria for adequate patterns
of explanation for psychiatric disorders, and are thus unable to capture the complex and
multi-directional causation involved in the development of these conditions. Patterns of
explanation that do not capture the causal complexity of psychiatric disorders have weak
explanatory and predictive power, which leads to poor reliability and validity in psychiatric
diagnosis. Thus, the patterns of explanations for psychiatric disorders discussed far so may
not be able to inform the development of diagnostic categories that reduce the problems
of poor reliability and validity, and arbitrary diagnostic boundaries.
This chapter explores genetic and epigenetic explanation patterns for autism spectrum
disorders. Instead of focusing solely on the nature of cognitive and behavioural symptoms,
genetic and epigenetic patterns of explanation provide more information about why such
impairments are seen in autism spectrum disorders, and why these disorders affect cer-
tain children. While genetic and epigenetic explanations of these disorders are far from
complete, such explanations can provide important pieces of the complex etiology of ASD.
Genetic explanations of these conditions attempt to identify the causes of the cognitive
and neurological impairments characteristic of ASD, and determine what distinguishes an
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individual with an autism spectrum disorder versus another developmental disorder (or
other psychiatric disorder) at the genetic level. On the other hand, epigenetic explanations
of these conditions identify the mechanisms by which certain genes are expressed, which
can help elucidate how the phenotypes for certain psychiatric conditions, including ASD,
can develop. According to epigenetic theories of human development, phenotypes for both
individuals with and without psychiatric conditions are expressed based on complex inter-
actions between genes, and interactions between genetics and the perinatal, neonatal and
early infant environments.
Genetic and epigenetic theories of psychiatric disorders such as those on the autism
spectrum provide valuable causal insight into the genetic and genetic x environmental
interactions that are involved in the development of these conditions. However, like the
other schemas discussed in this thesis, neither the genetic nor the epigenetic patterns of
explanation meet all of the criteria for adequate explanations of psychiatric conditions.
Thus, while such patterns of explanation are powerful and explain some of the causal
features of psychiatric disorders, these patterns cannot accurately and reliably identify
cases of ASD in the clinical population by themselves.
5.2 A Genetic Explanation Pattern for Psychiatric
Conditions
Genetic explanations identify phenomena at a lower level of description that can fill in
important details about both the neurological and cognitive aspects of psychiatric disorders.
Thus, genetic explanations of psychiatric disorders can help explain why certain types of
neurological and cognitive impairments are seen in some disorders listed in the DSM, such
as Down’s Syndrome and Fragile X syndrome. In the case of Down’s Syndrome, a third 21st
chromosome is responsible for the lower IQ, language difficulties, and other socio-cognitive
deficits characteristic of that disorder. Fragile X syndrome is the most common known
cause of inherited mental retardation, and is caused by a break in the X chromosome at
region X27q3 (Persico & Bourgeron, 2006). This condition affects approximately 1 in 4000
males and 1 in 8000 females (Narayanan & Warren, 2006; in Moldin & Rubenstein, 2006)).
Individuals with Fragile X syndrome experience developmental and language delays, and
have IQs in the lower range. Thus, the presence or absence of certain genetic defects, such
as a third 21st chromosome, includes or excludes an individual in a diagnostic category,
instead of a particular set of symptoms alone.
Genetic mutations or defects may also partially explain the neurological and cognitive
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deficits in more casually complex conditions such as addiction, bi-polar disorder, major
depression and anxiety. However, in these conditions, many genetic mutations in different
genes interact to cause the neurological and cognitive impairments, and these conditions
also have significant social causes that influence the presentation, onset, and severity of
the symptoms. Even though genetics may not entirely explain the presence or absence of
symptoms, genetic explanations can indicate which patterns of neurological dysfunctions
may be more likely to occur, given the genetic defect(s) that are present. Understanding
which neurological dysfunctions are more likely can help to predict what sort of cognitive
deficits an individual may have, given the nature of the neurological impairments. Thus, ge-
netic explanations can be combined with neurological and cognitive theories to potentially
provide a more detailed and multi-level account of why certain cognitive and behavioural
symptoms appear in certain individuals. We can formalize a genetic explanation pattern
for psychiatric disorders as follows:
Explanatory Target Why do certain individuals develop the symptoms of psy-
chiatric disorders?
Explanatory Pattern
The symptoms of psychiatric disorders are partially caused by interacting ge-
netic abnormalities and defects.
Patterns of interacting genetic abnormalities and defects are associated with
certain kinds of neurological malfunctions.
Certain kinds of neurological malfunctions are associated with certain kinds of
cognitive and behavioural impairments.
Certain cognitive and behavioural impairments are identified as the character-
istic symptoms of a particular psychiatric disorder.
Thus, understanding the genetic abnormalities involved in the conditions listed in the
DSM can provide a partial account of why certain cognitive and behavioural symptoms
appear in particular psychiatric disorders. According to a genetic pattern of explanation,
what distinguishes one psychiatric disorder from another is a particular set(s) of genetic
mutations or abnormalities and a particular cluster(s) of cognitive and behavioural symp-
toms. Thus, in one way, a genetic explanation pattern can make distinctions between the
different psychiatric disorders sharper, since the presence or absence of certain genes can
include or exclude an individual in a diagnostic category.
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5.2.1 The Genetics of Autism Spectrum Disorders
In recent years, there has been much research dedicated to discovering the genes involved in
the development of autism spectrum disorders. Genetic explanations of autism spectrum
disorders, while still speculative, attempt to provide information about the causes of the
neurological impairments associated with these conditions, which are identified by expla-
nations of ASD like the mirror neuron hypothesis. In their review of the current research
investigating the genes involved in ASD, Muhle, Trentacoste & Rapin (2004) argue there
is strong evidence that disorders on the autism spectrum are heritable. These researchers
note that the rate of recurrence in siblings of affected individuals is 2% to 8%, which is
much higher than the prevalence rate of ASD in the general population. Twin studies
conducted in Scandinavia (Steffenburg, Gillberg, Hellgren, Anderson, Gillberg, Jakobsson,
et al 1989) and Britain (Bailey, Le Couteur, Gottesan, Bolton, Simonoff, Yudza, et al
1995) report that identical twins had a rate of concordance of greater than 60% for autistic
disorder, with no concordance for fraternal twins (Muhle et al., 2004; Rutter, 2005; Bonora
et al., 2006). Further, Muhle et al (2004) state ”when the unaffected twin discrepant for
autism was re-evaluated for broader autistic phenotypes, including communication skills
and social disorders, the concordance among the [twins in the British study] rose...from
60% to 92% in [monozygotic] twins and from 0% to 10% for [dizygotic] twins (p. 475).”
The concordance rate for monozygotic (identical) twins is not 100%, and thus there are
pairs of MZ twins studied where only one of the twins has an autism spectrum disorder.
However, even in pairs of identical twins where only one twin has an autism spectrum
disorder, there are several traits that the non-autistic twin may exhibit that are similar
to the impairments seen in ASD. For instance, Folstein & Rutter (1977a, 1997b) found
that the non-autistic twin in a pair of MZ twins usually had language disorders and social
impairments, but did not meet the diagnostic criteria for ASD. Further, Bonora et al (2006)
note that social impairments, difficulties in communication and rigid behaviours are more
common in the relatives of children with autism that in relatives of non-autistic children.
Thus, the data from family and twin studies indicates that the heritability estimate for
autism is greater than 90%, making ASD some of the most heritable of the disorders listed
in the DSM (Bonora et al. 2006).
The high rate of concordance between monozygotic twins lends strong support to the
hypothesis that ASD have a significant genetic component in their etiologies. However,
despite the high condordance rate, the exact genetic origins of ASD are unknown. Most
cases of ASD are ’idiopathic’, meaning that no obvious genetic abnormality is present.
Investigations into the genetic basis of ASD indicates that idiopathic autism, i.e. autistic
disorders without a clear genetic origin, does not follow a pattern of monogenic inheritance,
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even though the heritability estimate is over 90%. Bonora et al. (2006) state
the difference in pairwise concordance between MZ and DZ twins and the rapid
decline in recurrence rate with decreasing genetic relatedness indicates a non-
Mendelian, complex mode of inheritance. The falloff in monozygotic to dizy-
gotic twin concordance rates is too steep to be explained by an additive hypoth-
esis, regardless of the genes involved, and evidence for multiplicative genetic
interaction (epistasis) is provided when the risk ratio decrease exponentially
across different degrees of relationship... (p. 51)
Most cases of autism spectrum disorders seen in clinical practice are ’idiopathic,’ with
the exception of Rett’s disorder, which is discussed in the following section.
Further, there are several developmental-neurological conditions caused by similar ge-
netic abnormalities to the ones implicated in the development of ASD. The genes thought
to be involved in the development of ASD are also implicated in developmental-neurological
conditions such as Angelman’s syndrome, Prader-Willi syndrome, Fragile-X syndrome and
Turner’s syndrome.
5.2.2 Pieces of the Genetic Puzzle: Related Neurodevelopmental
Conditions and Complex Models of Expression
Research into related conditions like those mentioned above provides clues as to which genes
and what sort of genetic abnormalities are responsible for the characteristic symptoms
of autism spectrum disorders. Angelman’s syndrome (AS) and Prader-Willi syndrome
(PWS), for example, often involve autistic-like behaviours but are not considered part of
the autism spectrum. Idiopathic autism spectrum disorders are thought to be caused by
as many as 5-15 genes, and some candidate genes have been identified. Numerous studies
have indicated that X-linked deficits and abnormalities on chromosomes 15 and 7 may be
involved in the development of ’idiopathic’ autism.
Investigations into the genetic origins of conditions like Angelman’s and Prader-Willi
syndromes indicate that abnormalities on chromosome 15 are involved in the development
of ASD (see Bonora, et al, 2006; Muhle et al, 2004; Schanen, 2006). Bonora et al. (2006)
state ”[t]he most prevalent chromosome 15 abnormalities are supernumerary isodicentric
chromosome 15 and maternally derived interstitial duplications of the 1511-q13 region...(p.
52).” Muhle et al (2004) state the cytogenetic abnormalities in the 15q11-q13 region of
chromosome 15 point to several other candidate genes for future study. These authors
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argue that the GABAa receptor gene cluster is strongly implicated in the development of
autism spectrum disorders, since this gene cluster is involved in the inhibition of excitatory
neural pathways and in neurodevelopment.
Abnormalities in the q22-q33 region of chromosome 7 have also been implicated in
the pathogenesis of autism spectrum disorders (Muhle et al, 2004). Persico & Bourgeron
(2006) state that a link between ASD and abnormalities on chromosome region 7q is one of
the most replicated findings in ASD research. Muhle et al (2004) argue that ”[t]he protein
reelin (RELN), which localizes to a site of chromosomal translocation at 7q22, is a large
secreted glycoprotein potentially involved in neural migration during development. It is
of particular interest given that it binds to neuronal receptors and that the pathology of
autism can include migration cell deficits (p. 477).” This region of chromosome 7 has been
called an autism susceptibility locus, or AUTS1, by the International Molecular Genetic
Study of Autism Consortium (Muhle et al, 2004). AUTS1 contains several genes that may
be involved in the development of ASD, including FOXP2, RAY1/ST7, IMMP2L, GRM8,
CADPS2, and WNT2, all of which are associated with speech and developmental delays
(Muhle et al, 2004).
Finally, certain X-linked disorders and abnormalities are also associated with autis-
tic symptoms. Some of these conditions, such as Fragile-X and Turner’s syndrome, are
co-morbid with ASD, indicating that some of the candidate genes are located on the X
chromosome. Both Fragile-X and Turner syndrome patients exhibit mental retardation and
autistic-like behaviours. Turner syndrome affects young girls, and is caused by monosomy
of the X chromosome. Females with Turner Syndrome display an increased susceptibil-
ity to ASD as opposed to XX females (Persico & Bergeron, 2006, p. 350). This data
is compatible with the existence of imprinted genes on the X chromosome. Muhle et al.
(2004) state that two separate studies have identified links to the Xq13-q21 region of the
X chromosome, which contains the neuroligin genes. These genes code for cell-adhesion
molecules, called neuroligins, which are thought to be involved in synapse development.
Also, Persico & Bourgeron (2006) state that Fragile X syndrome, briefly discussed above,
is often associated with autistic features and approximately 2-3% of males with autism
also have Fragile X syndrome. Further, these researchers state that 20-40% of Fragile X
patients meet the diagnostic criteria for autism spectrum disorders.
Persico & Bourgeron (2006) state ”[the] proteins that have been implicated in ASD[s] to
date...are involved in neurodevelopment and many have roles in synaptic function (p. 350.)”
While speculative, these authors state that the candidate genes identified so far in the de-
velopment of ASD indicate three aspects of the pathogenesis of these conditions. The first,
which is associated with 7q22-q33 and the protein REELIN, involves neural migration and
its role in neurodevelopment. Persico & Bourgeron (2006) state ”the evidence surrounding
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the reelin pathway, in conjunction with neuropathological studies, underscores the role of
altered neuronal migration in generating the aberrant neural networks that underlie altered
information processing in autism (p. 355).” The second aspect of the development of ASD
concerns the 15q11-13q region and the GABA receptor cluster in that region. 15q11-13q is
likely involved in the development of ASD because ”converging evidence from functional
studies of MeCP2 and NLGN, and from chromosomal rearrangements involving the GABA
receptor gene cluster, underscores the crucial role of unbalanced excitatory-inhibitory net-
works in abnormal CNS excitability and function in autism (p. 355).” The final aspect
of the pathogenesis of ASD that genetic studies have indicated is ”that abnormal synapse
formation and dendrite spines could contribute to ASD (Persico & Bourgeron, 2006, p.
355),” which are associated with several of the candidate genes just discussed.
5.2.3 A Genetic Explanation Pattern for Autism Spectrum Dis-
orders
Unlike conditions such as Huntington’s chorea, where the cognitive and neurological im-
pairments are caused by a single gene mutation, ASD have a complex genetic origin. Muhle,
Trentacoste & Rapin (2004) state ”autistic disorders are polygenic; that is, several syn-
ergistically acting genes in an affected individual’s genome may be required to produce
the full autistic phenotype (p. 475).” Since there are several genes likely involved in the
development of these disorders, a multi-gene model is needed. Borona et al. (2006) discuss
a multilocus epistatic model of ASD that has been proposed to explain the genetic etiology
of these disorders. A multi-locus epistatic model of the etiology of ASD is different from a
traditional model of genetic heritability, where mutations in certain genes cause the same
or a similar phenotype, and the presence of each mutation is sufficient on its own to cause
the disease (Borona et al, 2006). In an epistatic multilocus model, numerous genes interact
with one another to produce the phenotype in question. Thus, no single genetic variant or
defect is necessary or sufficient to cause ASD. Instead, multiple variants inherited through
one or more genes cause the neurological and socio-cognitive impairments that characterize
autism spectrum disorders. Further, ”the multilocus-epistatic model of autism is congru-
ent with the aggregation of features of the broader autistic phenotype among first-degree
relatives of individuals with autism (Borona et al, 2006, p. 52).” This may indicate that
those first degree relatives have only some of the predisposing genes for ASD, and autistic
features in first degree relatives can also indicate variable expression of the set of genes
involved in these disorders.
We can generate a genetic explanation pattern for the condition on the autism spectrum
as follows:
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Explanatory Target Why do certain children develop idiopathic autism, which
are disorders characterized by impairments in communication, interaction and
stereotyped behaviours?
Explanatory Pattern
Idiopathic autism is caused by the interaction of multiple genes and genetic
abnormalities.
These genetic abnormalities are thought to include genes in the 15q11-13q
region of chromosome 15, the q22-q33 region of chromosome 7, and Xq28 locus
on the X chromosome.
These genes code for proteins that are involved in neural migration, the creation
of synapses and other aspects of neurodevelopment.
These genes interact to cause particular socio-cognitive impairments in commu-
nication, interaction, and motor behaviour during early phases of development,
which are identified as the characteristic symptoms of autism spectrum disor-
ders.
On this account, the symptoms of ASD are explained by the presence of certain genetic
abnormalities and defects, which are associated with certain types of neurological dysfunc-
tion, which in turn causes the cognitive and behavioural symptoms of these disorders. If
ASD are genetic conditions, the presence or absence of certain genetic abnormalities will
demarcate a case of ASD from another psychiatric disorder with similar symptoms. The
presence of certain symptoms, even if they are similar to other conditions listed in the
DSM, are explained by genetic abnormalities, and thus the similarity in symptomatology
between ASD and other conditions will not confuse or blur diagnostic boundaries.
5.2.4 Genetic Explanation Patterns and the Criteria for Ade-
quate Explanation Patterns in Psychiatry
Genetic explanations of ASD may provide additional causal information about the origins
of the neurological deficits that are involved in these conditions, which are associated with
the characteristic cognitive and behavioural symptoms. Further, genetic data may indicate
why certain conditions may be co-morbid with ASD. If we can identify which abnormalities
cause particular neurological and socio-cognitive deficits, e.g. by finding individuals with
one developmental condition and not others, we have a better understanding of the bound-
aries of the category of autism spectrum disorders. Thus, even though genetic explanations
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of ASD are speculative, a genetic explanation pattern may provide more information than
previous schemas, and fills in more of the causal history of these disorders.
However, the interaction between variations and mutations in several genes makes it
difficult to classify and define the disorders on the autism spectrum based solely on the
genes involved in their development. Unlike genetic disorders that are caused by variations
or malfunctions in a single gene or set of genes, the lack of a clear genetic origin makes
ASD harder to classify. In the case of single-gene disorders, the presence or absence of
that gene reliably tells us whether someone has or will have that disorder or not. In
the case of disorders that are polygenic and epistatic, clinicians cannot be as accurate
in determining whether a patient has a particular condition, and the progression and
severity of the symptoms. ASD are complex genetic conditions, involving multiple genes
interacting to produce a constellation of symptoms. Identifying primary causes for ASD at
the genetic level can be difficult, since many of the candidate genes are also implicated in the
development of other conditions. At present, the genetic data does not clearly identify the
syndromes we call autism spectrum disorders. While candidate genes have been identified,
the exact genetic origins of idiopathic autism have yet to be uncovered. No one gene, or set
of genes, is a reliable indicator of the presence or absence of an autism spectrum disorder,
with the exception of Rett’s disorder, to be discussed in the next section. Thus, there is
good empirical support for the genetic origins of ASD, but consistent findings of the exact
genes involved and their interactions are yet to come.
Even though genetic studies like those reviewed above have identified a number of can-
didate genes thought to be involved in the development of autism spectrum disorders, none
of the chromosomal abnormalities nor the candidate genes identified fully correlates with
the symptoms of ASD. Even we are able to identify the patterns of interacting genetic
abnormalities involved in the development of ASD, doing so may not fully explain the
progression, onset, and symptomatology of these disorders. The strong concordance for
monozygotic twins indicates that autism spectrum disorders are heritable conditions, but
researchers caution that the autism phenotype is difficult to isolate, since the genes identi-
fied in related conditions like Angelman’s and Prader-Willi syndromes are found in a small
percentage of the autistic population (Veenstra-VanderWeele & Cook, 2004; Muhle et al,
2004). Thus, a genetic explanation pattern for autism spectrum disorders is not specific
enough to identify a case of ASD versus another developmental disorder, like Angelman’s
or Prader-Willi syndromes.
As more of the genetic origins of the conditions on the autism spectrum are discovered,
genetic explanations of ASD could become part of an inter-level mechanistic explanation
that represents the social, cognitive and biological features of these disorders. However,
causation in genetic explanations runs in one direction only: genetic abnormalities cause
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neurological deficits, that in turn cause cognitive and behavioural symptoms. However,
Borona et al. (2006) note that environmental factors may also influence the severity of
the expression of the autistic phenotype. Further, genetic changes only occur during chro-
mosomal and physical development, and mutations in genetic expression early in life do
not explain the onset or changes of certain symptoms as the individual ages and interacts
with the environment. Recall that adequate explanation patterns for psychiatric conditions
must be able to not only represent causes on multiple levels, but how these causes interact.
As I have argued throughout this thesis, the social and cognitive features of psychiatric
disorders can affect the biological level. Further, changes in the biological level continue
to cause changes at the cognitive and social levels throughout the individual’s lifespan.
Thus, the genetic explanation pattern for ASD is not universal enough to identify cases
of ASD if the disorder is discovered later in life, when the presentation of symptoms has
been influenced by environmental factors.
Thus, a genetic explanation pattern can provide important causal insight into the de-
velopment of disorders like those on the autism spectrum, but it does not meet all the
criteria for adequate explanation patterns for psychiatric conditions. This section argued
that genetic explanations of ASD have good empirical support, however the findings are
not consistent with respect to the candidate genes involved or the interactions between
these candidate genes. Further, while genetic explanations can be mechanistic, and in-
corporated into a multi-level explanation, they are not able to explain the interactions
between the biological, cognitive and social aspects of psychiatric conditions, nor do they
explain how cognitive and social factors can influence the biological level. Therefore, the
genetic explanation pattern of ASD is not specific enough nor universal enough to reliably
and accurately identify individuals with these conditions in the clinical population.
5.3 Epigenetics and Psychiatric Conditions
The last section highlighted the limits of the genetic explanation pattern for explaining the
causes and progression of psychiatric conditions, given that these disorders are not caused
by mutations in single genes and do not follow a Mendelian pattern of gene expression.
Recently, researchers have begun to investigate the epigenetic mechanisms involved in the
development of psychiatric disorders. The field of epigenetics studies the changes in gene
expression that occur during early development that are not directly coded for in DNA.
Just as DNA sequences are conserved during mitosis, epigenetic states can be inherited by
the daughter cells during DNA replication followed by somatic cell division. Epigenetic
explanations of diseases identify changes to genes based on environmental influences, and
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thus attempt to account for changes in neurological development and functioning at the
molecular and genetic level throughout early socio-cognitive development. Several studies
indicate that gene transcription errors and changes to regulatory regions of genes play a role
in mediating alterations in gene expression associated with certain psychiatric disorders
(Nestler, 2009). Epigenetic processes are thought to be at work in the development of
conditions like ASD, since many of the neurological, cognitive and behavioural symptoms
cannot be explained by genetic abnormalities alone.
5.3.1 Epigenetics: Broad and Narrow Definitions
There are several definitions given for what the field of epigenetics involves, some of which
are quite broad and go well beyond the scope of molecular biology and genetics. Under
some broad definitions, ’epigenetic changes’ refers generally to changes in genetic mate-
rial not coded in DNA, which may include a wide range of phenomena. On the other
hand, some definitions are much narrower and exclude certain processes, mechanisms and
environmental causes as being ’epigenetic.’ The different definitions have an impact on
what sort of causes will be included in epigenetic explanations of psychiatric conditions,
including those on the autism spectrum. While some broad definitions of epigenetics al-
lows for both environmental and genetic causes in explanations of psychiatric conditions
like ASD, these definitions can be vague about what counts as an ’environmental’ cause,
and the link posited between genes and environment can often be too speculative. Thus,
some definitions of epigenetics do not lend much explanatory power to a causal account of
autism spectrum disorders or other psychiatric disorders, while others provide potentially
powerful explanatory patterns.
Waddington (1942) was the first to coin the term ’epigenetics’ and defined it as ”all
those events that lead to the unfolding of the genetic program for development (p. 635,
in Goldberg, Allis, & Bernstein, 2007).” Unfortunately, this definition is too broad to lend
much explanatory power, since events that lead to the unfolding of the phenotype can
encompass an enormous range of phenomena, from DNA methylation to environmental
pathogens to social and political forces that shape one’s cultural environment. However,
in a paper entitled ”The inheritance of epigenetic defects,” Holliday (1987) introduced a
narrower definition of epigenetics that referred to changes in DNA methylation. The term
epimutation was also introduced at this time, which refers to heritable changes in genes
that are not caused by changes in DNA sequences.
Other definitions were introduced in the 1990s, two of which Holliday (2006) discusses.
The first is broader than the second, and he argues that while both are incomplete, together
they encompass most of the known epigenetic mechanisms. The definitions are as follows:
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1) The study of the changes in gene expression which occur in organisms with
differentiated cells, and the mitotic inheritance of given patterns of gene ex-
pression
2) Nuclear inheritance which is not based on changes in DNA sequence.
Holliday (2006) states the first definition can include DNA methylation, but also a
number of other epigenetic mechanisms. The second definition includes mechanisms like
imprinting, but would exclude cytoplasmic events which would be included as epigenetic
under the first definition. A similar definition of epigenetics was proposed by Alan Wolffe,
who defined epigenetics as heritable changes in gene expression that occur without a change
in DNA sequence (Nakao, 2001). Nakao (2001) states that there are several processes in-
cluded in Wolffe’s definition, which include DNA methylation, histone-modifying enzymes,
chromatin remodeling, and transcriptional factors. Further, chromosomal structures such
as the centromere, kinetochore and telomere are included under the category of epigenetics
even though they are not directly involved in gene function (Nakao, 2001). Under this
broader definition, Nakao (2001) suggests that epigenetics can be understood as a system
to selectively utilize genome information, through activating or silencing particular genes.
Adrian Bird (2007) proposes another definition that attempts to clarify what sort of
alterations to the genome should be considered ’epigenetic’, and how broad the definition
should be. Bird defines epigenetic events as ”the structural adaptation of chromosomal
regions so as to register, signal or perpetuate altered activity states(p. 398)” Bird favours
this definition over the many others in the literature because it
is inclusive of chromosomal marks, because transient modifications associated
with both DNA repair or cell-cycle phases and stable changes maintain across
multiple cell generations qualify. It focuses on chromosomes and genes, implic-
itly excluding potential three-dimensional architectural templating of mem-
brane systems and prions, except when these impinge on chromosome function.
Also included is the exciting possibility that epigenetic processes are buffers of
genetic variation, pending an epigenetic (or mutational) change of state that
leads an identical combination of genes to produce a different developmental
outcome (p. 398).
Nestler (2009) also defines epigenetic mechanisms in this broad sense, which he says in-
cludes cellular processes that integrate environmental stimuli, which influence gene expres-
sion through regulation of chromatin. Thus, the epigenetic explanation schema generated
in this section will be based on a broader definition of epigenetics.
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Central to epigenetic explanations is the metastable epiallele. Dolinoy et al. (2007)
define metastable epialleles as ”alleles that are variably expressed in genetically identical
individuals due to epigenetic modifications that were established in early development.
The term ’metastable’ refers to the labile nature of the epigenetic state of these alleles,
while ’epiallele’ defines their potential to maintain epigenetic marks transgenerationally (p.
32).” Further, these researchers note that ”gestational exposure to nutritional agents and
other environmental factors has been demonstrated to alter epigenetic marks at metastable
epialleles (p. 32).” Thus, metastable epialleles refer to regions of the genome affected by
epigenetic modifications that account for differences in phenotypic expression of identical
cells, and these epialleles can be affected by environmental factors.
Thagard & Findlay (2010) propose a potential epigenetic explanation schema. On their
account, the explanation schema runs as follows:
Explanatory target : Why does a patient have a disease with associated symp-
toms?
Explanatory Pattern: The patient has an epimutation affecting the accessibility
of gene(s) in a given region of chromatin.
The improper expression of gene(s) produces the disease and its symptoms.
In this schema, ”epimutation” refers to any epigenetic modifications to a particular
region of chromatin, which can be genetic or environmental in origin. Genetic causes of
epimutations usually occur when there is a mutation in a gene that would normally code
for a component of epigenetic regulation, such as HAT or DNMT, or in MeCP2 in the case
of Rett’s disorder, which I discuss in a later section. Epimutations are well documented
in disorders that are the result of genetic imprinting, such as Angelman’s syndrome and
Prader-Willi syndrome, which are discussed below. Further, the mutation in MECP2 in
Rett’s disorder is associated with the disruption of epigenetic processes, since MeCP2
functions to mediate interactions between DNA methylation and chromatin remodeling
(Amir et al, 1999; also discussed in Thagard & Findlay, 2010).
5.3.2 Epigenetic Mechanisms: DNA Methylation, Histone Mod-
ifications, and Imprinting
Gene expression occurs because DNA wraps around octamers of histone proteins to form
nucleosomes. The base pairs that make up DNA wrap around a core made with histone
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proteins H2a, H2b, H3, and H4 to form the nucleosome. Nucleosomes of DNA and histone
proteins are called chromatin, and changes to chromatin influences gene expression by
either silencing or activating genes. When chromatin is condensed, genes are silenced,
and when chromatin is open genes are activated. Changes in chromatin structure are
regulated by epigenetic patterns of DNA methylation and histone modifications. Enzymes
involved in these processes include DNA methyltransferases (DNMTs), histone deacetylases
(HDACs), histone acetylases, histone methytransferases, and the methyl-binding protein
MECP2 (Rodenhiser & Mann, 2006).
DNA methylation involves the addition of a methyl group (CH3) to a CpG base pair.
This process is carried out by enzymes called DNA methyl transferases (DNMT). Areas
in the DNA sequence where there are many CpG pairs clustered together are called CpG
islands, and they are located in the upstream regulatory regions of many genes. Prior to
their discussion of the potential epigenetic explanation schema, Thagard & Findlay (2010)
give more detail about epigenetic changes to gene expression and epigenetic modifications to
DNA. They state that hypermethylation of CpG islands is associated with transcriptional
silencing of the downstream gene, while hypomethylation of these regions is associated with
transcriptional activation of the downstream gene. These authors (2011) also note that
”[r]esidues on the slim ’tails’ that extend away from each of the core histone proteins can
be modified by the addition of small chemical groups that affect the attraction between
histones and DNA. Such modifications include acetylation, phosphorylation, methylation,
ubiquitination, and sumoylation (p. 2)”. These modifications work to either weaken or
strengthen the attraction between DNA and the histone proteins. For instance, acetylation
of lysine residues by an enzyme called histone acetyl transferases (HAT) weakens the
interaction between DNA and histones to allow transcriptional activation. On the other
hand, a class of enzymes called histone deacetylation (HDAC) removes a methyl group
from a CpG pair, and thus represses transcription (Thagard & Findlay, 2010).
In addition to DNA methylation, changes to histone proteins can change DNA orga-
nization and gene expression. Histone-modifying enzymes ensure that a receptive DNA
region is either accessible for transcription or silenced (Rodenhiser & Mann, 2006). Thus,
active regions of chromatin have high levels of acetylated histones, and inactive regions
of chromatin have methylated DNA and deacetylated histones. These regions act as an
epigenetic ’tag’ on targeted DNA that actives or silences genes. These epigenetic processes
are reversible, and ensure that specific genes are activated or silenced in the presence of
certain developmental and biochemical cues, which Rodenhiser & Mann (2006) state can
include hormone levels, dietary components and drug exposures. These authors argue
that DNA methylation patterns can fluctuate in response to changes in diet, inherited
genetic polymorphisms and exposure to environmental chemicals like heavy metals and
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hydrocarbons.
Epigenetic changes can also occur throughout the lifespan. Rodenhiser & Mann (2006)
state
[i]mmediately following fertilization, the paternal genome undergoes rapid DNA
demethylation and histone modifications. The maternal genome is demethy-
lated gradually, and eventually a new wave of embryonic methylation is initiated
that establishes the blueprint for the tissues of the developing embryo. As a re-
sult, each cell has its own epigenetic pattern that must be carefully maintained
to regulate proper gene expression (p. 343.)
Further, Crepaldi & Riccio (2009) note that recent evidence indicates that differentiated
neurons in the central nervous system deploy epigenetic changes that produce behavioural
responses. These authors state the expression of behaviour, either simple or complex, is
the result of the complex interplay between neuronal networks connected within the CNS.
Even though neurons are fully differentiated and do not produce daughter cells, chromatin
within neurons retains a significant amount of plasticity.
There are two other epigenetic mechanisms most commonly discussed in the epigenetic
literature: X-chromosome inactivation and genetic imprinting. The former affects females
and occurs when one X chromosome is silenced in every cell. Imprinting refers to the
hemizygous expression of certain genes in that is parent-of-origin dependent. Imprinting is
regulated by DNA methylation and histone modifications, and allows a gene to ’remember’
whether it was inherited from the mother or the father, so only one of the two parental
alleles is expressed. As discussed in the previous section, congenital developmental disor-
ders like Angelman’s syndrome and Prader-Willi syndrome are related to ASD, and these
disorders are the result of imprinting errors. In Angleman’s syndrome, imprinting errors
are inherited on the paternal allele, and in Prader-Willi syndrome, errors are inherited on
the maternal allele.
5.3.3 An Epigenetic Explanation Pattern for Psychiatric Condi-
tions
Theorists such as Nestler (2009) are investigating the epigenetic mechanisms involved in the
development of psychiatric disorders with complex etiologies, such as addiction. Epigenetic
research presents a potentially powerful explanatory account of the etiology of psychiatric
disorders. For instance, epigenetic mechanisms give a partial account of how environmental
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factors throughout the lifespan such as stressful life events can cause changes in the brain
(see Moffitt, Caspi & Rutter, 2005; Nestler, 2009). In the case of addiction, many theorists
have argued that there is a biological component to addiction, and that relatives of addicts
often develop substance abuse problems as well. However, there are also environmental
aspects to addiction, such as trauma, a home environment where addictive behaviour and
substance abuse are modeled, and introduction to substance use at an early age. If the
relationship between environmental and genetic risk factors for addiction could be eluci-
dated, an epigenetic explanation of this condition could account for why some individuals
become addicts and some do not, despite similar upbringings and genetic predispositions.
Further, Thagard & Findlay (2010) argue that epigenetic explanations of diseases are pow-
erful because they provide a mechanistic account of how such environmental and genetic
factors interact to cause diseases including psychiatric disorders like addiction. If correct,
epigenetic explanations of psychiatric disorders may provide a way to include causes that
occur early in life as well as during later periods of socio-cognitive development, because
epigenetic changes or mutations can occur any time during an individual’s life.
If such epigenetic explanations of psychiatric conditions could be generated, the course,
progression and presentation of symptoms of a complex disorder like addiction may be
better predicted. On this account, the progression of symptoms could be predicted based
on the nature of the subject’s environment, the extent of genetic predispositions, and the
interactions between these causes.
We can construct an epigenetic explanation schema for psychiatric disorders as follows:
Explanatory target : Why does a patient develop the symptoms of a psychiatric
disorder?
Explanatory Pattern:
The patient has multiple, interacting epimutations, that affect the accessibility
of genes in given regions of chromatin.
These epimutations cause the improper expression of genes.
The improper expression of genes produces the multi-level impairments char-
acteristic of a given psychiatric disorder.
Impairments in neurological development and functioning result in particular
socio-cognitive impairments.
The improper expression of certain genes involved in neurological development
and functioning cause particular cognitive and behavioural symptoms.
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Thus, if further research continues to elucidate epigenetic causes for psychiatric condi-
tions, an explanatory framework using a broad definition of epigenetics may be a powerful
one for explaining the causes and progression of psychiatric conditions.
5.3.4 Re-Framing the Genetic Research: ASD as an Epigenetic
Disorder
Epigenetic research is compatible with the genetic research discussed in the previous sec-
tion, and presents the possibility to explain the role of genetics in ASD by understanding
how the particular genes involved in these disorders are expressed. Epigenetic explanations
of autism spectrum disorders identify the genetic, epigenetic, and de novo changes to the
genes involved in the development of neurological structures and pathways associated with
socio-cognitive processes like theory of mind and imitation. Thus, an epigenetic explana-
tion pattern for autism spectrum disorders identifies the epimutations associated with the
neurological impairments that cause the cognitive and behavioural symptoms characteristic
of these disorders. Schanen (2006) states that
despite considerable effort over the past decade, [the] underlying risk alleles [of
ASD] have been remarkably elusive...[and] the obstacles encountered in map-
ping risk alleles have led a number of investigators to rethink the model of
inheritance to include contributions of new mutations and/or epigenetic mech-
anisms such as genomic imprinting or epimutations in the underlying genetic
susceptibility to ASD (p. 138)
Schanen (2006) argues that epigenetic factors are clearly at work in the development
of ASD, since epigenetic regulatory mechanisms are central to the development of Rett’s
disorder and Fragile X syndrome. Further, in the case of autism spectrum disorders other
than Rett’s Disorder, there may be many factors that contribute to the development of the
ASD phenotype, from maternal diet to epimtuations and de novo mutations and epimuta-
tions. For example, Schanen (2006) states DNA methylation can be modified by mutations,
maternal exposures and postnatal experiences. Thus, research into the genes involved in
the development of autism spectrum disorders indicates that a mixed genetic/epigenetic/do
novo model is the most likely candidate for an accurate genetically based causal account
of these disorders (Jiang, et al. 2004).
Researchers discovered that FMR1, an X-linked gene, is involved in the development
of Fragile X syndrome (Persico & Bourgeron, 2006). Persico & Bourgeron (2006) state
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that the ”Fragile-X mental retardation protein (FRMP) is encoded by the FMR1 gene,
the 5’-untranslated region (5’-UTR) of which contains a polymorphic CGG repeat that
can undergo triplet-repeat expansion, resulting in promoter hypermethylation and FMR1
gene silencing. The clinical outcome is fragile X syndrome...(p. 350)”. FMRP is an
RNA-binding protein, located on the Xq28 region of the X chromosome. This particular
genetic abnormality is associated with what Persico & Bourgeron (2006) call ’secondary’
autism, or ’syndromic’ autism, which refers to autistic behaviours associated with other
developmental-neurological conditions.
Schanen (2006) states that genomic imprinting is an epigenetic mechanism that leads to
parent-of-origin specific expression. Recall the discussion in the previous section regarding
Angelman’s and Prader-Willi syndromes, and the overlap between the symptoms of these
syndromes and those that characterize ASD. Angelman’s syndrome is caused by the du-
plication of 15q11-q13 region of chromosome 15. The Angelman syndrome gene, UBE3A,
is maternally imprinted, which means that it is expressed only from the paternal allele.
Prader-Willi Syndrome is caused by abnormalities in the same region of chromosome 15 as
Angelman’s syndrome. However, Prader-Willi is caused by a deficiency in the expression
of the paternal allele, instead of the maternal allele and is not as strongly associated with
ASD as Angelman’s syndrome. Since AS and PWS share some genetic abnormalities with
ASD, it is very likely that epigenetic mechanisms are at work in the development of ASD
as well. Further, genetic studies investigating the origins of autism spectrum disorders also
point to the role of imprinting in the pathogenesis of these disorders.
The genes on the 7q region of chromosome 7 and abnormalities on the X chromosome
implicated in ASD exhibit epigenetic properties, and their functions can be interpreted
using an epigenetic explanation pattern. Schanen (2006) notes that the genes at 7q32.2
show parent-of-origin effects on the sharing of alleles in this region. Further, epigenetic
mechanisms have been proposed to explain the gender bias in ASD (Schanen, 2006). Recall
that autism affects four times more boys than girls, and the girls who do have ASD usually
have Rett’s syndrome. A study of 80 females with Turner syndrome, also known as mono-
somy X, found parent-of-origin effects. Females with a paternally derived X chromosome
performed better on measures of social cognition than females with a maternally inherited
X chromosome. This indicates that an imprinted locus, tentatively mapped onto Xq or
Xp, increases social behaviours in females, and the genes on this locus are hypothesized
to insulate females from developing ASD (Schanen, 2006). We can develop an explanation
schema for ASD, based on this epigenetic research. The schema is as follows:
Explanatory Target Why do certain children develop ASD, which are disorders
characterized by impairments in communication, interaction and stereotyped
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behaviours?
Explanatory Pattern
ASD is caused by the interaction of multiple genes and epigenetic mechanisms.
These epigenetic abnormalities are thought to include the imprinted regions of
the 15q11-13q region of chromosome 15, the q22-q33 region of chromosome 7,
and Xq28 locus on the X chromosome.
These genes code for proteins that are involved in neural migration, the creation
of synapses and other aspects of neurodevelopment.
These genetic abnormalities and epimutations interact with each other and
with environmental causes to cause particular socio-cognitive impairments in
communication, interaction, and motor behaviour during early phases of devel-
opment.
This schema is very similar to the genetic schema discussed in the previous section.
However, an epigenetic explanation pattern attempts to explain why the concordance rate
between identical twins is not 100% despite strong evidence that ASD is one of the most
heritable disorders in the DSM, and why there is a significant gender bias in individuals
with ASD. Recall that the heritability of the broad ASD phenotype is approximately
92%, and several authors have argued that ASD are the result of genetic, epigenetic and
do novo changes, where epigenetic changes are thought to be a significant aspect of the
development of the ASD phenotype. On an epigenetic account of these disorders, one twin
may not develop an autism disorder despite having identical genes, and thus identical risk
alleles, because he or she does not develop certain epimutations which cause these risk
alleles to be expressed in the ASD phenotype. Since by definition epigenetic changes are
not coded in DNA, these changes are responsible for one twin developing ASD while the
other does not. If the data just discussed are correct, and continue to provide clues as to
the etiology of ASD, epigenetic mechanisms can help explain the patterns of inheritance
and the development of the ASD phenotype, and thus may begin to elucidate the complex
causation involved in ASD that cannot be explained by genetics.
Rett’s Disorder: Single-Gene Mutations and Epigenetic Changes
Rett’s disorder, or Rett’s syndrome, is a pervasive developmental disorder currently in-
cluded in the autism spectrum disorders listed in DSM-IV-TR. Rett’s disorder, like the
other disorders on the autism spectrum, is characterized by impairments in communi-
cation, interaction and motor behaviour. However, unlike autistic disorder, Asperger’s
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syndrome and pervasive developmental disorder not otherwise specified (PDD-NOS), the
impairments in Rett’s disorder appear after a period of at least 6 months of normal de-
velopment, and previously learned socio-cognitive skills are lost. Also, unlike the other
disorders on the spectrum, Rett’s disorder mostly affects girls.
Van Acker, Loncola, & Van Acker (2005) state ”Rett syndrome is a phenotypically
distinct progressive X-linked dominant neurodevelopmental disorder...(p. 126).” These
researchers state that next to Down Syndrome, Rett’s disorder is one of the most common
causes of mental retardation in females. Genetic research into the etiology of Rett’s disorder
discovered abnormalities at the Xq28 locus, and Schanen (2006) states that Rett’s disorder
”is a complex neurological disorder that arises from mutation in the gene that encodes
the methyl-CpG-binding protein 2 (MeCP2).” MeCp2 plays an important role in silencing
genes during certain critical periods of central nervous system development (Van Acker
et al, 2005), and mutations in this gene results in the failure to produce the MeCP2
protein. Thus, unlike other disorders on the autistic spectrum, Rett’s disorder is the result
of the mutation of a single gene that is responsible for epigenetic changes during early
development. Van Acker et al. (2005) state the MeCP2 protein
binds to prescribed mehtylated cytosine nucleotides (CpG dinucleotides) on
the DNA. The bound DNA-MECP2 complex then interacts with a histone
deacetylase complex and the transcriptional co-repressor Sin3A. Together, these
repressors alter the chromatin making the genes inaccessible to transcriptional
activators - in essence, silencing the further transcription of that gene (p. 137).
Thus, the genes that would normally be silenced by the MeCP2 protein continue to
engage in transcription. While the exact role and number of the genes MeCP2 is meant
to silence is not known, Van Acker et al. (2005) state that these genes may be involved in
the development and regulation of the brain and central nervous system.
Based on the discovery of the MeCP2 mutation, we can construct an epigenetic expla-
nation schema for Rett’s disorder as follows:
Explanatory Target Why do certain females exhibit autistic symptoms, such
as impairments in motor, social interaction and communication skills already
acquired at six months of age?
Explanatory Pattern
Certain females have a mutation in the MECP2 gene.
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MECP2 encodes the methyl-CpG-binding protein 2.
MeCP2 is involved in methylating DNA and silencing certain genes that are
thought to be responsible for the degredation of already acquired socio-cognitive
skills and autistic symptoms.
Mutations in MECP2 causes autistic symptoms and the loss of motor and
communication skills already acquired by six months of age.
Thus, Rett’s disorder may have a different etiology than other disorders on the autism
spectrum, since a mutation in a single gene is responsible for this condition and for the
autistic symptoms, unlike the multiple genes likely involved in the other autistic disorders.
Since MeCP2 is implicated in Rett’s disorder, many researchers have argued that Rett’s
disorder should be considered an epigenetic disorder, since MeCP2 is involved in transcrip-
tion and other epigenetic processes (see Rutter, 2005, in Volkmar et al, 2005a; Beaudet &
Zoghbi, 2006). While the role of MeCP2 in idiopathic autism is less clear, defects in the
MECP2 gene is thought to be involved in the development of these disorders as well.
5.3.5 Epigenetic Explanation Patterns and the Criteria for Ad-
equate Explanation Patterns in Psychiatry
The epigenetic explanation pattern is a powerful one, and meets most of the criteria for
adequate explanations of psychiatric disorders. First, although research into the epigenetic
mechanisms involved in disorders like ASD, the data is far from conclusive and accounts of
the epigenetic causes of most psychiatric conditions are highly speculative. An epigenetic
explanation pattern of conditions like Rett’s disorder is internally consistent, and has good
empirical support. Further, understanding the causes of Rett’s disorder can assist in the
diagnosis of this condition in female children. While autism spectrum disorders is more
common in boys, female children can also develop autism spectrum disorders, and deter-
mining which subtype of ASD a female child may have can be difficult based on symptoms
alone. However, according to an epigenetic explanation pattern, a female child cannot be
diagnosed with Rett’s disorder unless she has the epimutation in the MeCP2 gene. If a fe-
male child does not have an epimutation in the MeCp2 gene, she should be diagnosed with
another autism spectrum disorder besides Rett’s disorder. Thus, an epigenetic explanation
of Rett’s disorder seems universal and specific enough to clearly demarcate this condition
from the others on the spectrum, despite the similarities in neurological, cognitive and
behavioural symptoms.
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While an epigenetic explanation pattern for Rett’s disorder seems to clearly demarcate
that condition from others on the spectrum, and from other developmental disorders, the
epigenetic causes of the other disorders on the spectrum are must less robust. As research
continues, an epigenetic explanation pattern may be able to identify possible primary
causes of autism spectrum disorders, even though these causes are both environmental
and biological. Further, if correct, epigenetic explanations of conditions like ASD can help
to fill in important details about the interactions between certain environmental factors
and certain genes that result in particular neurological dysfunctions, which in turn cause
particular cognitive and behavioural symptoms. Thus, epigenetic explanations could be
mapped onto a multi-level, mechanistic representation of the interactions between the
biological, cognitive and social levels of description, which produce changes in neurological
functioning which results in the characteristic socio-cognitive and behavioural symptoms
of ASD.
However, chapter 2 argued that the causation in psychiatric conditions such as those on
the autism spectrum is complex and involves interactions between all of the levels, not just
the environment and genetic of explanation. Epigenetic changes may be able to explain
some of the interactions between primary causes, but it is less clear how epigenetic muta-
tions are responsible for the cognitive aspects of psychiatric conditions, or how breakdowns
and ongoing dysfunction in neurological and cognitive mechanisms can affect the genetic
level. Thus, while the epigenetic pattern of explanation is a potentially powerful one, it
may be not be powerful enough on its own to explain the complex, multi-directional and
ongoing causation that is involved in the development of psychiatric conditions, such as
most of the conditions on the autism spectrum.
5.4 Conclusion
Causal theories from epigenetics may be able to partially explain some of the complex
causation involved in the development of psychiatric conditions such as ASD, and can be
integrated into a multi-level, mechanistic explanation of the causes of a particular disorder.
However, it seems that in the case of most of the conditions currently listed in the DSM,
including most of the conditions on the autism spectrum, epigenetic explanations may
not be robust and complex enough on their own to fully elucidate the causal structure of
psychiatric conditions, and thus does not, at present, meet all of the criteria for adequate
patterns of explanations for psychiatric conditions. However, as the next chapter argues,
epigenetic explanations can be incorporated into an integrated explanation schema which I
argue does meet the criteria for adequate patterns of explanation for psychiatric conditions
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like those on the autism spectrum.
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Chapter 6
Explanation Patterns for Autism
Spectrum Disorder: An Integrated
Schema
6.1 Introduction
In this section, I develop a sketch of an integrated schema for explaining the possible
causes of psychiatric conditions such as autism spectrum disorders. To develop the inte-
grated schema, I incorporate the more powerful schemas previously discussed into one that
includes the genetic, epigenetic, cognitive neurological and cognitive levels of explanation.
Admittedly, the account developed here is speculative. The actual merits of such an ex-
planatory pattern are deeply contingent on the empirical evidence and theoretical changes
that will emerge as research into the causes of psychiatric conditions continues. However,
I argue that an integrated schema will likely be the most powerful one for elucidating the
causal relations in psychiatric conditions like ASD for four reasons.
First, many theorists and clinicians discussed in chapter two argue that explanations of
psychiatric conditions will likely be explained using a combination of all the explanatory
patterns examined in this thesis. For instance, theorists such as Murphy (2006, 2008),
Mitchell (2008a, 2008b) and Kendler (2008) argue that explanations of psychiatric condi-
tions should incorporate multiple levels of description. Further, Mitchell (2008a, 2008b)
and Kendler (2008) argue that social factors, such as stressful life events or trauma, are just
as essential to explaining the causes and development of psychiatric conditions as biological
and cognitive causes.
117
Second, as chapter one and two argued, emerging data from fields such as genetics,
epigenetics, neuroscience, cognitive neuroscience and cognitive psychology indicate that
psychiatric disorders are the result of complex interactions between multiple causes at
different levels of description. Murphy (2006, 2008), Mitchell (2008a, 2008b), and Kendler
(2008) have argued that adequate explanations of psychiatric conditions should include not
just an account of the causes of psychiatric disorders, but how these causes interact across
levels to produce the characteristic symptoms of conditions such as those on the autism
spectrum.
Third, I have shown in the preceding discussion that none of the non-integrated explana-
tory frameworks seems to be powerful enough to explain the complex causation involved
in the development of psychiatric conditions like those on the autism spectrum. Some
of these schemas, such as the cognitive, cognitive neurological, genetic, and epigenetic
schemas, meet some of the criteria outlined in chapter two, and thus have some explana-
tory and predictive power. However, while the conditions on the autism spectrum have
biological, cognitive and social features, none of these features are powerful enough on their
own to accurately and reliably identify cases of these disorders. However, I will argue in
what follows that an integrated explanatory schema may be the most powerful for eluci-
dating the causal structure of psychiatric disorders because such a schema meets all the
criteria for adequate explanation frameworks in psychiatry. This fourth and most impor-
tant reason for adopting an interactive approach for explaining the causes of psychiatric
disorders will be elaborated upon in what follows.
6.2 Integrated Explanation Pattern for the Causes of
Psychiatric Conditions
To help develop an integrated explanation schema, I examine two examples of integrated
models of two very different psychiatric conditions discussed by Mitchell (2008a) and
Kender (2008) respectively. Mitchell (2008a) uses Major Depressive Disorder to argue
that an ”integrated pluralist approach” (p....) is the most powerful way to represent the
complexity of psychiatric conditions. DSM-IV identifies several symptoms that are charac-
teristic of this disorder, such as anhedonia (the inability to feel pleasure from activities and
experiences once enjoyed), thoughts of death and suicide, and profound feelings of sadness
and guilt. Mitchell discusses a model of MDD developed by Kendler, Gardner & Prescott
(2006), which includes both a ”bottom-up” and a ”top-down” analysis of the causal pro-
cesses involved in the development of this condition. Kendler, Gardner & Prescott identify
some of the biological factors associated with major depression, such as imbalances in the
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neurotransmitters serotonin and noradrenaline, changes in brain structure and function in
areas such as the frontal lobe, and changes to circulation and hormone levels in the brain.
On the other hand, these theorists also identify a number of environmental and cognitive
factors that are associated with the development of a major depressive episode, such as
low-self esteem, childhood abuse, low social support, and traumatic events such as the loss
of a loved one. However, none of these biological, cognitive or environmental factors are
present in every patient, and none of these factors are necessary conditions for developing
a major depressive episode (Mitchell, 2008a).
Mitchell also discusses the results of studies such as those conducted by Caspi et al.
and Kendler et al. (2005) that indicate that individuals with two short 5-HTT alleles (as
opposed to one long and one short allele, or two long alleles) are more susceptible to episodes
of major depression because they are more sensitive to stressful life events. Mitchell states
that ”[w]hat is significant about the gene-environment interaction results found for the
5-HTT gene and stressful life events is that they entail a nonreductionist approach for
explaining the complex causal network leading to MDD. In rejecting a purely molecular
reductionist approach, Kendler et al. state ’our results argue against this as they suggest
that understanding gene action in depression requires us to both ”go down” to individual
genetic polymorphisms and ”go out” into the environment with detailed measurements of
stressful experiences (Kendler et al. 2006, p. 534; in Mitchell, 2008a, p. 33). Mitchell states
that ”it is clear that depression is a complex behaviour of a complex system that depends
on multiple causes and multiple levels...(2008a, p. 30).” She argues that ”[i]n general,
psychiatric disorders will not be amenable to purely or even partially reductive strategies.
Because evidence suggests that they are behaviours of an integrative complex system, an
integrative methodology is needed to understand the etiology and causally explain such
behaviours (2008a, p. 33).” Thus, Mitchell argues that an ”integrative pluralist approach”
is the most powerful one for explaining the causal processes involved in complex phenomena
like major depression (2008a, p. 35).
Kender (2008) uses the example of alcohol dependence to argue that that complex
phenomena like addiction best understood using a multi-level mechanistic approach. He
argues that a ”range of compelling evidence indicates that [psychiatric] disorders involve
causal processes...that act within and outside of the individual, and that involve processes
best understood from biological, psychological, and sociocultural perspectives (p. 695).”
To illustrate the power of multi-level mechanistic explanations for psychiatric conditions
like addiction, Kendler (2008) develops a sketch of a multi-level mechanistic explanation of
alcohol dependence. The characteristic symptoms of this condition listed in the DSM in-
clude continued use of alcohol despite physiological, financial and social problems, tolerance
to increasing doses of alcohol, and withdrawal symptoms when alcohol is not consumed.
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He discusses some of the data and theories of addiction and alcohol dependence, which
identify possible causal factors at the genetic, psychological and social levels of descrip-
tion. Biological factors associated with alcohol dependence include genetic predispositions
that can increase an individual’s susceptibility to alcohol abuse and dependence. Kendler
(2008) states that the genes associated with alcoholism can affect the way an individual
metabolizes alcohol and the way alcohol interacts with receptors in the brain, which can
in turn affect the individual’s patterns of drinking and rate of intoxication. Psychologi-
cal factors associated with alcohol abuse include personality traits such as impulsiveness,
neuroticism and extraversion. Finally, social factors such as availability of alcohol, peer
substance use, socio-economic status, and cultural acceptance of substance use are also
associated with alcohol dependence.
Kendler (2008) states that each of these causal factors are vital to a complete under-
standing of a complex condition such as alcohol dependence. However, it is just as im-
portant to understand how these causes interact to produce the characteristic symptoms
of this condition identified in the DSM. He argues that in studies using ”twin designs,
genetic effects on risk for drinking or alcohol dependence have been shown to vary as a
function of religious beliefs, marital status, and social environment. Thus..[t]heir effects
are dependent on both biochemical and psychosocial contexts (p. 697).” He elaborates
on the ways in which genes and the environment interact to produce complex conditions
like alcohol dependence. He states that genes ”strongly influence the initial response to
ethanol. At one extreme, individuals with a variant of aldehyde dehydrogenase metabolize
acetaldehyde so slowly that they develop a dysphoric flushing reaction after significant
ethanol consumption. This genetic effect substantially reduces the chances that such indi-
viduals will repeatedly reexpose themselves to the large doses of ethanol needed to develop
dependence. At the other extreme, individuals who genetically have reduced sensitivity to
ethanols effects are more likely to drink frequently and have an elevated risk of developing
alcohol dependence. So genes influence subjective ethanol effects, which influence alco-
hol expectations, which in turn loop out into the environment, influencing consumption
patterns, which in turn affect risk of alcohol dependence (2008, p. 697).”
However, although environmental factors influence maladaptive patterns of alcohol con-
sumption characteristic of alcoholism, these environmental factors also affect the biological
aspects of alcohol dependence. As Kendler explains, repeated and frequent ”[e]xposure
to ethanol produces physiological tolerance both from increased metabolic rates and de-
creased CNS sensitivity. This can produce a positive feedback loop in which early phases of
heavy drinking permit an individual to better ’hold their liquor,’ which in turn encourages
yet greater consumption (2008, p. 697).” Further, psychological variables can also influ-
ence and exacerbate the biological and environmental risk factors for developing alcohol
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dependence. He states that ”[i]mpulsive, risk-taking adolescents seek out similar peers who
provide support for and access to further antisocial and drug-taking behaviors. Genetic
factors influence this process. So genetically influenced temperament causes individuals
to select themselves into high-risk environments, which feed back on their risk for alcohol
dependence by providing easy access to ethanol and encouragement for its excessive use
(2008, p. 697).”
Despite the importance of understanding the cognitive and social factors in the de-
velopment of alcohol dependence, Kendler also argues against purely cognitive or social
explanations of psychiatric conditions. Without an understanding of how the genes that
predispose an individual to alcohol dependence are affected by cognitive and social vari-
ables, clinicians are unable to explain why some individuals with this genetic predisposition
develop alcoholism while others do not. On the other hand, a purely social or cognitive
explanation account of conditions like alcohol dependence will also not be sufficient, since
not all individuals who live in low socio-economic areas or who are exposed to substance use
early develop alcoholism. Further, Mitchell (2008a) highlights the importance of knowing
how complex phenomena like major depression or alcoholism interact with and are influ-
enced by the environment in which they exist. Thus, a purely reductive approach will not
be sufficient for explaining the causes of psychiatric disorders because of the importance of
elucidating because the ”type of interaction of causal components, not just the fact that
there are other causal components...entails th[e] need for multiple levels in giving a causal
explanation (Mitchell, 2008b, p. 128)” for psychiatric conditions.
Based on the discussion and the examples from Mitchell and Kendler above, we can
generate a general integrated explanation schema for psychiatric conditions, which provides
the general explanatory pattern for identifying the causes of conditions such as Major De-
pressive Disorder and addiction. While the discussions from Mitchell and Kendler do not
include mention of epigenetic data for Major Depression or addiction, the previous section
mentioned research into the possible epigenetic processes involved in the development of
both these conditions (e.g. Nestler, 2009). Further, since an epigenetic schema was ana-
lyzed and evaluated in this thesis (and shown to have explanatory power), I will include
the epigenetic level of description in the integrated schema I develop below. The general
integrated schema for identifying the causes of psychiatric conditions is as follows:
Explanatory Target : Why do certain people exhibit the symptoms of psychiatric
conditions?
Explanatory Pattern:
The patient has particular patterns of interacting genetic and epigenetic ab-
normalities and defects.
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Certain patterns of interacting genetic and epigenetic abnormalities and defects
are associated with certain kinds of impairments in neurological development
and functioning.
Impairments in neurological development and functioning result in breakdowns
in neurological systems and mechanisms.
Breakdowns in neurological systems and mechanisms result in neurological mal-
functions.
Neurological malfunctions cause disruptions in cognitive processes, such as the
generation and implementation of attributions and beliefs.
Individuals with impairments in cognitive processes such as the generation and
implementation of attributions and beliefs, develop disruptions in typical cog-
nitive functioning and maladaptive patterns of social interaction.
Ongoing multi-directional and multi-level interactions between these biological
and cognitive causes and conditions in the environment result in the character-
istic symptoms of psychiatric disorders.
This schema identifies not just the causes at the biological, cognitive and social levels of
description, but also attempts to identify the possible interactions between these causes to
produce the symptoms of the psychiatric disorder in question. While this schema is specu-
lative, it may be robust enough to accurately identify cases of psychiatric disorders in the
population. Recall that emerging causal data on disorders like MDD, addiction, and ASD
indicate that there is a heterogeneity of causal features across patients in a particular diag-
nostic category. In other words, different patients with the same characteristic symptoms
may have some or all of the biological, cognitive and social causes in varying degrees and
combinations. Thus, for most of the conditions contained in the DSM, no single-level or
reductive causal schema will be able to identify all cases of a particular disorder. However,
an integrated schema may be powerful enough to do so. On this account, although no two
patients will have identical degrees, combinations, and interactions between the primary
causes (and there is likely to be many) identified for each condition, all patients within a
diagnostic category will have at least some of these causal features. For patients that seem
to have the characteristic symptoms of a particular disorder, but do not have the primary
causes identified by the explanation schema for that disorder, the patterns of biological,
cognitive and social malfunctions and the interactions between these malfunctions will be
better explained by the integrated schema for another disorder.
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6.2.1 Proposed Integrated Explanation Pattern for Autism Spec-
trum Disorders
If multi-level interactive mechanistic explanations are indeed the most powerful for explain-
ing the causes and development of psychiatric conditions, such explanations should also be
a powerful tool for explaining the causes and development of the conditions on the autism
spectrum. Like those that suffer from Major Depression and addiction, individuals with
autism spectrum disorders also have a heterogeneous combination of the core symptoms,
the degree(s) of severity of those core symptoms, and how those symptoms are affected by
the surrounding environment. In this section I argue that the integrated schema could also
provide a general framework for explaining the conditions on the autism spectrum.
Clinicians such as Boucher (2009) discuss the strengths of a multi-level explanation
of ASD that incorporates biological and cognitive levels of description. She (2009) states
”explaining autism is difficult for a number of reasons. These include the fact that a
full explanation of autism will involve understanding the root causes, linking these to
abnormalities of brain development and function, and linking these to psychological deficits
that in turn cause the kinds of behaviour that are characteristic of people with ASD. In
other words, there are at least three levels of explanation that have to be causally linked
to each other (p. 112).” Like Mitchell (2008a, 2008b), Boucher (2009) also argues for
the importance of understanding the role of the environment in the development of ASD
and the presentation of the characteristic symptoms of these conditions. Further, Boucher
(2009) argues against the feasibility of reductive explanations of autism spectrum disorders,
and states that a multi-level explanation is necessary to understand the complex causation
involved in the development of these conditions.
Although ASD are (at present) classified as a cluster of conditions with similar symp-
toms, each subtype currently identified as part of the autism spectrum has social, cognitive
and biological features, and thus have a similar causal structure to the psychiatric condi-
tions such as depression and alcoholism discussed above. However, it is very likely that
each subtype within the autism spectrum will have a distinct causal structure, which may
include different primary causes, or indicate that certain explanatory levels within the inte-
grated schema should be emphasized. In those cases, certain subschemas can be developed
that emphasize particular explanatory levels over others, depending on the nature of the
causal evidence from ongoing autism research. For instance, Rett’s disorder is caused by an
epigenetic mutation. Thus, although Rett’s disorder has cognitive and social features, the
primary cause of this disorder is the mutation in the MeCP2 gene. Using the integrated
framework developed in this section, Rett’s disorder could be explained using a subschema
of the integrated schema below where the primary cause it at the epigenetic level, and the
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social and cognitive features of this condition are the result of this epimutation.
For the subtypes on the autism spectrum, i.e. Childhood Disintegrative Disorder, Autis-
tic Disorder, Asperger’s Syndrome, and Pervasive Developmental Disorder Not Otherwise
Specified, the causes and progression of the symptoms are much more complex and are
not completely explained by the epigenetic explanation pattern. Thus, for ASD other than
Rett’s disorder, we can generate an integrated explanation schema for autism spectrum
disorders other than Rett’s disorder as follows:
Explanatory Target : Why do certain children develop the characteristic symp-
toms of autism spectrum disorders?
Explanatory Pattern:
The child has particular patterns of interacting genetic abnormalities and de-
fects, such as those identified with 15q11-13q regions of chromosome 15, the
q22-q33 region of chromosome 7, and Xq28 locus on the X chromosome.
These genes code for proteins that are involved in neural migration, the creation
of synapses and other aspects of neurodevelopment.
The child also has certain patterns of interacting epimutations that cause the
improper expression of genes involved in neurological development and func-
tioning.
These epigenetic abnormalities are thought to include the imprinted regions of
the 15q11-13q region of chromosome 15, the q22-q33 region of chromosome 7,
and Xq28 locus on the X chromosome.
These genetic and epigenetic abnormalities cause impairments in neurological
development and functioning, which result in breakdowns in neurological sys-
tems and mechanisms such as the mirror neuron system.
Breakdowns in neurological systems and mechanisms such as the mirror neuron
system are associated with cognitive impairments such as an underdeveloped
theory of mind.
Stereotyped behaviours, impairments in language and social interaction are
associated with cognitive impairments such as an underdeveloped theory of
mind.
The characteristic symptoms of ASD are caused by the on-going interaction
between genetic, epigenetic, neurological, and cognitive causes and features of
the individual’s environment.
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The integrated schema for autism spectrum disorders has several strengths. Some
of these strengths are inherited from integrating previously discussed schemas, whereas
others are gained from the integration of these previous schemas. First, the integrated
schema retains the ability of some of the previous schemas to differentiate between and
identify cases of autism spectrum disorders and cases of unrelated disorders with similar
symptoms. For instance, the theory of mind hypothesis developed by Baron-Cohen et al.
(1985) reliably differentiates between typically developed children, children with Downs
Syndrome and children with ASD. Further, epigenetic causal theories can help differentiate
between cases of ASD and cases of Prader-Wili Syndrome and Angelman’s Syndrome, and
reliably identifies cases of Rett’s disorder in females with autistic symptoms. However, with
an integrated schema, we can ’fill in’ some of the causal ’gaps’ left by the other schemas,
such as what biological dysfunctions are associated with theory of mind deficits, and how
genetic and epigenetic changes can influence neurological and socio-cognitive development.
Therefore, on this account, the disorders currently identified as the autism spectrum are
best explained as complex conditions with biological, cognitive and social features, and are
the result of complex interactions between causes at these levels of description. I argue in
what follows that such an explanatory framework may be the most powerful for explaining
and predicting the causes and progression of psychiatric conditions like those on the autism
spectrum.
6.2.2 Integrated Explanation Schema and the Criteria for Ade-
quate Explanation Patterns in Psychiatry
An integrated schema may better represents what the causal structures of psychiatric con-
ditions seem to be, based on the limited causal data that has been obtained. That is,
an integrated schema seems to fit better with the heterogeneous nature of the psychiatric
disorders listed in the various categories of the DSM. Recall that some conditions listed in
the DSM seem to be primarily biological in nature, such as ASD and schizophrenia, and
thus biological primary causes such as genetic mutations, epigenetic mutations, and neu-
rological malfunctions may bear most of the explanatory weight. However, some disorders
seem to be primarily social in nature, such as eating disorders or post-traumatic stress
disorder. In the case of these conditions, social or environmental primary causes may carry
much of the explanatory weight. However, each of the specific schemas will still have the
same basic explanatory pattern, and can be incorporated into a larger explanatory frame-
work where the primary causes and their effects are linked to malfunctions or changes at
the other levels identified in the integrated schema. Elucidating how the primary causes
of each disorder influence the other levels identified in the schema will help differentiate
125
each disorder in terms of its primary causes, as well as its social and cognitive symptoms.
Although each condition in the DSM likely has biological, cognitive and social features,
and thus could potentially be explained using an integrated schema, the specific causal
explanation for each disorder will be distinct, and may privilege or emphasize one or more
levels over others, such as the explanation of Rett’s disorder just discussed. Thus, although
this integrated schema is complex and identifies multiple potential primary causes, it meets
all the criteria for adequate explanation patterns outlined in chapter 2.
The first criteria that adequate schemas must meet is empirical support. While the
causal data is still ongoing, there is good empirical support for most of the causal theories
of ASD discussed in this thesis. If these theories continue to be supported by more research,
clinicians and theorists can help to further identify and elucidate the parts of the inter-
level mechanism, and how these parts interact. Causal theories such as the theory of
mind hypothesis has good empirical support, as do the epigenetic data on Rett’s disorder.
Further, the mirror neuron research and the genetic studies discussed in chapters four and
five may gain further support as research into the causes of ASD continues. If the causal
theories included in the explanation pattern given below continue to gain good empirical
support, this integrated schema may be the best way to capture the fundamental biological,
cognitive and social features of these conditions. Even if continuing research reveals very
different causes and processes in the development of each disorder on the autism spectrum,
an integrated schema will likely be the most powerful for explaining these conditions and
identifying each of them in the clinical population.
The second criterion is internal consistency. Using an integrated schema may help to
link the various causal theories of ASD in a consistent and powerful way. Although the
causal processes are complex, clinicians may be able to explain multiple primary causes
could interact to produce the characteristic symptoms of conditions like ASD. The story
goes something like this: certain genetic and epigenetic changes cause impairments in neu-
rological development. These impairments in neurological development result in patterns
of neurological dysfunction, such as a malfunctioning mirror neuron system. Certain pat-
terns of neurological dysfunction like a malfunctioning mirror neuron system are implicated
in the development of certain cognitive impairments, such as an underdeveloped theory of
mind. Cognitive deficits like an underdeveloped theory of mind cause the characteristic
symptoms of ASD, which are impairments in social interaction and communication, and
stereotyped behaviours. On this account, the characteristic symptoms of ASD are caused
by the interactions between causes at the biological, cognitive and social levels. Interactions
between causes at multiple levels occur through processes such as genetic and epigenetic
mutations, which can affect neurological development and functioning. The characteristic
symptoms of ASD, impairments in social interaction and communication and stereotyped
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behaviours, can be mitigated through intensive behavioural interventions, which are de-
signed to scaffold the developmental precursors to theory of mind, such as imitation and
pretense. Thus, while speculative, this schema is potentially internally consistent.
However, an explanation of psychiatric conditions like those on the autism spectrum
must also have predictive validity. While there is still much that is unknown about the
causal structures and causal processes that result in the development of psychiatric symp-
toms, the causal data that has been gathered seems to indicate that these phenomena
are not syndromes with unity, but are the result of multiple causes interacting to produce
particular symptoms. Thus, psychiatric conditions such as ASD are complex phenomena,
and being able to identify their characteristic features at multiple levels is a more powerful
way to identify these conditions, since there is no one primary cause or tell-tale sign that
a patient has a particular psychiatric disorder. Therefore, as many theorists discussed
in this thesis argue, psychiatric conditions are best explained as breakdowns in complex
interactive mechanisms. The integrated schema may be powerful enough to be able to ex-
plain and predict the development and progression of disorders such as those on the autism
spectrum, even though there is more than one primary cause involved (with the exception
of Rett’s disorder) and these primary causes occur at different levels of description. Thus,
an integrated explanation pattern is parsimonious, even though it identifies more than one
primary cause, and the primary causes it identifies are at different levels of description.
Since psychiatric conditions like those on the autism spectrum are not syndromes with
unity, the causal processes and the development of the cognitive and behavioural symp-
toms do not have a law-like relationship. However, the casual processes involved in the
development of conditions like ASD can be explained in terms of the relations between the
parts of a mechanism, the activities of those parts, and the interactions between the parts
of the mechanism to produce the phenomena in question, in this case the characteristic
symptoms of ASD. Like most of the other schemas discussed in this thesis, the integrated
explanation pattern is mechanistic.
However, like conditions such as major depression and alcoholism discussed above, the
development and progression of the conditions on the autism spectrum (with the exceptio
of Rett’s disorder) is the result of complex interactions between the primary causes iden-
tified at the biological, cognitive and social levels. Thus, the fourth criterion for adequate
explanation patterns is that not just a mechanistic explanation, but a multi-level mecha-
nistic explanation. As indicated above, the integrated explanation pattern is multi-level,
since it includes the biological levels (genetic and epigenetic causal theories), the cogni-
tive level (cognitive causal theories like theory of mind), and also mentions the social or
environmental levels of explanation as well.
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The final criterion for adequate explanation patterns for psychiatric conditions is that
it must not just identify the primary causes at multiple levels, but explain the interaction
between these primary causes. The integrated schema is interactionist, since the genetic,
epigenetic, cognitive neurological, cognitive and social levels interact with each other to
produce the symptoms of psychiatric conditions like ASD. If processes like epigenetics and
epigenetic changes in neurological functioning were better understood, the link between
epigenetic changes and neurological dysfunction can explain some of the causal interactions.
Thus, processes like epigenetics can explain some of the interactions between causes at
different levels of description, such as the interaction between causes at the neurological and
genetic levels. If the interactions between neurological dysfunction and patterns of cognitive
impairment were better understood, such as how a malfunctioning mirror neuron system
is associated with a theory of mind deficit, that would also help to explain the interactions
between the neurological and cognitive levels. If this integrated explanation schema does
give the right basic structure to the explanation (identifying a stable cluster of causal
properties), and these clusters of causal properties can be understood mechanistically,
then further research can begin to elucidate the interactions between causes at multiple
levels included in the mechanism.
While an integrated schema seems to have the advantage of including multiple levels,
there are also concerns about such as what levels to include, and how each or all of these
levels will be emphasized or integrated into the overall schema. In the case of psychiatric
disorders such as ASD, alcoholism, and major depression, we can restrict the levels included
in the explanation to those that seem to be more fundamental than others. For instance,
the genetic, epigenetic, neurological, cognitive neurological, cognitive and social levels seem
to be implicated in the development of most psychiatric disorders, including ASD. These
levels of description are also identified in the more powerful explanation schemas discussed
in this thesis. However, some psychiatric disorders may not have primary causes at all of
the levels identified in the integrated explanation pattern generated here. For example,
disorders such as Down’s syndrome and Rett’s disorder have primary causes at the genetic
and epigenetic levels, which are a third 21st chromosome in the case of Down’s syndrome
and a mutation in the MeC2P gene in the case of Rett’s. On the other hand, some
psychiatric disorders, such as eating disorders, may be explained primarily in terms of
social and cognitive causes, and thus the biological components of these conditions will not
have as much explanatory weight in the schema. Finally, other disorders such as major
depression, anxiety, and eating disorders may need all of these levels to full elucidate the
causal processes involved in their development.
Thus, as more evidence comes in, more powerful and supported causal theories can
help determine what the fundamental causes are, and thus what aspect(s) of the inte-
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grated schema will be emphasized in the explanation of a particular condition. All psychi-
atric disorders can be explained in terms of biological, cognitive and social features, but
certain causal explanations will be more robust or powerful than others, and thus these
explanations will be emphasized when explaining and identifying these conditions, while
the other aspects will flesh out the complete picture of the causal structure and processes
involved in the development of a particular psychiatric condition. There are also levels
within the levels included in the integrated schema, for instance the neurological level
can be further broken down into levels such as neurological systems, individual neurons,
neurotransmitters, neuromolecular, etc. These more specific levels may/can be integrated
and/or emphasized in explanations of particular psychiatric disorders, depending on what
causal evidence is found for a particular condition. Therefore, the integrated schema gen-
erated above may be the most powerful explanation schema for psychiatric disorders in
general, and the causal evidence from ongoing research can also help inform what levels to
include in an explanation of a particular disorder.
I have argued that integrated schema is the most powerful explanation of conditions
such as those on the autism spectrum, because it may be able to differentiate between
psychiatric conditions better than previous schemas discussed in this thesis. Thus, if the
integrated schema is a more discriminating explanation pattern than previous schemas, it
may help improve the explanatory and predictive power of psychiatric diagnosis. If this
integrated schema is indeed the most powerful, this shows that a cause-based diagnostic
system for psychiatry is feasible, even though the causation in psychiatric conditions is
complex and heterogenous. It helps to look at more ambiguous or tougher diagnostic cases
to show that the integrated schema is the most powerful one for explaining the complex
causation involved in the development of psychiatric disorders. If an integrated schema
can help with these ambiguous or tougher cases, it may be robust enough to inform a
cause-based diagnostic and classification framework in psychiatry, and may help improve
the explanatory and predictive power of psychiatric diagnosis and classification. Diagnostic
categories may have better validity and reliability if diagnostic categories were informed
by integrated causal schemas such as this one.
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Chapter 7
The Ethical Implications of
Cause-Based Diagnosis of Psychiatric
Conditions
7.1 Introduction
The preceding chapters addressed the metaphysical and epistemological issues that a cause-
based diagnostic and classification system for psychiatry present. I investigated whether
the explanatory and predictive power of the diagnosis and classification of psychiatric con-
ditions such as those on the autism spectrum could be improved if psychiatry adopts a
cause-based framework in place of a symptom-based framework. The causation involved in
the development of psychiatric conditions is complex and multi-directional, and thus only
some explanatory patterns will be powerful enough to inform a cause-based diagnostic
and classification system. I examined the difficulties in generating causal explanations of
psychiatric conditions such as those on the autism spectrum, and developed a preliminary
list of criteria for adequate explanation patterns in psychiatry. I then used these crite-
ria to evaluate different explanatory patterns of ASD from past and present conceptual
frameworks in psychiatry and clinical psychology. I argue only explanatory patterns that
are mechanistic and identify primary causes interacting at multiple levels will be able to
adequately capture the complex and multi-directional causation involved in the develop-
ment of conditions such as ASD. Chapter 6 argued that an integrated explanatory pattern
informed by fields such as epigenetics, genetics, cognitive neuroscience and cognitive psy-
chology may meet the criteria for adequate explanation patterns outlined in chapter 2,
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and thus may be able to help inform a cause-based diagnostic and classification system in
psychiatry.
I also briefly argued that explanatory patterns that meet the criteria for adequate
explanation patterns in psychiatry, such as an integrated explanatory pattern, may help
to further justify two-stage realist accounts of psychiatric conditions, such as Wakefield’s
Harmful Dysfunction analysis (e.g. Wakefield, 1992, 1997, etc.). While developing a realist
account of psychiatric conditions is beyond the scope of this thesis, chapter 1 argued that
psychiatric disorders may have the same causal structure as many diseases and disorders
treated by other branches of medicine. If this is correct, psychiatric conditions are as ”real”
as conditions such as lung cancer and type-II diabetes.
However, there are several ethical issues that arise if psychiatry adopts a cause-based
diagnostic framework. These ethical issues are of two types: those that concern the di-
agnostic practices themselves, and those that concern the policy and social implications
of changes to classification and diagnosis. I will discuss each of these ethical concerns,
both with respect to autism spectrum disorders, but also with respect the treatment and
diagnosis of psychiatric conditions in general. Many of the arguments put forward in this
thesis can be applied to the classification and diagnosis of other psychiatric disorders, and
a shift to a cause-based diagnostic framework will affect the legal and social status of these
conditions as well.
In what follows, I examine whether explaining the conditions on the autism spectrum
using an integrated explanation pattern can help to address the ethical issues of resource
allocation, meeting and managing health care needs of individuals with ASD in a more
effective way, and reducing the harmful false beliefs about these conditions. This thesis
argues that basing diagnostic categories on causal theories from fields like epigenetics and
neuroscience may make diagnostic boundaries less arbitrary, increase the explanatory and
predictive power of diagnosis, and increase the effectiveness of treatment.
First, I discuss the ethical dilemmas that can arise in diagnostic practices themselves.
If the disorders on the autism spectrum are best explained as the result of breakdowns in
complex biologically-based inter-level mechanisms, a better understanding of the genetic,
neurological and developmental characteristics of these conditions may re-draw diagnos-
tic boundaries. If diagnostic categories are based on causal theories from fields such as
epigenetics and neuroscience, diagnostic categories may have increased explanatory and
predictive power, which increases the reliability and validity of psychiatric diagnosis. More
accurate diagnosis may reduce the amount of time and resources needed to obtain a defini-
tive diagnosis of ASD, and may reduce the costs involved in clinician and physician visits
in the diagnostic process. Further, more accurate diagnosis may allow children with ASD
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and their families to have access to treatment programs earlier in the child’s development,
which can make treatment more effective. Finally, I analyze how the costs of diagnosis and
treatment of autism spectrum disorders will be affected by a cause-based system. I argue
that while some of the costs involved in diagnostic procedures will increase, the overall
costs over the individual’s lifespan will be reduced.
The second issue I discuss is how the possible changes to diagnostic practices dis-
cussed in this thesis will influence legislative and policy decisions regarding the allocation
of resources for the treatment of ASD. There have been several cases brought before the
provincial and Supreme Courts of Canada petitioning for increased funding for Intensive
Behavioural Intervention/Applied Behavioural Analysis treatment programs. Most of the
provinces provide some funding for IBI/ABA programs, but the amount and extent of
funding varies between the provinces. I discuss the possible impact of a shift to a cause-
based diagnostic system and a better understanding of the causes of ASD using two recent
Canadian cases: Auton v British Columbia and Wynberg v. Ontario. I suggest that ex-
plaining ASD as a complex biologically-based disorders may help support for the plaintiffs’
claims that the deficits and characteristic symptoms of these conditions are severe enough
and unique enough that treatment should be considered medically necessary under the
Canada Health Act, and the provinces of British Columbia and Ontario should expand
their funding of treatment programs.
The third issue I discuss is the social implications of a cause-based classification and
diagnostic framework for psychiatric conditions. I discuss the potential changes to lay con-
cepts of both ASD and psychiatric conditions in general. I argue that explaining ASD as
the result of breakdowns in biologically-based inter-level mechanisms may help to further
reduce the prevalence of ’myths’ regarding these conditions that still have a significant im-
pact on lay views of these conditions. A better understanding of the causes and progression
of these conditions and how treat them may help to finally dispel the false, but still popular,
beliefs that autism is caused by the MMR vaccine or poor parenting. Understanding ASD
as biologically-based conditions may also help to alleviate feelings of responsibility parents
might have for the diagnosis of autism their child receives. Finally, if other psychiatric
conditions are also best explained using an integrated explanation pattern, such causal
explanations may help to further reduce the stigma associated with other conditions in the
DSM.
A shift to a cause-based diagnostic and classification framework will not automatically
resolve the many ethical issues involved in the diagnosis and treatment of psychiatric
disorders, and in the allocation of resources for diagnosis and treatment. However, I argue
that while some direct medical costs involved in diagnosis and treatment may increase,
the overall amount of time, resources, financial costs, legal boundaries, and social stigmas
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associated with ASD and other psychiatric conditions are reduced. Thus, a shift to a
cause-based diagnostic and classification framework may have positive consequences not
just in the possible improvements in diagnosis and treatment, but in the legal and social
realms as well.
7.2 Ethical Issues in the Diagnosis and Treatment of
Autism Spectrum Disorders
As stated in earlier chapters, the current classification and diagnostic system is plagued
with problems regarding diagnostic reliability and validity. Currently, ASD represent a
spectrum of conditions included in one diagnostic category, based on the similarity of
symptoms across these conditions. Chapter 1 discussed the five disorders currently iden-
tified as part of the autism spectrum: autistic disorder, childhood disintegrative disorder,
Rett’s disorder, Asperger’s syndrome, and pervasive developmental disorder not otherwise
specified (PDD-NOS).
Chapter 2 discussed the current diagnostic criteria for ASD. These criteria overlap
with the criteria for other disorders of childhood, such as mental retardation and childhood
coordination disorder, since ASD share a number of symptoms with these conditions. Thus,
there is much ambiguity in the diagnostic boundaries of ASD as a spectrum, and in the
boundaries between disorders on the spectrum. Children with autistic disorder often have
IQs and behavioural impairments similar to children with mental retardation, and share
language and motor impairments with other disorders of childhood. On the other end of
the spectrum, children and adults with Asperger’s syndrome may seem simply eccentric,
shy or awkward, and may not be diagnosed with a disorder at all if the symptoms are
mild. Such blurring at the ends of the continuum that represents ASD can make proper
diagnosis and effective treatment difficult.
Further, much of the costs associated with autism spectrum disorders involve the di-
agnostic process. Misdiagnosis can incur more costs for the parents of children with ASD,
for clinicians, and for society at large. An incorrect diagnosis can lead to the wrong treat-
ment being prescribed, which may not be designed to address the unique deficits that are
characteristic of ASD. Also, a re-diagnosis requires more interviews with clinicians and
physicians, and in the case of ASD, a reassessment of what sort of special education a child
will receive. Thus, re-diagnosis can be costly, both in terms of direct medical costs and the
costs of educational assessment and assistance.
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7.2.1 Diagnostic Accuracy and Better Access to Treatment
Integrated patterns of explanation can be used to elucidate the causal structures of many
different types of psychiatric disorders, since the different explanatory levels can carry
more or less weight depending on the nature of the primary causes. For instance, some
disorders may have more or most primary causes at the social level, rather than the biolog-
ical or cognitive, such as post-traumatic stress disorder or adjustment disorders. On the
other hand, conditions like alcoholism discussed in chapter 6, can have primary causes at
the biological, cognitive and social levels. Integrated explanation patterns for psychiatric
conditions may generate more refined diagnostic criteria, and may help to draw sharper
diagnostic boundaries around these conditions.
Causal theories from epigenetics, genetics, cognitive neuroscience and cognitive psy-
chology may help to better determine whether a child should be diagnosed with autism
spectrum disorder or another disorder of childhood even if the symptoms are similar. Fur-
ther, causal theories can distinguish between the disorders on the spectrum. Chapter
five discussed the example of Rett’s disorder, an autism spectrum disorder affecting only
female children. Rett’s disorder shares the same pattern of deficits in the same three
socio-cognitive domains as the other disorders on the spectrum, but shares only one as-
pect of the epigenetic mutations thought to cause the other conditions currently identified
as the autism spectrum. Rett’s disorder has a single epimutation as its cause, while the
other disorders on the autistic spectrum have a more complex origin. Thus, identifying
the epimtuation involved in the development of Rett’s disorder could help clinicians to
diagnose female children exhibiting the characteristic symptoms of ASD with more cer-
tainty. More accurate diagnostic categories for the disorders on the autism spectrum can
ensure that children with these conditions are diagnosed and start treatment as soon as
possible. If female children with autistic symptoms are diagnosed as having Rett’s disorder
in a more efficient and certain manner, affected females can enter behavioural intervention
programs earlier in their socio-cognitive development, thus reaping more benefit from these
treatment approaches.
The most effective and popular treatment for children ASD is Lovaas-style Intensive
Behavioural Intervention/Applied Behavioural Analysis programs. These programs use
learning theory and reward contingencies to help the children develop some ability to
communicate and interact, and to reduce self-injurious or maladaptive behaviours. These
treatment programs are designed to scaffold and develop socio-cognitive skills like imitation
and verbal communication, which many researchers argue are important milestones in
the development of theory of mind (Rogers & Williams, 2006; Baron-Cohen et al, 2000).
These skills are delayed or malfunctioning in children with ASD, and interventions are
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designed to develop these skills through the techniques of behavioural management, reward
contingencies and structured interactions with a therapist.
However, there are varying results regarding the efficacy of Lovaas-style intervention
programs, and the overall success achieved by such programs has been debated. Higher
estimates suggest that this style of therapy may be effective in as many as 40% of cases
(Lovaas, 1993, 1987; Motiwala, Gupta, Lilly, Ungar and Coyte, 2006). However, there are
more conservative estimates of the success rate of such programs indicating that sometimes
very limited progress is made, and there are significant individual differences between the
progress made by children in these programs (Motiwala et al 2006). However, Lovaas style
therapy remains the most popular and effective treatment, even if its success is limited to
a smaller number of cases.1
Lovaas (1993; 1987) stated that the earlier the child receives treatment for ASD, the
more effective in ameliorating the severity and progression of symptoms. He (1987; 1993)
states that applied behaviour analysis is effective in improving IQ, language skills, social
interaction and overall levels of functioning if the child receives 40 or more hours a week for
more than 2 years. In the discussion of his results, Lovaas (1987) argues that the younger
the child when the intervention is started, the less severe the symptoms, and the closeness
of the protracted mental age to the child’s chronological age predict greater outcomes for
treatment and a better prognosis. Motiwala et al (2006) also found that individuals with
ASD who received treatment early in life needed less long-term care as adults, and gained
more dependency-free years in their adult lives.
Thus, early and accurate diagnosis for young boys and girls may help to ensure that
the predicting factors for successful interventions are in the child’s favour. Further, a
more accurate account of the underlying causes of the deficits in communication, social
interaction and behaviour can help design more targeted and effective treatments. In turn,
a better understanding of the development of the impairments in the three socio-cognitive
domains can help to determine what the goals of the intervention should be, and what
cognitive-behavioural techniques are best suited to ameliorating the symptoms of ASD.
7.2.2 Parent and Educator Interactions with Children with ASD
A better understanding of the causes and development of the symptoms of the conditions
on the autism spectrum may help parents of children with ASD to interact with their
1it should also be noted that there are newer systems of IBI/ABA, such as the Denver Start Model
developed by Sally Rogers and her colleagues that also attempt to scaffold socio-cognitive and language
skills. For instance, see Rogers & Dawson (2009).
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children in less stressful and more effective ways. First, understanding these conditions as
complex conditions involving causes at the biological, cognitive and social levels can help
parents have a better idea of the nature of their children’s symptoms, why they occur, and
how best to deal with their manifestation. Teaching parents how to manage the symptoms
of these conditions in the home can reduce the psychological and emotional stress for both
parents and children. Second, parents can gain the knowledge that the condition is the
result of a complex interaction between genetic, neurological, cognitive and environmental
factors, and not the result of bad parenting or their choice to give their child the MMR
vaccine. Third, increased understanding of the causes of these conditions may reduce the
amount of alternative therapy approaches parents try, which reduces the direct non-medical
costs and stresses associated with ineffective approaches.
A more powerful explanation of the causes of ASD may also affect educational costs
and services associated with these conditions. First, explaining these conditions using an
integrated explanatory pattern may help to prevent anti-immunization behaviours on the
part of parents worried about the link between autism and the MMR vaccine. If anti-
immunization behaviours are reduced, the administrative problems and costs that arise
with unvaccinated children in the school system are also reduced, as is the chance of a
spread of dangerous childhood diseases. Second, a better explanation of the causes of ASD
may also change the way these disorders are understood in relation to other disorders of
childhood, and the nature of educational resources available for children with ASD. Causal
theories from fields such as epigenetics and neuroscience may provide more insight into the
nature of the socio-cognitive deficits that define the conditions on the autism spectrum.
Thus, educators may gain a better understanding of what sort of resources should be
allocated to manage the symptoms of ASD in special education and the regular classroom.
Further, a child with ASD who enters treatment in early childhood treatment may improve
enough in IQ, language and social interaction to be integrated into the regular classroom
environment. More children with ASD who are able to function in the regular classroom
reduces the number of children needing special education services, thereby reducing some
of the costs of these services. Earlier access to IBI/ABA programs depends in part on
a more accurate diagnosis of these conditions, which I argue may result from a shift to
a cause-based framework informed by adequate patterns of explanation for psychiatric
conditions.
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7.2.3 Managing the Costs of Diagnosis and Treatment for Autism
Spectrum Disorders
A final report was submitted to the Standing Senate Committee on Social Affairs, Science
and Technology in March of 2007 regarding the care and treatment currently available
for Canadians with ASD and their families. The report (2007) states that the Commit-
tee ”heard repeatedly during its hearings that ASD families often have a single income
earner because the second parent must stay home to care for the affected child or children.
Frequently, the earning parent must also take on a second job in order to pay the high
cost of ASD care and treatment. Witnesses explained that this results in pushing the
income earner into a higher tax bracket, reducing the effect of the medical expense tax
credit (p. 27).” The report (2007) further states that ”The Committee fully supports the
view expressed by families with autistic children and autistic individuals themselves that
governments must pay now; otherwise, they will pay later. We believe that the latter is
simply not an option (p. 30).”
Parents of children with ASD face expenses in several areas, both financial and emo-
tional. Financial expenses individuals with ASD and their families face are in the form of
direct medical costs, non-direct medical costs, productivity costs in terms of loss of pay,
and the obstacles to achieving higher-paying employment. Direct medical costs include
things like physician and specialist visits, drugs, transportation to physician visits and
therapy sessions, and behavioural interventions. Direct non-medical costs include things
like out-of-home services, developmental services, day programs, and child care. Indirect
costs include the loss of wages and opportunities for individuals with ASD, which occur
as a result of the symptoms of these conditions. The parents and family members of peo-
ple with these disorders also experience a loss of wages and employment opportunities,
since much of their time is devoted to caring for these individuals (Ganz, in Moldin &
Rubenstein, 2006).
Ganz (2006) highlights several other areas in which there are heavy costs for individuals
with ASD and their families. These areas include 1) legal costs to secure services, 2)
value of lost productivity of individuals other than parents, 3) level of psychological stress
that people with ASD and their families endure 4) costs of genetic testing, 5) full costs
of alternative therapies, such as special diets or vitamin regimens, 6) costs associated
with adverse outcomes of potentially dangerous treatments, and 7) effects of changes in
immunization-avoidance behaviours. In this section, I argue that while a cause-based
framework may increase some costs involved in the treatment of these disorders, it will
reduce costs in several areas. The brief cost-benefit analysis I give here indicates that a
shift to a cause-based diagnostic framework is a viable solution to some of the financial
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problems related to diagnosis and treatment of these disorders.
Interventions are intensive behavioural modification programs that are expensive and
time consuming. Jacobson, Mulick, & Green (1998) estimate that it costs approximately
$37, 537 US per child per year for behavioural interventions. Hildebrand (1999) estimates
that the cost for Canadian citizens seeking treatment for ASD is approximately $45, 053
CAN in 1999, which Ganz estimates to be closer to $65,000 CAN in 2000. Currently,
IBI/ABA programs are partially funded by the provinces, but parents and family mem-
bers still pay a significant amount for such treatment. However, the high costs of the
interventions are not the only financial obstacle individuals with ASD and their families
face.
As stated in the report to the Standing Senate Committee on Social Affairs, Technology
and Science (2007), parents of autistic children often have to switch to lower-paying but
more flexible employment in order to care for them. Such an occupational change can place
financial constraints on the amount and type of resources parents are able to secure for
their child. Ganz (2006) estimates that the average income loss for parents of children with
ASD to be up to $46,033, depending on the level of the child’s disability. However, ASD
are pervasive disorders that will continue to manifest throughout the individual’s life time,
and there is a pressing need to provide services for individuals with these disorders as they
reach adulthood. However, care of adults with ASD can also be expensive. For instance,
Ganz (2006) argues it can cost up to $3.2 million dollars US to care for an individual
with autism spectrum disorders over the lifespan, and about $35 billion dollars to care
for all individuals with ASD in the United States across their lifetimes. For Canadians,
Hildebrand et al (1999) estimate that the cost of day programs for adults with ASD to be
$13, 168 CAN to $25, 937 CAN, depending on the individual’s level of disability. They
(1999) also argue that special education of children with ASD can cost up to $28, 216
dollars, which Ganz adjusts to up to $39, 599 in Canadian rates from the year 2000.
The figures discussed above are based on the current state of diagnostic practices, and
on the type of treatment typically available to individuals with autism spectrum disorders.
If a cause-based framework is informed by causal theories from fields such as epigenetics,
there will likely be a larger role for genetic testing and neuroimaging technologies in the
diagnostic process. The cost of genetic or neurological testing procedures is likely to
be great, and the availability of such resources for diagnostic and treatment practices
may place additional strain on the already scarce resources allocated to mental health
care and the services focused on those with developmental delays. Thus, a cause-based
diagnostic system informed by an integrated explanation pattern may increase direct and
non-direct medical costs for individuals with ASD and their families. However, a cause-
based diagnostic framework can help to reduce the costs of autism treatment in several of
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the areas Ganz (2006) discusses.
I argue that cause-based diagnosis of ASD may have better explanatory and predictive
power, which may make diagnosis more accurate. If diagnosis is more accurate, individu-
als with ASD may save costs in terms of re-diagnosis, re-assessment of one’s legal rights
based on re-diagnosis, and the amount of care individuals with these conditions may re-
quire over their lifetimes. Further, more accurate diagnosis may help to secure earlier
access to behavioural interventions, which may reduce the amount of treatment and re-
sources these individuals need as adults. Motiwala et al (2006) conducted a cost benefit
analysis of the financial gains and therapeutic benefits of IBI/ABA programs in Ontario.
They (2006) argue that even if such therapy has limited success, government funding of
IBI/ABA programs saves significant costs, not just for the individuals with ASD and their
families, but for the provincial government as well. Motiwala et al (2006) argue even the
current amount and duration of IBI/ABA treatment funded by the Ontario government
can result in a gain of ’dependency free years’ where individuals with ASD need less health
care and social assistance from the province as adults. Further, they argue that expanding
IBI care in Ontario past the age of 6 results in more dependency free years, and more
improvements in cognitive and social functioning across individuals with these conditions.
A gain in dependency-free years saves costs for the Ontario government in the long-term
care of individuals with ASD over their lifetimes. These theorists (2006) estimate that ex-
panding current the funding of ABA/IBI programs in Ontario could result in a savings of
$45,133,011 in 2003 Canadian dollars, based on gains in dependency free years by individ-
uals with ASD treated with these programs.Thus, early access to behavioural intervention
programs may reduce the number of physician visits, reduce the amount of time and re-
sources parents must spend to help manage the symptoms as the child develops, and the
total cost of care for individuals with ASD throughout their lifespans.
7.3 Legal Issues and the Social Status of ASD and
Psychiatric Conditions
The last section argued that a cause-based diagnostic framework may save costs and re-
sources involved in the treatment and care of individuals with ASD, their families, and the
health care and education systems. However, the legal system plays a large role in how
much access one has to the diagnostic and treatment resources. A cause-based diagnostic
classification and diagnostic framework may change the boundaries and clustering of dis-
orders drastically based on a better understanding of the causes of psychiatric conditions.
Re-drawing diagnostic boundaries can sometimes lead to a change in one’s legal status,
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which may change the amount of resources and access to treatment programs and social
services. This section explores two areas in which theories and data from fields such as
epigenetics, genetics, cognitive neuroscience and cognitive psychology could influence legal
decisions regarding the treatment and care of individuals with ASD in Canada. First,
I discuss the possible impact causal theories of the conditions on the autism spectrum
on legal claims for increased funding for treatment programs. Causal theories of autism
spectrum disorders could play an evidentiary role in legal cases such as those discussed
below. Plaintiffs in Canadian legal cases such as Auton v British Columbia and Wynberg
v Ontario are fighting for increased resources from these provinces for the treatment of
these conditions, on the grounds that ASD involve impairments severe enough, and unique
enough to qualify for expanded funding for IBI/ABA treatment programs. An increased
understanding of the causes of autism spectrum disorders could be used as evidence of
the unique needs of children with these conditions and the importance of early access to
treatment.
Second, I discuss the possible impact of cause-based diagnosis and a better understand-
ing of the causes of ASD on lay beliefs about these conditions and their causes. The beliefs
that ASD are caused by bad parenting or vaccinations still influence lay concepts and
explanations of these conditions. I argue that using an integrated explanation pattern to
identify the causes and progression of ASD can further reduce the tenability of explana-
tions such refrigerator mothers or vaccination, which may reduce the influence of these
false causal theories in popular culture. While the refrigerator mother hypothesis has been
discredited by psychiatrists and clinicians, some parents still believe that their parenting
skills are part of the reason for their child’s symptoms. Feelings of responsibility or guilt
on the part of parents can create more psychological and emotional stress in already diffi-
cult situations, and can negatively affect the interactions between these parents and their
children. If parents had a better understanding of the causes of these condition, feelings
of responsibility and stress levels may be reduced. Also, disproving the vaccine hypothesis
may reduce the amount of anti-immunization behaviours on the part of parents and family
members, which saves both financial and emotional costs that result from not vaccinating
children. Further, a reduction in anti-immunization behaviours may reduce the risk of the
spread dangerous childhood diseases such as measles, mumps and rubella, which can be a
danger if children are unvaccinated.
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7.3.1 Improving the Treatment of Autism Spectrum Disorders
in Canada
The final report to Standing Senate Committee on Social Affairs, Science and Technology
states ”[f]amilies with autistic children in Canada are facing a crisis (2007, p. 11).” Al-
though the treatment and management of the symptoms of ASD is crucial for increasing
the quality of life for individuals with these disorders, the report states ”families must
often pay out of their own pockets for a very large portion of expensive autism therapy
whose cost may reach $60,000 per year because provincial and territorial jurisdictions
offer only limited financial assistance (p. 11).” The report also discussed the need for
specialized care and resources devoted to the treatment and care of individuals with ASD.
Several parents and advocacy groups argued that the funding allocated for children and
adults with disabilities is not sufficient for the ”diverse and substantial needs [individuals
with ASD] have (p. 18)” and further ”that ASD is not always eligible for tax credits or
deductions intended for disability or medical expenses (p. 18).” Further, the committee
also heard testimony regarding the wait time involved in diagnosis and assessment, which
further delays access to treatment programs. Sometimes, parents have to wait months, or
even years, for a diagnosis of ASD only to find that their child was now too old to qualify
for government funded programs.
Because of the extent of the wait times and expenses associated with treatment pro-
grams, parents and family members of individuals with ASD have filed lawsuits arguing
that treatment with IBI/ABA programs should be deemed ’medically necessary’ under
the Canada Health Act, and that increased funding for these programs should be required
of provinces such as Ontario and British Columbia. For instance, in 2000, four families
from British Columbia filed a lawsuit against the province, stating that the treatment of
autism spectrum disorders in the form of intensive behavioural interventions (IBI) should
be considered ’medically necessary’ under the Canada Health Act. Plaintiffs in Auton v.
British Columbia argued that not funding IBI programs for children with ASD constituted
discrimination under sections 7 and 15 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms (see Auton
et al. v. British Columbia 2000), since funding for treatment and services for children
with other disabilities is provided by these provinces. British Columbia Superior Court
Madam Justice Allan found that the province’s narrow interpretation of medically neces-
sary treatment was discriminatory to individuals with ASD on the basis of their disability
(Auton, 2000 paras 126, 129; Tiedemann, 2008). Madam Justice Allan concluded that the
province’s decision to not fund IBI programs was based on the premise that treatment
for children with ASD was of limited success and effectiveness. However, she found that
access to early IBI programs was necessary to reduce the marginalization and exclusion of
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children with ASD in society (Auton, 2000 para 127; Tidemann, 2008).
The province of British Columbia appealed the British Columbia’s Superior Court’s
decision, and the case was heard by the Supreme Court of Canada in 2004. Madam Chief
Justice McLachlin found that while the Canada Health Act requires that provinces fund
’core services’ that are medically necessary, the Act does not require that all medically
necessary treatments are funded. Currently IBI/ABA programs for the treatment of ASD
lies outside the ’core’ services covered under the CHA (Auton, 2004 paras. 35,36; Tiede-
mann, 2008). Madam Chief Justice McLachlin found ”[t]here is no evidence suggesting that
the governments approach to ABA/IBI therapy was different than its approach to other
comparable, novel therapies for non-disabled persons or persons with a different type of
disability. In the absence of such evidence, a finding of discrimination cannot be sustained
(Auton, 2004, para 62).” Thus, the Supreme Court of Canada found that the province of
British Columbia was not required to fund IBI/ABA programs under the Canada Health
Act.
Tiedemann (2008) states that while the plaintiffs in Auton v. British Columbia lost
their case, the case did bring out a number of positive consequences. First, she states
the trial motivated the province of British Columbia to expand a small pilot
treatment program into policy. That province now delivers autism intervention
services through three programs: Autism Funding, Under Age 6; Autism Fund-
ing, Ages 6-18; and Early Intensive Behavioural Intervention (EIBI). Under the
first program, families are allocated up to $20,000 per year to purchase autism
intervention. Under the program for children aged 6-18, families are allocated
up to $6,000 annually; and under the EIBI program, some treatment and in-
tervention services for children under age 6 are delivered through contracted
agencies (p. 9).
Second, the case brought the issue of government funding of ASD treatment into the
public eye. Tiedemann (2008) notes that an Ipsos-Reid poll taken after the conclusion
of Auton trial indicated that 84% of Canadians support public funding of IBI programs.
Third, there were a number of petitions placed before Parliament to expand the CHA to
include IBI/ABA as medically necessary treatment. Fourth, the Auton case motivated
other families in provinces such as Ontario to petition the courts for increased funding for
the treatment of ASD.
For instance, the Ontario Superior Court of Justice heard Wynberg v. Ontario, where
the plaintiffs argued that access to IBI/ABA programs was a right under the Education Act
(Wynberg v. Ontario, 2006; Tiedemann, 2008). While the province of Ontario does fund
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IBI/ABA programs, the funding is only provided for children aged 2-5. Before and after
ages 2-5, parents and families must bear the cost of treatment and services. The plaintiffs
in Wynberg v Ontario argued that the cut-off age of 5 discriminated against children with
ASD outside of that age bracket based on their age. Madam Justice Kiteley ruled in favour
of the plaintiffs, and rewarded damages to compensate the plaintiffs for the costs of past
and future IBI/ABA treatment (Wynberg, 2006 paras. 4, 792, 808, 871-872; Tiedemann,
2008). However, the government of Ontario successfully appealed the ruling by Madam
Justice Kiteley in the Ontario Court of Appeals. On July 7 2006, the Ontario Court of
Appeals found that plaintiffs in Wynberg v Ontario had failed to adequately establish their
claims of age discrimination. The families involved in the Wynberg case attempted to have
the decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal reversed in the Supreme Court of Canada, but
the Supreme Court refused their application for an appeal on April 12 2007 (Tiedeman,
2008).
While the families in both Auton and Wynberg ultimately lost their cases in the Supreme
Court, these cases are interesting to examine for a number of reasons. These lawsuits were
filed to change policies regarding the allocation of resources to children with ASD based
on these disorders’ severity, and on their similarity and differences of the impairments in
ASD compared to other developmental disorders. Causal theories and data regarding the
conditions on the autism spectrum may play an evidentiary role in any future lawsuits
filed on grounds similar to those in Auton and Wynberg. Explaining the conditions on the
autism spectrum using an integrated pattern may help to provide support for the pressing
need for children with ASD to enter IBI programs as soon as possible, for which an accurate
diagnosis is necessary.
First, an integrated explanation pattern for ASD may help to identify the interactions
between the biological and environmental aspects of these conditions, which emphasizes
the importance of the early environment in the development of these conditions. If ASD
are best explained as conditions that result from breakdowns in complex interactive mech-
anisms, the early environment plays an important role in the development, progression
and severity of the symptoms of these conditions. Second, a better understanding of the
causes and progression of these conditions may help to make distinctions between the im-
pairments and needs of individuals with ASD compared to other developmental disorders.
A better understanding of the similarities and differences to other developmental disorders
provide more data that can inform legal decisions when comparing the needs of individuals
with ASD to those with other conditions, to help determine whether treatment for ASD
should be considered ’medically necessary.’ According to the autism research discussed in
earlier chapters, the conditions on the autism spectrum are similar to other developmental
disorders in that they are all biologically-based disorders with strong genetic components
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in their etiologies. Both ASD and other developmental disorders have an early onset,
and all of these conditions persist throughout the lifespan. However, if these conditions
are best explained using an integrated pattern, ASD are unique in terms of characteristic
symptoms and the progression of these symptoms, which are the result of complex inter-
actions between genetic, neurological, cognitive and environmental causes. Although some
of the genes may be shared between the conditions on the autism spectrum and other
developmental disorders, if they are best explained using an integrated pattern, they are a
distinct set of conditions with primary causes and interactions between these causes that
may be distinguished from the interactions and primary causes in the development of other
developmental disorders.
7.3.2 False Beliefs, Myths and Stigmas Associated with ASD and
Psychiatric Conditions
The final report to the Standing Senate Committee on Social Affairs, Science and Tech-
nology (2007) discussed above also highlighted the importance of public awareness of the
causes and symptoms of ASD and awareness of the special needs of individuals with these
conditions. The report (2007) states:
”Throughout the course of the hearings on this difficult subject, witnesses iden-
tified a clear need for a national public awareness campaign. The Committee
agrees that there is a general lack of understanding among Canadians about
autism and its spectrum of disabilities and feels that a greater understanding
of ASD by all Canadians could help to reduce the stress experienced by these
individuals and their families. The general population should be made aware
of the associated early signs and symptoms in order that parents might pursue
assessment of their child at the youngest possible age (p. 22-23).
Several myths and misconceptions continue to misrepresent and exacerbate the difficulties
individuals with ASD and their families face, and generate stigma and misunderstanding
of these conditions in Canadian society.
Herbert,Sharp & Gaudiano (2002) argue that ”several factors render autism especially
vulnerable to etiological ideas and intervention approaches that make bold claims, yet are
inconsistent with established scientific theories and unsupported by research (Herbert &
Sharp, 2001) (citation in original, para 3).” These theorists argue that since the diagnosis
of ASD can be emotionally and financially devastating for families of individuals with these
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conditions, ”[p]arents are typically highly motivated to attempt any promising treatment,
rendering them vulnerable to promising ’cures.’ The unremarkable physical appearance
of autistic children may contribute to the proliferation of pseudoscientific treatments and
theories of etiology...The normal appearance of autistic children may lead parents, caretak-
ers, and teachers to become convinced that there must be a completely ’normal’ or ’intact’
child lurking inside the normal exterior (para 3).” Believing that ASD can be prevented
or cured by dubious or untested methods (such as avoiding vaccination or special diets)
can be detrimental to accessing the proper care and treatment that individuals with these
conditions need.
Herbert et al (2002) discuss several of the ’myths’ associated with the causes of autism
spectrum disorders and how best to treat them. They (2002) argue that some of these
’theories’ of ASD are pseudoscientific as best, and harmful to individuals with these con-
ditions and their families at worst. For instance, although there is no evidence that poor
parenting on the part of the mother causes ASD, the psychoanalytic hypothesis of ’refriger-
ator mothers’ still remains in popular culture. As discussed in chapter 3, the ’refrigerator
mother’ hypothesis was popular during the era of psychoanalysis, but continued in the
mental health literature and lay concepts of these conditions long after psychoanalysis fell
out of favour. Analysts such as Bettelheim (1967) and Mahler (1952; 1958) argued that
ASD were caused by frigid, emotionally unresponsive mothers, and the symptoms of these
conditions were defense mechanisms against emotionally unavailable mothers. Bettelheim
(1967) argued that a ’parentectomy’ was necessary for the improvement of children with
these conditions, advocating the removal of the child from the parent’s care. Blaming the
parents of children with ASD for their condition is unfair, unwarranted given the empirical
evidence to the contrary, and harmful to the relationship between these parents and their
children.
Another myth that can be detrimental to individuals with ASD, their families, and to
accurate lay concepts of these conditions is the ’vaccine hypothesis.’ This myth, although
false, is pervasive and remains a popular theory of the causes of the conditions on the
autism spectrum. The supposed evidence for this hypothesis comes from the increase
in the prevalence of ASD over the last two decades or so, which as roughly coincided
with the widespread use of the measles, mumps, rubella (MMR) vaccine starting in 1979
(Herbert et al, 2002). Also cited as evidence is the fact that the administering of the
MMR vaccine coincides with the age when diagnoses of ASD are usually made in children.
Finally, the MMR vaccine was identified in a now-discredited study as the cause of autism
spectrum disorders. Originally published in the scientific journal Lancet, a study by Andrew
Wakefield and his colleagues (1998) argued that they found cases of ASD in children after
they had received the MMR vaccine. However, no medical evidence has ever been found
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that supports a causal link between the MMR vaccine and ASD. Further, the evidence
Wakefield et al (1998) presented has been greatly debated, and recently recanted by The
Lancet in 2010. However, despite the lack of medical evidence, the vaccine hypothesis
was reported and discussed in popular media, and was adopted by many people in the lay
community.
The pervasiveness and popularity of the vaccine hypothesis has resulted in many parents
refusing to vaccinate their children for fear of ’causing autism.’ However, not vaccinating
children causes significant administrative problems when the child enters school, since
admission into preschool and elementary school requires that children be vaccinated. Not
vaccinating children against harmful diseases like measles, mumps and rubella can also
result in financial costs and significant loss of time for parents attempting to be exempted
from the vaccination requirement, which are usually not granted on the grounds that
vaccines are associated with the development of ASD. However, Herbert et al (2002) argue
that ”the real harm [from the vaccine hypothesis] is the public health concern raised by
encouraging parents to avoid vaccinating their children from serious diseases that can easily
be prevented (para 15).” Thus, the vaccine hypothesis is harmful to individuals with ASD,
since false theories of the causes of these conditions will not reduce, and can exacerbate
the stigma and misconceptions associated with these conditions. Further, this hypothesis
is harmful to parents and families of individuals with these conditions, since believing
that vaccination is the cause of ASD may incur guilt from parents or family members
for the existence of these conditions in their loved ones. Finally, the vaccine hypothesis
is harmful to society at large, both for perpetuating false theories of these conditions,
and for potentially exposing the public to infectious diseases that would be prevented by
vaccination.
However, ASD are not the only psychiatric conditions associated with myths, miscon-
ceptions and unwarranted stigmas. Torvino (2008) states that the National Mental Health
Association, recently renamed Mental Health America, estimate that 71% of Americans
still believe that mental disorders are caused by mental weakness, 65% of people believe
they are the result of poor parenting, and 35% believe that mental disorders are a form
of retribution for sinful behaviour. These statistics indicate a significant amount of the
population believes that mental disorders are the result of moral failings or character flaws,
and that and individuals who suffer from these conditions are blameworthy in some way.
However, if psychiatric conditions have the same causal structure as conditions treated by
other branches of medicine, the stigma attached to them may be reduced.
A better understanding of the causes of psychiatric disorders may help to eliminate the
notion that these conditions mental disorders are the product of a weak will, moral failings,
or poor upbringing. The belief that individuals with mental disorders are blameworthy for
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their conditions may be partially based on the view that mental disorders do not have
physical causes. However, if psychiatric conditions are best explained using an integrated
pattern, they are the products of breakdowns in neurological mechanisms, which are the
result of ongoing interactions between genes and the environment (see Nestler, 2009 for a
discussion of epigenetic explanations of psychiatric conditions such as addiction and major
depression). As I argued in chapter 1, if psychiatric conditions are best explained as the
result of breakdowns in complex, biologically-based interactive mechanisms, they have the
same causal structure of conditions such as cancer, type-II diabetes, obesity and heart
disease, which are also the result of complex interactions between biological and environ-
mental factors. If psychiatric conditions are best explained using an integrated explanation
pattern, they are biologically-based conditions with complex causal interactions, like heart
disease and cancer. Thus, an integrated explanation pattern may provide a better un-
derstanding of the causes of psychiatric conditions, and thus may help collapse the social
distinctions between ’medical’ and ’mental’ disorders.
7.4 Conclusion
Changes in the classification and diagnosis of psychiatric conditions provide an opportu-
nity to examine some longstanding epistemological issues in the philosophy of psychiatry.
Several philosophers and clinicians have argued that classification and diagnosis may be
more accurate if psychiatry adopts a causal framework based on theories from fields such
as neuroscience, genetics, and epigenetics. This thesis used the disorders on the autism
spectrum as a case study to investigate the relationship between patterns of explanation,
diagnosis and classification in psychiatry. I examined the debate regarding whether psy-
chiatric classification and diagnosis should continue to be based on symptoms, or whether
psychiatry should adopt a cause-based framework. I discussed the conceptual and method-
ological problems with the current symptom-based framework identified by theorists who
argue for a shift to a cause-based framework, and identify the classification and diagnostic
issues with ASD as a result of a symptom-based framework. This thesis argued that the
diagnosis and treatment of ASD could be improved by a shift to a cause-based framework.
However, there is much disagreement and debate regarding what sorts of causal ex-
planations are best for psychiatric conditions, given the complexity and heterogeneity of
causes in most psychiatric conditions. I identified and analyzed several obstacles to gener-
ating adequate casual explanations in psychiatry, and discuss arguments by theorists and
clinicians regarding to how to address these obstacles. Through this analysis, I identified
criteria that adequate explanation patterns in psychiatry may need to meet. I apply these
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criteria to various explanation patterns for the disorders on the autism spectrum, based on
the conceptual frameworks in which they were developed, and show that some explanation
patterns can improve the reliability and validity of the diagnosis of these autism spectrum
disorders if the criteria are met. However, this analysis also shows that inadequate ex-
planation patterns for the causes of autism spectrum disorders limit the explanatory and
predictive of the diagnosis of these conditions, which reduces the effectiveness of treat-
ment. Thus, only some explanation patterns for psychiatric conditions and the conditions
on the autism spectrum will be viable candidates for informing a cause-based diagnostic
and classification system. I argued that an integrated explanation pattern may be the
most powerful for explaining the causes and progression of ASD, since this pattern seems
to meet the criteria I identified.
While this thesis mostly concentrated on the epistemological and ethical issues regard-
ing a shift to a cause-based system, the types of explanation patterns that inform this
system could influence metaphysical issues such as realism about psychiatric conditions.
Debates regarding how best to explain, classify and diagnose psychiatric conditions has sig-
nificant impact on the development and justification of realist theories of mental disorders.
If the causes of psychiatric conditions are poorly understood, it is difficult to argue that
these are real, biologically-based conditions and not social constructions (Murphy, 2006).
However, the limited causal information we have about psychiatric conditions indicates
that they are biologically-based conditions that are just as severe and harmful as so-called
medical disorders. Thus, increasing understanding of the causes of psychiatric conditions,
such as those on the autism spectrum, may help to justify realist accounts of these condi-
tions. For instance, if psychiatric conditions are best explained using an integrated pattern,
they have the same causal structure as medical conditions like heart disease and cancer.
If psychiatric conditions are best explained using an integrated explanation pattern, they
are just as ’real’ as medical disorders.
These metaphysical and epistemological questions can inform ethical issues such as the
type and extent of treatment resources for ASD that ought to be publicly funded, and
how causal theories from fields such as epigenetics can further reduce misconceptions and
stigmas associated with the disorders on the autism spectrum and psychiatric conditions
in general. This chapter argued that a cause-based diagnostic framework may help address
these ethical questions. I argued that while a cause-based framework may increase some
costs of the diagnosis of these conditions, the overall costs of diagnosis and care of individ-
uals with ASD will likely be reduced. Further, if the accuracy of diagnosis does improve
with a cause-based system, the overall costs of treatment and care across the lifespan of
individuals with ASD may be reduced. Next, I argued that a better understanding of the
causes of ASD may provide support for legal cases petitioning for more government funding
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for the treatment of ASD in Canada. Families of individuals with ASD often have to pay
for the expenses of treatment and care themselves, which places a significant financial and
emotional burden on the family members. Finally, I argued that a better understanding of
the causes of ASD may help to further reduce the prevalence of myths and misconceptions
about these conditions in society. Thus, adopting a cause-based diagnostic and classifica-
tion framework may help to address ethical issues such as how to reduce the stigma and
misinformation associated with ASD and other psychiatric conditions, and how best to
allocate resources to treat these conditions.
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